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Much depends on the future course of interest rates. 
The decisions of families to make major purchases, the 
willingness of businesses to expand and invest, the rise 
and fall of the economy and stock market, the ability of 
lesser developed countries to repay their debts, the tenure 
of presidents and prime ministers--all of these may turn on 
whether interest rates increase or decrease in the months 
ahead. 
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Several forecasting models developed in the disserta-
tion permit the direction of change of interest rates on 
long-term u.S. government bonds to be forecast correctly 
about 60% of the time. When the different models are com-
bined, effectiveness is increased: and when the forecasts 
are dollar-weighted, performance rates in excess of 70% are 
possible. 
The dissertation reports on one of the first 
applications of powerful techniques recently developed in 
cybernetics, engineering, and artificial intelligence to 
forecasting the direction of change in interest rates. Two 
forecasting algorithms, called linear decision functions or 
linear classifiers, are derived using the principles of 
pattern recognition. Because they are recursively updated, 
both algorithms operate dynamically and adapt their 
performance to changes in the economic environment. One 
classifier, a modification of the widely used least-mean-
squared-error algorithm, permits monthly revision of the 
forecasting model and allows the larger historical move-
ments in interest rates to have greater weight in future 
decisions. The second algorithm permits refinement of the 
parameter estimates generated by the first. 
These formal, mathematical classifiers use financial 
variables suggested by economic theory--leading indicators 
of inflation and investment activity. The raw economic time 
series are computer-enhanced with a detrending algorithm to 
reduce "noise" and extract more information for input into 
the forecasting models. The direction of change of interest 
rates on twenty-year, constant-maturity U.S. government 
bonds is forecast over a one-month time horizon throughout 
the period 1969-82. All forecasts are unconditional and 
ex-ante, i.e., all forecasts refer to periods beyond 
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the time used in estimating model parameters and assume no 
knowledge of future economic events. The results are 
evaluated in comparison with a Bayesian forecasting model 
and a lO,OOO-event Monte Carlo simulation of a random 
decision rule. The forecasting ability of the algorithms is 
statistically significant at the 99% level of confidence. 
These results have both theoretical and practical 
importance. They are of practical interest to investment 
managers who would improve the total return on assets under 
their control, to speculators who would increase profits 
and reduce risk, to treasurers of large corporations who 
would lower the cost of borrowed funds, and to policymakers 
who would reduce uncertainty. The results are of methodol-
ogical interest to forecasters who would be satisfied to 
predict the direction of change in a variable if they were 
not yet able to make reliable point estimates. Finally, 
there is material of interest to those who are uneasy about 
the economic edifice being constructed on the theory of 
rational expectations. In particular, the so-called 
efficient market theory is tested and found wanting. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
It is the most crucial question facing the 
world economy. The answer will determine 
whether millions of Americans will be able to 
afford a new home or a new car, whether U.s. 
companies will undertake new investment to 
propel the recovery on to a sustainable growth 
path, whether the stock market will continue to 
rise, and whether massive defaults by heavily 
indebted developing countries will cause the 
international financial system to collapse. Yet 
aft~r the wild gyrations of the past year, 
businessmen, investors, and economists appear 
more confused than ever over this question: 
Where will interest rates go? 
With that paragraph Business Week (1983) began a 
cover-featured story on interest rates. The objective of the 
research reported here is to find a method for answering the 
"most crucial question"--to find a way to forecast the 
direction of change of interest rates. 
The results should interest several groups: financial 
decision makers in business and industry who borrow or lend 
large sums of money in the nation's capital markets; specu-
lators who seek to profit by correctly predicting swings in 
interest rates; government officials who set economic 
policy; economic theorists who are concerned about questions 
of market efficiency; financial forecasters who are not 
fully satisfied with existing forecasting techniques; and 
those in the systems field who believe that a systems 
perspective can help solve real-world problems. 
First consider the financial decision makers. On 
September 22, 1982, The Wall Street Journal ran a front 
page article, "Baffled Borrowers: Corporate Treasurers Find 
the Rate Outlook Unusually Confusing." 
A prudent finance executive whose company is 
borrowing $100 million at short term can save 
about $10,000 a day just by doing nothing .... 
Over a 10-year period, however, inaction could 
cost the company $20 million or more if it misses 
a window and later has to sell $100 million of 
bonds at a higher interest cost. 
Forecasting interest rates has always been 
tricky because nobody knows what will happen next 
week, much less six months or a year hence •.•• 
Moreover, the penalty for being wrong is much 
higher than it used to be, finance men lament, 
because interest rates have become so volatile. 
Twenty years ago, bond rates moved only fractions 
of a percentage point for months at a time ..•• 
But in just 15 months, from mid-1980 to last fall, 
bond interest rates soared almost six percentage 
points. A company that missed the 1980 window 
and borrowed $100 million last September could 
pay an extra $60 million of interest over 10 
years. 
This Journal article adopts the viewpoint of the 
borrower, the corporation selling bonds to raise needed 
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funds. The other side of the transaction involves the lender 
of funds, the bond purchaser, which may be an insurance 
company, pension fund, or bank trust. The investment 
managers of these institutions face a similar dilemma: to 
buy bonds when returns appear low or to hold out for 
possibly higher returns later. But while higher yields would 
increase the future income received by lenders making new 
investments, the higher rates have a seriously negative 
3 
impact on the value of debt securities already held in 
portfolios. Consider the life insurance business as an 
example. The bond portfolios of life insurance companies 
were reported to exceed $200 billion at the end of 1982 
(American Council of Life Insurance, 1983). Since bond 
prices and interest rates are inversely related, a 1% rise 
in interest rates would reduce the value of these assets by 
perhaps $20 billion. Clearly, changes in interest rates have 
serious financial consequences for borrowers and lenders 
alike. 
It is possible, however, for those who hold fixed-
income securities to use the financial futures markets to 
hedge their risk of capital loss. A futures contract is an 
agreement to buy or sell a specified quantity of a commodity 
at a specified price at some future date (Horn and Farah, 
1979). The commodity involved in financial futures contracts 
is a security. For example, futures contracts for u.S. 
Government bonds are traded in $100,000 units on the Chicago 
Board of Trade. Futures contracts allow the risk of price 
fluctuation to be transferred from the holder of the 
commodity to someone else willing to bear that risk. Those 
who hold bond portfolios can sell futures contracts: if 
interest rates were to rise, the loss on its bond portfolio 
would be offset by the gain on its futures contracts. 
The party to whom the risk is transferred is 
frequently a speculator hoping to profit by correctly 
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anticipating the direction that prices will move. The volume 
of risks so transferred by hedging and speculation is 
enormous: the value of financial futures traded on the 
Chicago futures exchanges exceeds by far the total value of 
stocks bought and sold on New York and American Stock 
Exchanges combined. Given this volume of trading, it is 
easy to see why participant speculators as well as 
commercial hedgers are so seriously concerned about the 
future course of interest rates. 
It is not only borrowers, lenders, and speculators who 
follow closely the outlook for interest rates. Those who 
guide and influence national economic policy consider 
interest rates an important macroeconomic variable. Total 
debt outstanding in the u.s. economy is measured in 
trillions of dollars. The interest component of national 
income has risen from $4 billion in 1952 to more than $250 
billion in 1982: in percentage terms, from less than 1.5% of 
national income to almost 11% (U.S. Department of Commerce, 
1983). 
This trend concerns thoughtful observers. Felix 
Rohatyn (1984), credited with engineering the fiscal rescue 
of New York, worries particularly about the public sector: 
I think that this country by 1985 is going to 
look the way New York City looked in 1975, with 
a runaway budget and a debt service that's going 
to run up to, I don't know, 20% or 25% of total 
government spending, which you can't sustain. At 
some point there are going to be market problems. 
The financial effects of interest rate movements are 
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so widespread that financial regulators, central bankers, 
and policymakers in general would like to be able to antici-
pate these changes. 
Interest rate forecasting has bearing on another, more 
theoretical, aspect of public policy. It is a tenet of most 
free-market advocates that efficient markets contribute to 
the general welfare of society. Because the question of 
market efficiency is such an important one in economic 
theory, it has been subject to extensive empirical investi-
gation. This study provides additional evidence in the 
continuing debate. 
Forecasters are always looking for new and better 
forecasting methods. The techniques used here, while 
broadly applied in engineering, have not received much 
attention in economics. When the primary forecasting task is 
to gauge the direction of change of an economic variable (as 
is typical, for example, in the so-called turning point 
problem), these approaches appear to have substantial merit. 
This research may be of interest to some in the 
systems field. As president-elect of the Society for 
General Systems Research, John Warfield (1981) issued a 
statement concerning the criteria for selecting research 
topics. 
Most systems researchers are not studying 
the hard problems that are constantly in the 
fore in the media. [We] leave inflation to the 
economists, leave world stability to the 
political scientist, leave education to the 
educators, leave productivity to the business 
entrepreneurs, leave organizational design to 
the personnel people . 
... in many of these hard-problem areas, much 
relevant work has been done in one or more 
disciplines. If this work were properly 
integrated and augmented from a system 
perspective, highly valuable results might 
be produced. 
The research undertaken here demonstrates how 
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techniques developed in engineering can be applied to a hard 
problem constantly in the fore in the media. Concepts from 
physics, ecology, physiology, psychology, sociology, and 
information theory help, from time to time, to illuminate 
the problem. 
In this chapter the author has identified the 
audiences-to whom the work is addressed and has discussed 
the reasons some of these groups are motivated to forecast 
interest rates. 
Chapter II looks at the interest rate forecasting 
problem from several perspectives. The major theoretical 
impediment to forecasting--the efficient market theory--
is discussed at length. The nature of the economic environ-
ment in which forecasting takes place is considered, and 
different methods of forecasting prices are reviewed. 
The second chapter concludes with a general, nontechnical 
overview of how forecasts can be made using pattern 
recognition techniques. 
Chapter III starts from basic principles and develops 
the subject of pattern recognition just far enough to 
derive the algorithms needed to forecast the direction 
of change in interest rates. 
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The substantive results are in Chapter IV. First, it 
provides unambiguous notions of what a forecast is and which 
interest rate variable is to be forecast. It then proposes 
a reasonable forecasting objective and suggests standards by 
which forecasting success can be judged. A brief discussion 
of the economic theory underlying the choice of variables to 
be used for forecasting is followed by the development of a 
method of detrending those variables so as to better capture 
information useful in forecasting interest rates. Four 
specific models for making forecasts are then presented and 
their performance evaluated in comparison with a random walk 
simulation and a Bayesian alternative. The four forecasts 
are then combined in several different ways to yield 
composite forecasts that are better than their components. 
The final chapter summarizes the work. It gathers in 
one place the major conclusions and develops their implica-
tions for the audiences identified here. Since the sections 
of Chapter V which deal with conclusions and implications 
are brief and phrased nontechnically, some readers may want 
to read those sections first before starting Chapter II. 
CHAPTER II 
PERSPECTIVES ON INTEREST RATE FORECASTING 
"1984 interest rates? Ask Ouija board." 
This Oregonian headline, which ran jn late 1983, 
exhibits its writer's skepticism about interest rate 
forecasting: Can it be done at all? If so, what methods 
work best? The present chapter considers these questions. 
The author concludes that interest rates can be forecast--
though not perfectly and only with difficulty--and he 
offers pattern recognition as the preferred method. 
MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES 
Many phenomena are usefully considered from 
different, sometimes conflicting, points of view. This is 
as true in physical science as in social science and 
everyday life. In physics, for example, the propagation of 
light is best explained by the electromagnetic wave 
theory, while the interaction of light with matter is 
better understood using the corpuscular theory {Ridley, 
1976}. Physicists no longer ask which theory is true, 
they only ask which is more useful in a given context. 
James Keys (pseudonym of G. Spencer-Brown, 1972) 
makes the point this way. 
You may look at the world any way you please, 
through any window you choose .•.• How the world 
appears, what you see and what you miss ... 
depends on which window you are using. 
Windows or viewpoints can go by different names. One 
set of epistemological models has been catalogued under 
the term inguiring systems. C. West Churchman (1971) 
labeled his models with the names of the philosophers who 
espoused them. (Of course, the descriptions of these 
models, and others that follow, are caricatures. No man's 
ideas can be summarized in two sentences. But it is the 
caricatures that makes them memorable and useful.) 
Locke, the empiricist, finds truth in data, 
observation and experience. It is from "hard 
facts" and consensual agreement about them 
that reality is known. 
Leibniz, the rationalist, finds truth in the 
analytic, deductive and theoretical. What is 
needed to understand reality is a grand world 
model from which all truth can be derived. 
Kant finds truth in the synthesis of data and 
theory. Data and model are complementary and 
inseparable: the theoretical and empirical must 
be meshed. Objectives and alternatives are 
important to Kant. 
Hegel, the dialectician, finds truth in the 
conflict of structured debate. Conflicting views 
9 
are synthesized into a broader, more encompassing 
world view. 
Singer, the pragmatist, finds tru~h in a 
holistic view which utilizes all of the above 
approaches. He also asks that both subjective 
and objective factors be considered and that 
important values give rise to injunctions and 
commands. 
Another set of windows has been developed by 
Linstone (1981, 1984). Called multiple perspectives, 
these have proven especially valuable in the study of 
socio-technological systems, particularly technology 
assessment and policy decision making. 
The Technical Perspective is closely 
associated with and encompasses most of the 
paradigms of science and technology. It 
emphasizes classical rationality, seeks to 
optimize product or performance, and looks 
for cause-effect relationships. 
The Organizational Perspective is the 
viewpoint of a group within the social 
infrastructure. Challenge-response may 
replace cause-effect; problem-avoidance 
may replace problem-solution; "satisficing" 
takes over from optimizing; and loyalty 
may be more important than rationality. 
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The Personal Perspective is the viewpoint 
of the individual. It is the outlook of the 
person with his particular knowledge and 
beliefs, values and biases, fears and 
ambitions. 
A third set of windows has been provided by Martino 
(1972) in the context of technology forecasting, but its 
usefulness is certainly not limited to that domain. His 
sectors or dimensions include the following: 
Technological 
Economic 
Managerial 
Political 
Social 
Cultural 
Intellectual 
Religious/Ethical 
Ecological 
Like Linstone's perspectives, Martino's dimensions 
can be considered as ways of viewing a problem as well as 
indicating where to look for aspects of it, both things 
you look through and things you look at. 
Other broadly useful sets of perspectives have been 
given by Allison (1971), Steinbruner (1974), Lilly (1975) 
and Andersen (1977). A set of perspectives particularly 
suited to dealing with the topic of interest rate 
forecasting and making sense of securities markets is that 
developed by Smith (19Bl). Smith's perspectives are 
examined later in this chapter. 
When one begins to use multiple perspectives, 
11 
several difficulties become apparent. First, as Keys 
(1972) notes, "The number of different windows is 
endless." This problem is overcome by using only a few 
perspectives to spotlight a given problem and resolutely 
excluding all others. Failure to do so may postpone action 
through endless analysis. When choosing the perspectives, 
one should be careful to pick those which fit oneself as 
well as those which fit the problem. 
Not everyone is psychologically able to handle the 
cognitive dissonance that multiple, conflicting 
perspectives can create. In extreme situations, some 
people go crazy (Bateson, 1972j. Lilly (1967) has 
proposed a multi-valued logic that may be of some help 
here. Rather than the usual dichotomy of truth and 
falsehood, Lilly proposes a logic with four values 
true, false, as-if-true, and as-if-false. This is 
really not so radical as it seems: children and 
mathematicians, for example, use as-if-true frequently. 
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Another "problem" is that once one admits of multiple 
perspectives, the question of values cannot be ignored. 
Perspectives are not scientifically verifiable statements; 
instead, science (considered as a method of knowing rather 
than as a body of knowledge) is a perspective. 
Perspectives are justified by their utility, by how well 
they #ork, and by the value system of the user. The 
organizational and personal perspectives, for example, 
require that some organization's or some person's 
preferences be considered. Moreover, those with opposing 
views must be given broader range to criticize. Since the 
views from different windows are not generally isomorphic, 
those using different perspectives can become involved in 
endless, sometimes fruitless, debate. 
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At the highest level, this study has been guided by 
a pragmatic, Singerian inquiring system. I~ execution 
(Chapters III and IV) it falls well within the range of 
main-stream science, employing primarily the technical 
perspective of Linstone and looking mainly to the economic 
sector of Martino. From time to time, it has been 
enlightened ("cross-cued") by observations taken from other 
perspectives. 
The next section examines the most widely held 
academic theory on the question of interest rate forecast-
ing. In the view of many economists, the efficient market 
theory is true (or as-if-true). If one wishes to forecast 
interest rates, it is far more useful to consider the 
theory as false (or as-if-false). 
'fHE EFFICIENT MARKET THEORY 
The efficient market theory (EMT) is extremely 
important to would-be interest rate forecasters since, if 
true, it effectively puts their goal beyond reach. The 
theory implies that meaningful trading profits cannot be 
made by forecasting interest rates using publicly 
available information. 
What Is An Efficient Market? 
In academic circles an efficient market is 
defined as one in which there are a large number of 
well-informed participants actively competing to 
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maximize profits. In this kind of market all existing 
information and all anticipated informatio~ is "discounted" 
in the prevailing market price. In an efficient market only 
new information or new anticipations can affect price. 
Since new information arrives randomly, is disseminated 
rapidly, and is fully and correctly reflected in the market 
price almost instantaneously, no one can consistently 
outperform the market in the sense of earning excess 
profits as a result of price prediction based on publicly 
available information. This is the efficient market 
theory. It does not deny the existence of causes and 
explanations for prices changes; it only says that these 
causes, and therefore the resulting price movements, cannot 
be known in advance on the basis of public information. 
The efficient market theory comes in seyeral 
varieties. In its "pure" form it is a statement about a 
mental construct that does not exist in the real world. 
Just as physicists postulate imaginary substances (such as 
an ideal gas to which Boyle's law applies by definition), 
economists postulate situations where their theories would 
hold of necessity. To ensure an efficient market requires 
a large number of market participants with rational 
expectations. No single participant is permitted to buy or 
sell in quantity sufficient to significantly affect the 
price. It is also required that information be costless, 
and that transaction fees, the costs of buying or selling 
in the market, be nil (Carlozzi, 1983). The term rational 
expectations has a technical meaning. 
The concept of rational expectations is 
based on the belief that economic agents are 
utility maximizers. Thus, market participants 
form expectations that fully reflect all 
available information. More formally, rational 
expectations imply that individuals' subjective 
probability distribution of possible outcomes 
is identical to the objective probability 
distributions that actually occur (Hafer, 1983). 
Market efficiency, however, is more than a 
theoretical concept. Whether markets are efficient is not 
only an issue to be debated abstractly, but an empirical 
question to be tested with evidence from the real world. 
In order to transform the "pure" form into a testable 
hypothesis it is necessary to take into account the 
unreality of the initial postulates. Consequently, markets 
are not deemed inefficient if the "inefficiency" can be 
attributed to the cost of acquiring relevant information 
or to the cost of executing a transaction. Agreement on 
the meaning of the terms excess profit and consistently 
is also needed. 
The difficulty of testing how closely a theory 
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approximates reality exists with respect to many 
questions, but it does not prevent reasonable men and 
women from agreeing if the evidence is sufficiently 
strong. A statement of the theory that permitted a test 
which could elicit such agreement might be termed the 
"operational form" of the EMT. It is this type of 
statement of the EMT that is considered relevant here. 
There are "weak" and "strong" version!=> of the EMT. 
The weak version is sometimes called the random walk 
hypothesis; it asserts that market price changes cannot 
be distinguished from a statistical random walk in which 
changes are serially uncorrelated (after adjustment for 
any bias in the mean). The random walk hypothesis is 
"weak" in the sense that it allows only past price 
history to be used to obtain superior profits; in other 
words, it asserts that price history alone will not help 
one predict the course of future prices. The strong 
version of the efficient market theory goes further to 
assert that there is no public information helpful in 
predicting price changes. 
These different statements of the EMT stress a 
common theme: markets are to be judged as efficient or not 
on the basis of some agreed-upon set of information. Since 
market efficiency must be empirically tested relative to a 
specified information set, it follows that a given market 
could be judged efficient with respect to one information 
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set but inefficient with respect to another. 
The Importance of the Efficient Market Theory. 
Because the question of market efficiency is a 
pivotal point in the economic theory of free-market 
capitalism, it is easy to understand why the theory has 
been the subject of so much debate and empirical testing. 
The argument, using Carlozzi's (1983) words, goes something 
like this: 
In an efficient market the price "accurately 
reflects all relevant information." In other 
words, all the factors that matter to buyers 
and sellers in the market, including their 
expectations of future events, are built into 
the market price. In a sense, the price is 
always right in an efficient market ..•• 
The price changes generated by new informa-
tion are viewed favorably by economists. They 
signal to everyone who looks at the price that 
something has occurred that calls for people 
to rethink their decisions on how to allocate 
their resources. When all markets are efficient 
the reactions of individuals to price changes 
will produce the best economy-wide allocation 
of resources--no one could be made better off 
without injuring someone else. 
The social welfare aspect makes it clear that the 
efficient market theory is not just a technical question 
of interest only to specialists but one whose resolution 
carries ideological ramifications important in contexts 
other than price forecasting. 
The focu3 of this research is not on the laissez-
faire/central-planning controversy, it is on interest rate 
forecasting. But the the implications of the EMT for 
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interest rate forecasters are equally crucial: if the 
efficient market theory is correct in its "operational 
form," then it is not possible to forecast interest rates 
well enough to make meaningful profits. 
Weaknesses of the Efficient Market Theory. 
Although the EMT is an empirical hypothesis to be 
tested with evidence from the real world (some of which is 
discussed later in this chapter and in Chapter IV), the 
efficiency question is of sufficient importance that other 
arguments, not all of them economic, ought to be 
considered. 
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It is not necessary to argue against the EMT when it 
is put forth in either of two forms. In the "pure" form the 
theory is a statement about "an imaginary substance," and 
there is no need to make an issue. 
At the other extreme, if the theory is interpreted 
merely to say that price forecasting is only difficult 
(what might be labeled the "asymptotic" form of the EMT) , 
then there is no controversy. The author agrees that price 
forecasting is difficult and almost no one is so naive as 
to believe that markets routinely shower fortunes helter-
skelter on casual investors. 
Information. The EMT is a statement about the 
relationship of prices and information, "prices accurately 
reflect all relevant and available information." 
But what if the data are wrong? Churchman (1977) 
warns that bad data make for bad forecasts, and it is well 
known (Webb, 1983; Morgenstern, 1963) that most economic 
data are attributed a spurious accuracy when, in fact, they 
are plagued with errors of observation and conceptual 
ambiguities. 
How much relevant information is available? "Masses 
of information, data, news, analyses, research reports, 
computer-assisted paraphernalia are availab~e on virtually 
anything by way of investment products" (Gerbino, 1982; 
emphasis in the original). That is the problem. There is 
so much relevant data the its volume exceeds the ability 
of any individual or group of individuals to process it 
effectively. 
Miller (1978) has done extensive research, from the 
level of a cell to the level of a society, on how systems 
respond when gluts of information produce what he calls 
information input overload. His general conclusion is ~hat 
as more and more information is input to a system it 
finally becomes unable to process all of the data 
correctly. When this happens, stress occurs and the 
system compensates by adjusting its behavior. 
The following appear to be the chief 
adjustment processes. 
Omission--failing to transmit certain 
randomly distributed signals in a message. 
Error--incorrectly transmitting certain 
signals in a message. 
Queuing--delaying transmissions of 
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certain signals in a message, the sequence 
being temporarily stored until transmission. 
Filtering--giving priority in processing 
to certain classes of messages. 
Abstracting--processing a message with 
less than full detail. 
Multiple channels--simultaneously 
transmitting messages over two or more 
parallel channels. 
Escape--acting to cut off information 
input. 
Chunking -- transmitting meaningful 
information in organized "chunks" of 
symbols rather than symbol by symbol 
(Miller, 1978; emphasis in the original). 
Psychology. Information overload is also likely to 
produce confusion. 
Confusion triggers off an immediate search 
for meaning or order to reduce anxiety 
inherent in any uncertain situation. The 
result is .•. a readiness to assume causal 
connections even where such connections 
may appear to be quite nonsensical .•.. 
Anybody who is confused is likely to jump 
to conclusions by holding to the first 
apparently reliable piece of evidence 
that he detects through the fog of his 
confusion (Watzlawick, 1976). 
Adam Smith (1967), despite the pseudonym, is a real 
market participant who complains that "most of what has 
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been written about the market tells you the way it OUg(lt to 
be, and the successful investors I know do not hold to the 
way it ought to be, they simply go with what is.1I What 
determines market value, Gerald Loeb (1965) says, is not 
balance sheets and income statements but the "hopes and 
fears of humanity ... greed, ambition, .•. stress and 
strain, fashion " 
Evidence en this score is to be found in Charles 
MacKay's (1932) classic, Extraordinary Popular Delusions 
and the Madness of Crowds, a fascinating account of the 
Holland tulip mania, the South Sea bubble, and other 
market anomalies. Other case histories are recounted by 
Charles Kindleberger (1978) in Manias, Panics, and 
Crashes. But one need only recall the frenzied precious 
metal speculation of 1980, when silver skyrocketed to $50 
per ounce only later to plunge below $5, to realize that 
markets are sometimes more emotional than rational. 
Regardless of one's views of his economic theories, 
John Maynard Keynes must be acknowledged as a very bright 
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fellow and a perceptive observer of human behavior. He made 
fortunes for himself and his school, Kings College, through 
astute investment and speculation. Keynes (1983) was under 
no illusion about efficient markets. 
Very few American investors buy any stock for 
the sake of something which is going to happen 
more than six months hence, even though its 
probability is exceedingly high; and it is out 
of taking advantage of the psychological 
peculiarity of theirs that most money is to be 
made. 
The winners, says Keynes (1967), are those who 
"guess better than the crowd how the crowd will 
behave." 
Make the (heroic) assumption that the data 
considered by the market participant are accurate and not 
so voluminous as to overwhelm the system. Assume also that 
fear, greed, and the herd instinct are not operative so 
that the investor is coldly logical in his or her 
decision. Can it then be expected that the "individual's 
subjective probability distribution is identical to the 
objective probability distribution that actually occurs?" 
Not quite. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and Kahnem~n and Tversky 
(1979) demonstrate that there are extreme biases when 
people make judgments under conditions of uncertainty. 
They find an insensitivity to prior probabilities, 
misconception of chance, insensitivity to sample size, 
illusions of validity, misconceptions of regression, and 
insufficient adjustment to new information. Any of these 
errors will usually lead to subjective probability 
distributions that are extremely different from the 
objective distributions. The investigators are careful to 
point out that these biases and misconceptions are not 
attributable to motivational effects (such as wishful 
thinking or skewed payoffs) and that some errors are 
found as much among experienced researchers with extensive 
training in statistics as among statistically naive 
laymen. 
Tversky and Kahneman's experiments dealt with 
situations where the objective probability distributions 
were relatively simple. In more complex circumstances 
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another difficulty compounds the problem of arriving at a 
correct view of the world--the counterintuitive behavior 
of large social-economic-rinancial systems. Forrester 
(1976) argues, as a basic theme, that the human mind is not 
adapted to interpreting how these systems behave. Since 
they contain multiloop nonlinear feedback channels, the 
cause-effect relationships are very hard to disentangle. 
He notes particularly that the short-term and. long-term 
consequences of an innovation are frequently quite 
different. If Forrester is correct, it is not easy to 
see how markets can "accurately reflect" the consequences 
of a new and existing information. 
None of these research results--physiological, 
psychological, or sociological--nor the testimony of the 
market participants themselves support the efficient 
market theory. Homo economicus is as "extinct" as the 
Piltdown Man. 
Statistics. Four somewhat technical statistical 
notions bear on the efficiency question. The first goes to 
the very heart of the matter, to the concept randomness 
itself. Randomness is a curious, fundamentally undecidable 
proposition. It is easy to construct deterministic series 
which are statistically indistinguishable from random 
sequences. On the other hand any series, no matter how 
regular in appearance, could be produced by a random 
process (Gardner, 1968). G. Spencer-Brown (1957) considers 
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the profound difficulties and paradoxes that the issue of 
randomness raises. 
Second, the idea that the "real world" may always 
be accurately represented by objective probability 
distributions is faulty. The real world is both risky 
and uncertain. 
What's in a name? That which we call Uncertainty 
by any other name can be handled more easily. So 
Uncertainty were it but called Risk, wo~ld obtain 
that dear perfection without which scientific 
quantification and probability analysis is 
inapplicable (Davidson, 1978). 
Davidson (but not Tversky and Kahneman) uses the word 
uncertainty in its technical sense to convey an under-
standing of a state such that it is impossible to assign 
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probabilities to outcomes on the basis of either historical 
frequencies or subjective estimates. Risk, on the other 
hand, means a situation where, although the outcome is 
unknown, the probability distribution can be estimated. In 
the former case, 
our decision to do something ..• can only 
be taken as a result of animal spirits--of 
a spontaneous urge to action rather than 
inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted 
average of quantitative benefits multiplied by 
quantitative probabilities (Keynes, 1936). 
The third notion is an important st~tistical law, 
the arc sine law, which seems to have received insuf-
ficient attention from the EMT's proponents and detractors 
alike. Feller (1957) examines the law in detail and 
demonstrates its counterintuitive nature. Conside~ 
the cumulative result of a sequence of two-person zero-sum 
games in which an unbiased coin is tossed. The first 
player always bets heads, the second tails and the 
loser of each round pays the winner $1. It might be 
expected that each player would, on a cumulative basis, 
be in the lead about one-half the time and that the lead 
would change hands fairly frequently. This is incorrect. 
Feller shows, for example, that in a game seq~ence of 
twenty rounds the probability that one player takes the 
lead and never relinquishes it exceeds .350 
There are warnings here for both camps. The 
efficient market advocate must see that it is not only 
possible for an investor to outperform the market on a 
long-term, cumulative basis, it is almost guaranteed that 
some will do so. The lesson for those who disdain the 
theory because of their personally superior market 
performance must be more willing to ascribe their good 
fortune to good luck. 
The last statistical question is considered in 
connection with the empirical evidence presented below. 
The EMT Paradox. The efficient market theory has a 
paradoxical nature and potential for self-falsification. 
If it were universally believed that nothing could be 
gained by security analysis and other attempts at price 
prediction, such efforts would cease; at that point, of 
course, these activities would again yield worthwhile 
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information. What kind of proposition is this, one which 
is claimed to be true only if it is not believed? 
Right now of COI~rse, there is no danger of the 
efficient market theory being universally accepted. Large 
fees are charged by (and paid to) advisory services, 
brokers, investment fund managers and the like for 
forecasting future market prices. Clearly, many market 
participants with money to spend don't believ~ the 
academicians. The truth of the EMT will not be determined 
by a plurality of votes of market participants, but since 
economic reality is largely socially created, it can be 
perilous to ignore contrary views. 
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There is more paradox. The EMT says market partici-
pants have rational expectations. One such expectation 
(according to the theory itself) is that attempts to 
forecast security prices will not yield superior returns. 
Therefore, economic agents with rational expectations will 
not expend effort in attempting to forecast these prices. 
Even the most casual observation shows that many people do 
try to forecast prices. Consequently (again according to 
the theory itself) these people lack rational expectations. 
Thus the theory leads to its own denial; the snake eats 
its tail. 
Empirical Tests of the Efficient Market Theory. 
There is a vast literature on the efficient market 
theory. That there are so many studies and that they 
continue to be made in increasing numbers suggests that 
the results are inconclusive. After all, if economists had 
surveyed 847 markets and concluded that they were all 
efficient (or, for that matter, all inefficient) who would 
be eager to run Test Number 848? 
An important general review of the evidence is given 
by Fama (1970). More recent work, related particularly to 
interest rates, is discussed by Mullineaux (19~1) and 
additional material (with many references) can be found in 
Gay and Kolb' (1982). 
Some generalizations may be possible. First, with 
respect to the weak version of the EMT (the random walk 
hypothesis), the evidence indicates that most attempts 
to forecast price changes on the basis of their own 
history have failed, but some critics ("chartists" in the 
jargon of Wall Street) argue that the models employed have 
not been sufficiently sophisticated. Theory and evidence 
are given by Cootner (1964). The author's own attempts to 
forecast future interest rates on the basis of only their 
past behavior offer no convincing evidence that the random 
walk hypothesis should be rejected. 
When the information set is broadened and the range 
of statistical techniques is increased, the picture 
becomes less clear. While many of these tests still fail 
to reject the EMT, a growing number suggest that there is 
an inefficient use of pertinent information in economic 
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forecasting. 
One example, particularly relevant here, is from 
Hafer (1983). 
The impact of unanticipated changes in the 
weekly money supply on short-term interest 
rates has been investigated extensively •••• 
The evidence clearly indicates that unantici-
pated changes in the money stock have an 
important effect on interest rates ••.. 
Market participants still wager large sums 
and reputations on correctly anticipating _ 
the elusive weekly money figure •..• 
Forecasters could have improved upon their 
ability to predict changes in the money 
stock by incorporating information contained 
in the series on loans, demand deposits and 
the adjusted base. Thus, over the recent 
period, the forecasts do not meet the broader 
efficiency criterion tested here. 
Other recent evidence contradicting the EMT may be 
found in Brown and Maita1 (1981), Puglisi (1978), Lang and 
Rasche (1978), Branch (1978), Chow and Brophy (1978), 
Shiller (1979), Vignola and Dale (1979) and Gay and Ko1b 
(1982). 
In the author's opinion some proponents of the 
efficient market theory are too cavalier in their 
treatment of the empirical evidence and the conclusion it 
supposedly supports. Poole (1976), for example, says: 
Numerous investigators have analyzed 
an enormous amount of data using many 
different statistical techniques, and no 
serious departures from the predictionS-of 
the (efficient market) hypothesis have been 
found. Thus, there is very strong evidence 
in favor of the hypothesis (emphasis added). 
This is extreme indeed! First, there is contrary 
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evidence. Some very serious departures from the predictions 
of the theory are reported by Seligman (1983), a long-time 
partisan of the theory who confesses his own loss of 
faith. 
Question: how close to reality is [the EMT]? 
Having now resurveyed the basic case made 
for it in the business schools, and also 
looked at some recent findings that seem 
inconsistent with it, I find myself still 
answering that [the EMT] is extremely useful 
for understanding the stock market--but . 
doubting that it's as close to reality as 
I had previously assumed. It seems fairly 
clear that some superior investors are out 
there beating the market systematically. 
Second, Poole seems to take liberties with the whole 
thrust of hypothesis testing as presented in any intro-
ductory statistical text. The hypothesis is set up in the 
form: 
HO: Markets are efficient. 
Then evidence from a sample is gathered and, if it is 
inconsistent with the hypothesis, leads to rejection 
of Ho: otherwise the hypothesis is "accepted." But, 
it is important to understand that the 
rejection of a hypothesis is to conclude 
it is false, while the acceptance of a 
hypothesis merely implies that we have 
no evidence to believe otherwise (Walpole 
and Myers, 1978: emphasis added). 
There is quite a difference between "strong evidence 
in favor" and "no reason to believe otherwise." 
Moreover, efficient market tests are always made 
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with respect to a given, usually quite limited, information 
set. To find that one or two variables are not useful in 
price forecasting fails to justify the conclusion that 
other variables would fair no better. 
The Difficulty of Forecasting. 
It is one thing to argue that excess profits are 
possible, quite another to say they are easy to obtain. 
Listen to the legendary Bernard Baruch (1980), speculator 
extraordinaire: 
If you are willing to give up everything else, 
and will study the market and every stock 
listed there as carefully as a student studies 
anatomy, and will glue your nose to the ticker 
tape at the opening of every day of the year and 
never take it off till night; if you can do all 
that, and in addition have the cool nerves of a 
gambler, the sixth sense of a clairvoyant and the 
courage of a lion--you have a Chinaman's chance. 
To succeed on Wall Street, claims Gerbino (1982), 
requires grueling research, market savvy, and 
economic analysis .•.. The pro will push himself 
beyond the limits to be successful in any field. 
And that's only one of the steps to success on 
Wall Street. One must also search and find a 
technology and methodology of investing that 
works and then ... learn it and make it work. 
Many of the arguments advanced above in opposition 
to the efficient market theory serve just as well to 
support the contention that price forecasting is likely to 
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be very difficult. It has been argued here (contrary to the 
EMT) that market participants do not in the aggregate 
correctly perceive what prices should be. The logic works 
just as well at the level of the individual: if it is hard 
for the market as a whole to determine the correct price, 
it is not going to be easy for the participdnt~ as 
individuals to do so. To summarize those arguments: 
There is incorrect information. 
There is too much information to process it all 
correctly. 
Hopes and fears, greed and ambition determine market 
prices as much as economic fundamentals. 
People are subject to extreme biases when making 
judgments under uncertainty~ their estimate~ of the 
probability distributions are faulty. 
The distinction between uncertainty and risk, the 
terms used technically, may invalidate much of the use 
of the concept of probability distributions in 
connection with the EMT. 
The human mind is not adapted to interpreting 
correctly how some types of complex systems operate. 
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There is more. Not only is the economy extraor-
dinarily complex, involving a large number of variables 
interacting with nonlinear feedbacks, it sometimes exhibits 
instability and discontinuity, with unpredictable results. 
The unstable nature of securities markets has been 
discussed by Zeeman (1974), who used catastrophe theory, a 
branch of differential topology, to deal with the discon-
tinuities. Moreover, the economy is an evolving system, 
adapting and changing over time (Nelson, 1982). Georgescu-
Roegen (1975) argues this point forcefully and proposes a 
biological rather than a mechanistic model of the economic 
system. Evolution may proceed smoothly through natural 
selection or dramatically through mutation. The growth of 
the underground economy and the 1973 oil price increase, 
respectively, seem to fit these descriptions. As systems 
grow more complex, qualitatively new properties 
(emergents), unpredictable beforehand, corne to the fore. 
The economy in the United States is a living, evolving 
system, the parts of which do not fully understand the 
whole. 
Self-Altering Forecasts. 
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Were the interest rate forecaster to overcome all of 
these obstacles and succeed in predicting interest rates 
accurately, a Catch 22 still looms--the problem of the 
self-altering forecast. In one version, the self-altering 
phenomenon would assure the forecast; in another version, 
the forecast would be self-defeating. For either phenomenon 
to occur, the forecast must be public and must be 
believed. 
In the first instance, market participants, believing 
the forecast and seeking financial gain, enter the market 
and through their buying or selling of financial instru-
ments bring about the predicted change. The forecast 
becomes self-fulfilling. In the second case, one can 
imagine economic policymakers, say the Federal Reserve 
Board, confronting a forecast which they believe but do 
not like. In response they manipulate monetary policy to 
prevent the forecast's realization. It becomes self-
defeating. Henshel and Kennedy (1973) argue that "the 
purest example of 3elf-altering predictions in economics 
is the operation of the stock market, with its self-
generated markets reflecting investor confidence as well 
as objective conditions." 
Not long ago the bond market provided a striking 
example of the self-fulfilling prediction pheno~enon. Henry 
Kaufman is partner and chief economist of the brokerage 
firm, Salomon Brothers. Mr. Kaufman's views are respected 
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in money markets and his interest rate forecasts are widely 
reported in the financial press. A Kaufman speech can move 
bond prices by several percentage points. The Wall Street 
Journal (1980) reported a self-fulfilling prediction by 
Mr. Kaufman on the front page: 
Bond prices, which move inversely to interest 
rates, surged in response to two developments: 
the prime-rate cut by Chase and a few smaller 
banks, and a memorandum to portfolio managers 
from Henry Kaufman in which the oracular 
economist at Salomon Brothers withdrew his 
forecast for even-higher interest rates and 
conceded that lower rates might lie ahead. 
Some long-term Treasury bonds soared by as 
much as 5%, the biggest rise for any day on 
record. 
Survival of the Fittest Forecasters. 
When individuals possessed of differential ability 
engage in competition, the more able tend to win and the 
less able tend to lose. This is so evident from experience 
and common sense that Darwinian arguments are unnecessary. 
In virtually every field of human activity those ~ho 
possess superior information and process it more 
effectively outperform those who do not. Price forecasting 
is not an exception. 
The implication is that some will consistently earn 
excess profits because they will be competing against 
others less able to acquire and interpret price-relevant 
information. But since they will also be compet~ng against 
those of equal or greater ability, the excess profits will 
not be achieved easily. 
Conclusion. 
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For all these reasons, the author views the efficient 
market theory as incorrect in its operational form. This is 
no minor quibble over the precise wording of the theory. 
The contention to be advanced and defended in this study is 
this: it is possible, albeit difficult, for some people to 
consistently outperform the market and earn financially 
significant excess profits. 
Having emphasized this conclusion, the author does 
not necessarily suggest that economists abandon the 
hypothesis. Like the ideal gas or the corpuscular theory of 
light, the EMT is, for many purposes, a highly useful 
fiction and it will frequently be advantageous for 
economists to consider it as-if-true. 
But given the evidence presented here, the interest 
rate forecaster has good reason to think of the EMT 
as-if-false. 
OTHER MARKET PERSPECTIVES 
The efficient market theory is only one view of the 
securities markets, the one held by many economists but 
not generally shared by market participants themselves. 
The market is a confusing place. It is time to see how 
some of those involved attempt to make sense of the 
confusion. 
The material of this section is based on the book 
by sociologist Charles A. Smith, The Mind of the Market 
(1981). The present author has added some additional 
distinctions, buried others, and otherwise reinterpreted 
some of the material, but the debt to Smith is clear. 
Smith presents his different perspectives in the 
form of characters, archetypes, who are represented as 
holding the respective views. Most real people reflect 
more than one of the perspectives, or different ones at 
different times, or perhaps mutations of the pure strain. 
But some people, it is claimed, are fairly represented by 
the archetypes--these real people are the true believers. 
The Fundamentalists. 
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If any perspective can be said to have a plurality of 
adherents among market participants, it is probably the 
fundamentalist view. The fundamentalist perspective stresses 
economic conditions as the determinant of market prices. 
Economic conditions encompass the usual national and 
international macroeconomic variables as well as the 
balance sheets and earnings statements of specific 
companies. The fundamentalist expects to profit by buying 
undervalued securities and holding those securities until 
their true value is more generally recognized. Fundamental-
ists read and react to economic and political news. They 
follow the teachings of Graham and Dodd (1962) iry Security 
Analysis, which emphasizes profits, book value, market 
share and other traditional financial ratios. They agree 
with the conservative market adage, "investigate, then 
invest." 
The Chartists and Cyclists. 
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Chartists might be called anti-random-walkers. The 
chartist believes that the future of market prices can be 
divined from their past history, a position antithetical to 
the random walk hypothesis. Chartists keep charts, 
sometimes hundreds of charts on many variables--but always 
related to market statistics, not primary economic data. 
Chartists believe that their charts reveal patterns that 
portend future price movements. 
In many ways cyclists are closely akin to the 
chartists (in fact, Smith lumps the two together as a 
single species). Cyclists believe that the market is ruled 
by a transcendental order and that prices rise or fall as 
if with the tides. Profits are made by understanding these 
rhythms and acting in accordance with them. 
While the fundamentalist see economic events and 
supply and demand forces influencing market prices, the 
chartists and cyclists are likely as not to reverse the 
order of causality. They give great weight to the market's 
power to determine both future economic conditions and the 
forces of supply and demand within the market itself. 
The Insiders. 
The insider generally agrees (with the efficient 
market theory) that prices cannot be forecast on the basis 
of publicly available information. Consequently, he works 
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to develop personal contacts who can supply him with inside 
information. Profits are to be made by buying securities 
before their prices have reacted to the yet-to-be-
disseminated information. The information itself is not so 
important as how it will be perceived and acted upon. As a 
result, the insider emphasizes the importance of 
"sponsorship" or lack thereof. What counts, he believes, are 
the buying and selling of big-money coalitions and large 
institutional investors. Winning is a result of being in 
the know. 
The insider lives on "tips" and frequently skirts 
securities laws which prohibit the use of inside 
information to make profits. 
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The Traders. 
The trader emphasizes his intuition and personal 
feelings about the market. He sees the market as much 
emotionally as cognitively. True, the market reacts to 
economic information; to the buying and selling pressures 
of large institutions, and to its own internal rhythms and 
patterns; but it is the correct interpretation of these 
factors that leads to profits. By being in tune with the 
psychological mood of the market, the trader is better able 
to act correctly on the news and information he has 
received. 
The views held by Smith's market participants conform 
closely to the taxonomic scheme of Linstone--the fundamen-
talists, the chartists, and the cyclists hold Technical 
Perspectives; the insiders hold an Organizational 
Perspective; and traders maintain a Personal Perspective. 
FORECASTING METHODS 
Many methods can be used to try to forecast interest 
rates. One classification of these methods, intended to be 
broadly representative but certainly not exhaustive, is 
outlined below: 
A. Judgmental Methods 
B. Econometric Models 
1. Single-Equation Models 
2. Multiple-Equation Models 
C. Economic Indicator Analysis . 
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D. Time Series Analysis 
1. Smoothing Methods 
2. Box-Jenkins ARIMA Models 
3. Stepwise Autoregression 
4. Harrison-Stevens Bayesian Approach 
5. Spectral Analysis 
E. Market Analysis ("Technical") Methods 
F. Pattern Recognition Approaches 
Judgmental Methods. 
All forecasting involves an ingredient of judgment 
and intuition. The choice of the forecasting method, the 
variables included in the model, and the functional form to 
represent the relationships are all matters of judgment. 
But here the term judgmental methods is used to encompass 
all approaches that do not involve explicit techniques; 
sometimes the approach is called "expert forecasting" or 
"intuitive forecasting." 
The forecast may take the form of a simple statement, 
but more often it is incorporated within a scenario. The 
following are typical: 
The release of the minutes of the October FOMe 
[the Federal Open Market Committee, the policy-
making arm of the Federal Reserve Board] meeting 
and the press release accompanying last week's cut 
in the discount rate suggest that concern about 
the economy and international and domestic 
financial tensions have become increasingly 
important to FOMe members. Indeed, monetary policy 
over the next few months should be conducted with 
a bias toward accommodation. The path will prove 
somewhat erratic, but interest rates should continue 
downward well into 1983 (Mastrapasqua, 1982). 
Behind its recovery-is-just-around-the-corner 
facade, the Administration is now joining the Fed 
in panicking. Treasury Secretary Regan wants to 
push the July 1st income tax cut ahead by six 
months. Such a speedup mayor may not be more 
effective than the first two installments. But 
one thing is sure: It will" further widen the 
Treasury's already monstrous fiscal gap and will 
thereby worsen the strain on the money market. 
In fact, interest rates have already started 
climbing anew. Earlier this week, three-month 
Treasury bills reached the highest level in 
three months and bond prices softened across 
the board. Note that this latest rise in rates 
is taking place in spite of the liberal Fed and 
the economy relapGe. Implication: The demand for 
credit generated by deficit-ridden governments 
at all levels and by illiquid private borrowers 
is be~oming too strong for the Fed to offset 
(Holt, 1982). 
The lack of reproducibility, evidenced above, is one 
reason the approach is frequently criticized. The 
fallibility of human judgment (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) 
and the inability to obtain quantitative confidence 
intervals or probability estimates are also used as 
arguments against the method. Nevertheless, sound judgment 
will always be called for and some retrospective studies 
of economic forecasting accuracy have given a slight edge 
t~ the judgmental approach over competing large-scale 
econometric models (McNees, 1973: Haitovsky, Treyz, and 
Su, 1974). 
Econometric Models. 
40 
Econometric models, as the term is used here, include 
only single- and mUlti-equation statistical regression 
models. 
A multi-equation model is intended to represent the 
structure of the economy in greater or lesser detail. The 
so-called St. Louis model is relatively simple, involving 
perhaps a half-dozen variables and equations. This is 
dwarfed by many of the large-scale models developed by 
consulting firms like DRI and Chase Econometrics and 
educational institutions like MIT and Michigan, all of 
whose models run to hundreds of equations. 
A single-equation regression model relates a 
dependent variable to a set of explanatory variables 
chosen on the basis of economic theory or hunch. The 
function is usually a linear combination of the 
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explanatory variables. If the statistical assumptions are 
satisfied, then the ordinary least square regression 
technique yields parameter estimates that are "best," 
linear, and unbiased. Standard measures for developing 
confidence intervals and testing hypotheses are easily 
obtained. Unfortunately, the mathematical assumptions 
underlying the statistical basis of regression models are 
almost never satisfied. This point cannot be overemphasized 
just because the power, ease of application, and 
sophistication of the technique make it so seductive in 
comparison with cruder approaches. 
Econometric regression methods are usually 
classified as causal: they purportedly represent 
cause-effect relationships in a quantitatively 
sophisticated manner. This argument is too easily 
overemphasized. The method merely computes correlations. 
If the economy is a jungle of mutually causal feedbacks, a 
simple single-equation econometric model, even if it 
includes the right variables, will not be able to capture 
them. 
Examples of attempts to forecast interest rates with 
single-equation econometric models may be found in Hunt 
(1973), Schott (1973, 1977) and Horan (1978). 
Economic Indicator Analysis. 
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A general approach to forecasting is to relate the 
current situation to an analogous historical precedent. In 
technological forecasting the method is associated with the 
terms "quantified analogy" and "precursor events." In 
economics the method is widely used and goes under the 
label, "indicator approach." 
In its simplest form it makes perfectly good sense. 
In many businesses, for example, orders precede production, 
which in turn precedes actual income from sales. It is not 
unreasonable, then, to forecast short-term gross income on 
the basis of recent orders. 
In the late 1930's Wesley Mitchell and Arthur Burns 
at the National Bureau of Economic Research undertook a 
monumental empirical analysis of some 500 economic series, 
searching for timing regularities among them. Their 
original work, which focused on the business cycle has 
been revised and expanded several times in the intervenipg 
years, but the conceptual basis remains unchanged. The 
idea is to classify economic series into those which 
consistently lead the economy in expansions and 
contractions (called, reasonably enough, leading 
indicators), those which more or less parallel the economy 
as a whole (the coincident indicators), and those which 
follow the rest of the economy in its ups and down~ (the 
lagging indicators). The emphasis, it should be added, is 
on identifying turning points of the economy--peaks and 
troughs, as they are called--beginnings and endings of 
periods of recession and expansion. 
Strongly empirical, the method virtually guarantees 
that the forecaster who employs it will have an up-to-date 
feel for what is actually going on in the economy. As 
might be expected from an approach so blatantly 
data-oriented, it has been a source of controversy almcst 
from the beginning. In a classical confrontation of 
empiricists and rationalists, T.C. Koopmans' "Measurement 
Without Theory" (1947) attacked the work for giving 
inadequate attention to economic theory. 
Interest rates have been identified as one of the 
lagging indicators in the economy, so the method has 
potential value. Cagan (1972) provides the historical 
record through 1971. 
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Time Series Analysis. 
In each of the methods considered above, at least a 
trace of economics could be found. Most time series models 
forego explanation entirely. Prediction of a variable with 
time series models is usually based solely on the past 
behavior of that variable. Most time series methods are 
univariate, although multivariate time series models are 
becoming more common and may include causal explan~tory 
variables. (These causal models usually are called transfer 
functions and intervention models.) 
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There are obvious problems with noncausal time series 
methods. No matter how sophisticated the mathematics, the 
essence of the method is extrapolation of the past behavior 
of the series. There is a total lack of underlying theory. 
Burdened with such disadvantages, the method 
frequently performs surprisingly well. When time series 
forecasts are compared with those of the large structural 
models, the former often prove more accurate. Given their 
lower cost, smaller data requirements, relative ease of 
computation, and equal or superior accuracy, time series 
models deserve all the attention they have received. 
There are many approaches to time series modeling. 
Smoothing methods. Smoothing is generally 
accomplished by means of filters, which are linear 
transformations or weighted averages of historical data. 
Smoothing techniques usually don't forecast very 
well, but they are accurate enough when one must cheaply 
forecast 10,000 different items in inventory (Makridakis 
and Wheelwright, 1978). 
Box-Jenkins autoregressive, integrated, moving 
average (ARlMA) models. The first step in developing a 
Box-Jenkins model is to transform the original series so 
that it becomes stationary. Stationarity requires that the 
series have a constant mean, constant variance and ,constant 
covariances over time. Stationarity can frequently be 
achieved by differencing the original series one or more 
times. 
This transformed series is then represented as a 
linear combination of its own past values and past error 
terms. The use of past series values makes the method 
auto-regressive, accounting for the "AR" in the acronym. 
The use of a moving average of the past errors accounts 
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for the "MA" part. If the original series was differenced, 
then its representation must be restored by summing or 
"integration." This gives the "I" in ARlMA. The objective 
of ARlMA models is to decompose a series into two parts, 
the first dependent on its own past history, the second 
part purely random and unpredictable. The method proceeds 
in stages. After stationarity has been achieved one uses 
correlations and partial correlations between lagged values 
of the series to "identify" the number of autoregressive 
and moving average terms. The next stage is to estimate the 
model's parameters. The preliminary model thus obtained is 
then checked for adequacy_ Recycling through the steps may 
be necessary. 
The advantage of ARIMA models is that they have 
frequently yielded good short-term forecasts, in general 
better than those of other univariate techniques. Its 
major disadvantage, aside from those shared by all time 
series methods, is that it is relatively difficult to 
apply. Substantial judgment is required and the 
computations are not trivial. Both disadvantages have been 
reduced somewhat by the recent availability of package 
programs that lead the modeler through the process. 
The standard reference is the Box-Jenkins (1970) 
original, Time Series Analysis: Forecasting and 
Control. It is easier to understand Nelson's (1973) 
presentation in Applied Time Series Analysis for 
Manage~ial Forecasting. Miller and Hickman (1973) report 
an unsuccessful attempt to forecast the interest rate on 
Treasury bills using ARIMA methods. 
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Stepwise autoregression. Stepwise autoregression 
proceeds as follows. At the first step the lagged value of 
the series which contributes the most toward explaining the 
variance of the series is introduced in the regression 
equation. At the second step the lagged variable that best 
improves the fit is added. The process is continued until 
further lagged variables fail to produce significant 
improvement in fit. It frequently happens, however, that 
the addition of new lagged variables reduces below 
significance other lagged variables previously introduced. 
This difficulty is eliminated by specifying the order of 
variable introduction on subsequent iterations. 
Stepwise autoregression is the "poor man's" approach 
to ARIMA forecasting. The moving average part is ignored; 
the parameter estimation procedure is simpler, using 
ordinary least squares regression rather than the Marquardt 
nonlinear optimization algorithm; and the procedure is 
computer-automated, requiring no analytical intervention. 
On occasion stepwise autoregression produces good 
forecasts~ 
Harrison-Stevens' Bayesian Approach. During 
the 1970's Harrison and Stevens (1971, 1976) developed a 
new approach to short-term time series forecasting based 
on Bayesian principles. Generally ignored on this 
continent until recently, it received critical acclaim in 
Europe. 
The method assumes that the Soyio~ ~---- can be 
represented by a "variable" straight line contaminated by 
noise. The line is variable in that it is subject to 
occasional changes in intercept and slope. In addition to 
normal observational noise, the series is sometimes 
subject to major transient shocks which perturb it 
momentarily. These events--intercept change, slope 
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change, transient shock--are modeled explicitly and 
successive data points are used to estimate the posterior 
probabilities at each point in time. 
Its developers claim the following advantages: 
The system can recognize, and respond 
appropriately to, transient errors and 
sudden changes in level and slope. 
The system is truly adaptive in both 
level and slope, i.e. its sensitivity 
increases when changes occur (i.e. when 
uncertainty increases) and has a good 
response to transients. 
The system produces not merely a single-
figure forecast but a joint parameter distri-
bution, thus expressing the inherent uncer-
tainty of the estimates of level and 
slope (Harrison and Stevens, 1971). 
Unfortunately, the algorithms are not simple, 
probability distributions must be estimated, and computer 
programs are not readily available. 
Spectral analysis. The literature of spectral 
analysis, which considers a series represented in the 
frequency domain rather than the time domain, does not 
encourage its use as a forecasting tool. Kendall (1979) 
expresses the opinion that anything which can be achieved 
with spectral analysis is more easily and efficiently done 
by ARIMA techniques. 
Market Analysis Methods. 
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What is called market analysis is known in the jargon 
of Wall Street as "technical analysis." Much of market 
analysis differs from the methods discussed above in that 
it has failed to achieve academic respectability. 
There are several schools of technicians. Perhaps 
the best known and mcst followed are the chartists who 
look for patterns in the price history of the commodities 
or securities they follow. In their charts are found 
"head-and-shoulder-formations," "flags," "pennants," 
"island reversals" and a host of other forms. Of these 
patterns most fundamentalists can make "neither head nor 
tail." 
Some technical tools are more statistical in 
nature. Moving averages are used to identify trends and 
changes in trends, and forecasts made accordingly. For 
example, the forecast may be for higher prices if the 
lO-day moving price average exceeds the 40-day average. 
Indexes are computed which measure rates of price 
change. They are called momentum indicators, oscillators, 
or relative strength indexes. For example, a six-month 
rate of change index might be computed as the current 
price less the price six months ago, or alternatively, as 
the current price divided by the price six months ago. 
Most "technicians" would agree that forecasting on 
the basis of charts requires a fair measure of intuition 
and judgment. 
Another school of technicians are the cyclists. Some 
of the seemingly sound cyclical studies have found 
statistically significant cycles in interest rates (Shirk, 
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various dates). The problem for forecasters is that the 
percentage of change in interest rates accounted for by 
the cycles are generally too small to allow meaningful 
profits. 
Other cyclists go beyond empiricism to mysticism. 
Some believe that the market is ruled by a transcendental 
order and that prices rise or fall as if with the tides or 
cycles of the moon. Profits are to be made by unders~anding 
these rhythms and acting in accordance with them. 
Are these "technical" tools useful or is the whole 
scheme mumbo-jumbo? One thing is certain. The forecaster who 
uses charts containing price history, momentum indicators, 
and moving averages has before him a record of that which 
he is trying to forecast. That cannot be harmful. Whether 
these measures foretell continues to be a matter of 
controversy (Levy, 1971). 
It is not difficult to agree with Horn and Farah 
(1979): 
Regardless of the opinion held as to the 
value of charting, many traders use this 
technique, and their market influence must 
not be ignored .... When tens of thousands 
of these individuals act in unison when 
certain price levels are penetrated, their 
action can have a very potent influence 
upon the market. 
Representative literature includes Pring (1980), 
Kaufman (1980), Bernstein (1982), and Barnes (1979). 
Pattern Recognition. 
Pattern recognition (PR) is a relatively new and 
potentially powerful method for selecting and processing 
information. 
For several reasons PR has not received wide 
attention or application in economics. Knowledge 
disseminates rapidly within a given discipline because 
people active in the field share a common vocabulary.and 
read the same journals. More time is required to move 
knowledge across fields, however, because intellectual 
contacts are fewer and the process is inhibited by 
unfamiliar notation and specialized terminology. Pattern 
recognition originated and had its early development 
in engineering, where it continues to be used extensively. 
Kalman filtering, spectral analysis, and ARlMA modeling 
are other techniques that demonstrate the lag between the 
development of a method in engineering and its application 
in economics. Moreover, since economists deal primarily 
with continuous variables, they have less motivation to 
learn a new method which, like PR, is designed only to 
handle dependent variables that are categorical in nature. 
Pattern recognition deals with classes or sets. 
Recall the definition of set: 
A set is a collection of definite distinct 
objects of our perception or of our thought, 
which are called elements of the set. (Breuer, 
1958) 
Pattern recognition is concerned with the broad 
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injunction: Given the description of an object, recognize 
it as coming from or belonging to a set. 
This general problem comes in different forms. One 
subdivision of pattern recognition techniques is known as 
clustering. Clustering requires that a given set of 
heterogeneous objects be split into subsets that are in 
some sense more homogeneous. The goal is to discover these 
"more homogeneous" groups and develop a scheme for 
distinguishing them. 
A second subdivision, called scene analysis, deals 
with highly complex problems like recognizing objects ~n a 
photograph. Because of the complexity involved, the 
picture is broken down into subobjects and sub-subobjects 
in a hierarchical or tree-like structure. Methods of this 
sort are referred to as syntactic or structural 
approaches. 
Another subdivision within pattern recognition, the 
one of interest here, is pattern classification. Pattern 
classification takes a given description of an object and 
attempts to assign the object to its proper class. Some 
approaches to classification make assumptions about the 
probability distributions of different classes and attempt 
to estimate the parameters of these distributions. These 
approaches are termed parametric, statistical or 
Bayesian. Methods not requiring the estimation of the 
parameters of probability distributions are called 
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nonparametric or deterministic. Only nonparametric 
methods of pattern classification are used here. 
PR and its extensions have been applied in many 
areas of human endeavor. One of the earliest tasks to be 
tackled was reading alpha-numeric characters, both typed 
and handwritten. An important advance in PR was made in 
the late 1950's when Rosenblatt (1957) devised a linear 
decision function modeled on a simplified understandi.ng of 
the neuron. He called his classification machine a 
perceptron. The perceptron has the ability to learn from 
its classification errors and modify its structure so that 
future errors of the same type become less likely. 
Perceptrons and more complex classifiers have been used to 
interpret electrocardiograms, to analyze and classify 
chromosomes, to identify fingerprints, and to help monitor 
the safety of nuclear reactors (Tou and Gonzalez, 1974). 
There have been only a few uses of pattern 
recognition in finance and economics. Blin (1973) used PR 
to examine questions of consumer preference and welfare 
economics. Fogler (1974) found PR helpful in forecasting 
industrial production. Felsen (1975a, 1975b) used a 
percept ron to forecast stock market averages and select 
stocks with above average potential for appreciation. In 
addition, there are reports, without documented evidence, 
that ?R has been used to forecast commodity prices 
(Aronson, 1980; Liversidge, 1983). 
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The goal of pattern recognition, then, is to take a 
series or group of object descriptions and make "sense" of 
them. Sense means different things in different contexts. 
An optical character reader makes sense of a mark on a 
paper by recognizing it as the numeral three. A diagnostic 
machine makes sense of the P-QRS-T complex of an 
electrocardiogram by distinguishing those evidencing 
structural damage from normal patterns. A chromosome 
analyzer may make sense by building an evolutionary tree 
based on similarities and differences in the chromosome 
structure of animals. The current task is to make enough 
sense of economic data to be able to forecast the direction 
of change of interest rates on long-term bonds. 
PR is the product of many unions. Psychology, 
linguistics, cybernetics, information theory, engineering, 
statistics and data processing have all played important 
roles in its conception and development. An eclectically 
conceived offspring, pattern recognition has given rise to 
both conflicting custodial claims and disavowals of 
parentage. 
Practitioners of the subject tend to be a pragmatic 
lot. Heuristics and ad hoc procedures are welcomed when 
they work, not criticized for lack of rigor. Mathematical 
statisticians sometimes shudder at such approaches, but 
the problems encountered cannot always await elegant 
mathematical proofs. Each problem seems to have its own 
peculiarities and is best approached with a flexible 
attitude. Nonetheless, many people in the PR field 
recognize the discipline's deficiencies and seek to remedy 
them, but they refuse, in Milton Friedman's phrase, to let 
the best become the enemy of the good. 
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CHAPTER III 
PRINCIPLES OF PATTERN RECOGNITION 
This chapter starts from basic principles and 
develops the subject of pattern recognition just far 
enough to derive the classifiers needed to forecast the 
direction of change in interest rates. The important 
results are the weighted least squares classifier (and the 
recursive method of updating it to take into account 
changes in the economic environment) and the hyperbolic 
tangent algorithm which can be used to refine the 
parameter estimates generated by the weighted least 
squares classifier. 
PA'rTERNS AND FEATURES 
A patter~ may be defined as a description of an 
object, process, or event. A pattern represents and 
contains information about the object. It is the input data 
actually or potentially available concerning the object to 
be classified. 
Consider an epidemiological screening program where 
the objective is to identify those persons who have a 
heightened susceptibility to some particular disease. A 
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participant's "work-up sheet" would provide data on the 
individual's sex (female), age (32), weight (120), and 
height (5' 2"). It would include information about her 
medical and family history, blood pressure, pulse rate and 
so on. Extensive testing could provide hundreds of 
measurements on her body chemistry. All of this data 
together constitutes a pattern and is potentially useful in 
dist~nguishing those who are susceptible to the disease 
from those who are not. 
It is convenient to represent patterns as vectors of 
real numbers called pattern vectors. The participant's 
pattern vector, based on the data provided above, could be 
coded as (I, 32, 120, 5.17) where the numbers represent, 
respectively, her sex, age, weight and height. In general, 
the numerical elements of a pattern vector may be from 
ratio, interval, or ordinal scales or may be nominal in 
nature, representing qualitative aspects of the object 
(Stevens, 1968). 
The first major problem in designing a pattern 
classifier is to determine which elements of the pattern 
are to be used in the classification. The elements 
actually chosen are called features and the task of 
choosing them is called feature selection. One aspect of 
feature selection is economic ana practical: some 
desirable features may be too difficult or too expensive 
to obtain. Complex, invasive clinical tests, for example, 
would not be appropriate if an disease being screened for 
were not life-threatening. 
Other aspects of feature selection have to do with 
technical considerations. At first it would seem that all 
pattern elements possessing any independent information 
useful in classifying the pattern should be utilized by 
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the classifier. This turns out to be erroneous unless the 
numb~r of samples is infinite (Duda and Hart, 1973) and in 
fact the optimal number of features is remarkably small. 
The goal is to obtain discriminating information while 
reducing redundancy and noise. The only guaranteed way to 
find the best subset from a set of properties is to try all 
possible combinations. This is impractical for even a 
modest number of properties and computationally impossible 
for larger sets. Mucciardi and Gose (1971) have studied 
this problem and tested seven techniques of pattern 
selection. Two desirable attributes of discriminating 
features are that they be individually capable of 
classifying with low error probabilities and that they be 
relatively uncorrelated. Mucciardi and Gose propose an 
index composed of a weighted sum of these two attributes. 
Features need not be limited to simple unaltered 
choices from the elements of the pattern. Mathematical 
transformations and functional combinations of pattern 
elements frequently provide features with greater 
discriminating power. 
59 
Features, like patterns, are conveniently represented 
as vectors of real numbers. These are called feature 
vectors. In this paper lower case bold letters will 
always represent vectors; thus w, x, and yare 
vectors. Feature vectors will always be assumed to 
be (n x 1) column vectors and will be denoted by xa, 
where 
Xl I I 
x2 I I 
I 
I 
( 1 ) xa = I I 
I 
I 
xn 
I 
I 
and xi represents the ith feature. The notation 
(2) 
where the prime (I) indicates transposition f is equivalent. 
Similarly, 
( 3 ) 
For reference, the principal symbols used in this 
work are listed in Appendix A, Summary of Notation. 
CLASSIFIERS 
The ser,ond major problem in pattern classification is 
to determine an algorithm, called a classifier, which 
assigns a pattern to a set or class based on the information 
contained in the feature vector. The classes are assumed to 
be mutually exclusive and will be denoted by Cl , C2, ... , CM, 
where M is the number of classes. Since the direction of 
change of interest rates can only be up or down (ignoring 
the case of no change), two classes will suffice here; but 
most of what follows can be generalized to problems with 
more than two classes. 
If the feature vectors are considered to be points 
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in an n-dimensional Euclidean space, then (in the two-class 
case) the classification problem can be seen as one of 
partitioning that space into regions such that all points 
in one class lie on one side of the partition boundary, 
while the rest of the points lie on the other side. A 
simple case is illustrated iil ~igure 1 where the feature 
space is a plane, the feature vectors from classes C1 
and C2 are distinctly marked, and the partition boundary 
is the straight line. 
Let 
( 4 ) 
be the eguation of any partition boundary that correctly 
partitions the space so that the points in the two 
different classes fallon different sides of the boundary. 
Then it turns out that the function 
(5 ) 
evaluated at the points in feature space will be 
greater than zero for all points in one of the classes and 
less than zero for all points in the other. Consequently, 
d(x) is useful as a classifier and is called a decision 
function or a discriminant function. Any continuous 
x x o 
x o 
Figure 1. Linearly separable features in a two-dimensional 
feature space. 
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function can be used as a decision function, but it is 
frequently convenient to restrict attention to functions 
that are linear in xi. Since the individual features, 
xi' may be combinations o~ transformations of the 
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original pattern elements, the linear limitation is much 
less restrictive than it first appears. In the 
two-dimensional illustration of Figure 1 the linear 
decis~on boundary is a straight line; in higher dimensions, 
linear decision boundaries are planes or hyperplanes. 
Nonlinear decision functions are not discussed here. 
The general form of a linear discriminant function 
in n dimensions is 
d(x} = wIxI + w2 x 2 + ••• + wnxn + wn+1 
( 6) 
= wo' Xo + Wn+ 1 
where the vector Wo = (WI' W2' ,wn )' 
is called the parameter vector or weight vector. In 
order to employ vector notation it is conventional in 
pattern recognition to augment the the vectors by 
appending a 1 to the feature vector and wn+1 to the 
weight vector. In what follows the terms feature vector 
and weight vector refer to their augmented versions, and 
the subscript (o) is dropped, i.e., 
(7) x = (xli x2' .•. , x n ' 1)' 
and 
( 8 ) 
With this notation the decision or discriminant function 
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is 
( 9 ) d(x) = w'x 
Having chosen the form of the discriminant function, one 
tries to determine values for the weight vector so that the 
decision function partitions the feature space correctly. A 
set of feature vectors (representing elements of the two 
different classes) which can be correctly partitioned 
by a l~near decision function is called a linearly 
separabl~ set. In practice this partitioning objective is 
frequently unattainable. Figure 2 illustrates a situation 
where the elements of the two classes cannot be separated 
by a linear decision function in the given feature space. 
There are many methods of computing a weight vector. 
An important group, which take into account statistical 
knowledge about the relative frequency of the features 
within the classes, are the parametric methods. As 
standard references (Tou and Gonzalez, 1974; Young and 
Calvert, 1974; Duda and Hart, 1973) demonstrate, these 
approaches rest on a sound basis of statistical decision 
theory and can be shown to possess desirable optimality 
properties, when the underlying assumptions are valid. 
One of the important assumptions required is that the 
statistical distributions remain stable. 
The present author holds the opinion that the U.S. 
economy is not stable in the usual statistical sense; it 
is evolutionary. What is needed here, then, is a method 
x x o 
o x 
x 0 
o 
Figure 2. Linearly unseparable features in a two-dimensional 
feature space. 
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of determining the weight vector which can learn from its 
errors and change with the evolving economy. In a more 
general context, Jantsch (1976) discusses what is required 
if a system is to learn. 
The prerequisite for learning is a certain 
plasticity of the system which allows it to 
have a history. In evolving systems .•. each 
state depends on the past ..•. There exists 
therefore a "system memory" .••• 
Qne group of approaches for determining weight 
vectors which satisfy this prerequisite is the class of 
nonparametric methods. With these methods, each new 
feature vector is processed using the then-current weight 
vector. The computed class is compared with the actual 
class and if an error is made, the classifier adjusts its 
weight vector so that similar errors become less likely. 
Each state of the classifier depends on the past and the 
system memory is retained in the values of the weight 
vector. Advanced versions of this type of classifier can 
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also extract information from correctly classified feature 
vectors, that is, the performance of these classifiers may 
be expected to improve even without their having made a 
classification error. 
The pattern classification process is represented 
schematically in Figure 3. 
Patterns 
Feature 
Selector 
Features 
Decisions 
Figure 3. The pattern classification process. 
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THE PERCEPTRON 
In this subsection the perceptron algorithm is 
derived and discussed not only because it is historically 
important but also because it clearly illustrates important 
principles. 
Let (x(I),x(2), ... , x(n» be a set of augmented 
feature vectors for which the correct classification 
between two sets is known. Assume the set is linearly 
separable r i.e., that there exists at least one weight 
vector W*r called a solution vector, such that 
w*'x(i) > 0 for all x(i} in class C1 and w*'x(i) < 0 
for all xCi) in class C2. Let w(l) be an arbitrarily 
chosen initial estimate of w*. Successive estimates are 
denoted w(2), w(3), ..•. Take the first feature vector, 
x(l), compute w'(l)x(l) and proceed according to the 
following rule: 
If the result is positive and x(l) is a 
member of class Cl , then the pattern is 
correctly classified and no change is made 
to w, so w(2) = well. 
If the result is negative and x(l) is a 
member of C2 ' then the pattern is correctly 
classified so no change is required and 
w(2) = well. 
If the result is positive or zero and x(l) 
is a member of C 2 , then an error has occurred. 
Set w(2) = well - axel), where a is an arbitrary 
positive constant. 
If the result is negative or zero and x(l) 
is a member of Cl , there is an error. Set 
w(2) = w(l) + ax(l). 
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This process is continued with x(2), x(3), •.. , 
x(n), recycling through the whole set as many times as is 
necessa~y to correctly classify all patterns. An example 
of the process is given below. It can be shown (Tou and 
Gonzalez, 1974) that if the set is linearly separable, the 
process will correctly assign all feature vectors after a 
finite number of steps. If the set is not linearly 
separable, the algorithm will oscillate forever. 
The algorithm can be expressed more concisely. 
Define a new set of vectors (y(l), y(2), ... , YJn» 
equivalent to the old group of feature vectors except that 
those ~hich are members of C2 are multiplied by -1. In 
other words, y(i) = xCi) if xCi) is a member of class 
Cl , and y(i) = -xCi) if xCi) is in C2 • 
The condition for correct classification, 
w'y(i) > 0 for all y(i), is obviously equivalent to 
w'x(i) > 0 for xCi) in class Cl and w'x(i) < 0 for 
xCi) in C2 • 
Then the perceptron algorithm is 
w(k+l) = w(k) if w'(k)y(k) > 0 
(10) 
= w(k) + ay(k) if w'(k)y(k) < 0 
where the vectors x(k) in class C2 have been 
multiplied by -1 to obtain y(k), a is an arbitrary 
positive constant and w(l) is chosen arbitrarily_ 
The percept ron can be viewed as a reward-punishment 
scheme ~"here the algor i thm is "punished II by having its 
weight vector changed every time it makes a mistake and 
"rewarded" by being left alone if it classifies correctly. 
T~e following simple example, illustrated in Figure 
4, shows the operation of the perceptron algorithm. Let 
the feature vectors be (-1,-2), (0,1), (-1,-3), (0,0), 
and (2,2). Then the augmented feature vectors are 
x(l) = (-1,-2,1) 
x(2) = (0,1,1) 
x(3) = (-1,-3,1) 
x(4) = (0,0,1) 
x(5) = (2,2,1) 
Let x(l), x(3) and x(4) belong to class C1 and let x(2) 
and x(S) belong to C2 - Multiplying the vectors in C2 
by -1, the full set of y vectors is 
y(l) = (-1,-2,1) 
y(2) = (0,-1,-1) 
y(3) = (-1,-3,1) 
y(4) = (0,0,1) 
y(5) = (-2,-2,-1) 
Arbitrarily let w(l) = (1,1,1)' and a = 1. Then, applying 
the algorithm, 
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Intermediate 
Final 
-4 -2 2 
Initial 
-2 
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Figure 4. Evolution of the perceptron partition boundary in a 
two-dimensional feature space. 
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w'(l)y(l) = (1,1,1)(-1,-2,1)' = -1-2+1 = -2 
w(2) = w(l) + ay(l) 
= (1,1,1)' + (1){-1,-2,1)' = (0,-1,2)' 
w'(2)y(2) = (0,-1,2)(0,-1,-1)' = 0+1-2 = -1 
w(3} = w(2) + ay(2) 
= (0,-1,2) + (1)(0,-1,-1)' = (0,-2,1)' 
w'(3)y(3) = (0,-2,1}(-1,-3,1)' = 0+6+1 = 7 
w(4) = ~(3) = (0,-2,1)' 
w'(4)y(4) = (0,-2,1)(0,0,1)' = 0+0+1 = 1 
w(5) = w(4) = (0,-2,1)' 
w'(5)y(5) = (0,-2,1)(-2,-2,-1)' = 0+4-1 = 3 
w(6) = w(5) = (0,-2,1)' 
w'(6)y(1) = (0,-2,1)(-1,-2,1)' = 0+4+1 = 5 
w(7) = w(6} = (0,-2,1)' 
w'(7)y(2) = (0,-2,1}(0,-1,-1)' = 0+2-1 = 1 
Corrections were made after the first and second steps 
because the vectors yell and y(2) were misc1assified. 
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The final weight vector w = w(7) = (0,-2,1) correctly 
classifies all feature vectors. The corresponding decision 
function is d(x), 
(11) d(x) = w'x = - 2x2 + 1 
and the decision boundary is the equation 
(12) d(x) = - 2x2 + 1 = ° 
Confusion over notation is avoided by remembering that 
xCi) and y(i) are vectors, but xi and Yi are 
components of vectors. 
The perceptron is just one of a family of iterative 
algorithms that can be derived analytically from a 
properly defined criterion function, J(w), which is a 
mathematical specification of the objective to be 
achieved. In other fields the criterion function is 
sometimes called a cost function, objective function, 
or a loss function. 
Consider a particular criterion function J p 
defined by 
(13) Jp(w) = .5 (:w'y: - w'y) 
where :w'y: is the absolute value of w'y and it is 
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assumed that the feature vectors are linearly separable and 
that the augmented feature vectors belonging to class C2 
have been multiplied by -1 to obtain y. From the previous 
discussion it is known that if w'y > 0, then the pattern 
is correctly classified. Note that the criterion function, 
J p , is minimized if w'y > O. Ignoring the trivial case 
where w = 0, the zero vector, it is clear that the 
function will be minimized when a pattern is correctly 
assigned. The converse is also true. Consequently, 
minimization of J p provides a weight vector that 
correctly classifies y. 
Of the many minimization techniques that have been 
developed (Beveridge and Schechter, 1970: Cooper and 
Steinberg, 1970), a simple approach employing gradients is 
used here to develop a recursive formula for finding ~he 
minimum of J p • Recall from the calculus that the gradient 
vector is defined as the partial derivatives of a function 
with respect to its arguments. 
(14) 
df(z) 
grad f(z) = 
dz 
( df 
= (-=---, ( £zl 
df df ) , 
. . . , ----- ) 
£zn ) 
The gradient of a scalar function with a vector 
argument is a vector. The components of the vector give 
the rate of change of the function in the direction of 
the corresponding function argument. The gradient vector 
has the property of pointing in the direction of greatest 
increase of the function when the arguments increase; 
conversely, the negative of the gradient vector points 
in the direction of steepest descent. 
Starting with an arbitrary weight vector, w(l), 
the minimization scheme increments w in the direction of 
steepest descent, i.e., in the direction of the negative 
of the gradient vector. Mathematically, this process can 
be represented, at any step, by 
(15) w(k+l) = w{k) - a grad J(w) 
where the gradient is evaluated at w(k) and a is 
an arbitrary positive constant. Call (15) the general 
gradient algorithm. 
Now apply the general gradient algorithm to the 
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criterion function given in ( 13 ) . The gradient is 
(16) grad Jp(w) = . 5 (y sgn (w'y) - y) 
where the sign function, sgn (w'y) , is defined as 
sgn (w'y) = 1 if w'y > 0 
(17) 
= -1 if w'y < 0 
Substitution of (16) in (15) yields 
w(k+1) = w(k) - .5a (y sgn (w'y) - y) 
(18) = w(k) if w'x > 0 
= w( k) + ay if w'y < 0 
-
Obviously this is the perceptron algorithm. 
As a secopd example of the application of the 
general gradient algorithm, consider a criterion function 
which is one-half the square of the one used above, i.e., 
let 
(19) JR(w) = .125 (:w'y: - w'y) 2 
The gradient is 
(20) grad JR(w) = .25 (:w'y: - w'y) (y sgn (w'y) - y) 
Substitution in the general gradient algorithm (15) givC8 
w(k+l) = w(k) - .25a (:w'y: - w'y)(y sgn (w'y) - y) 
(21) = w(k} if w'y > 0 
= w(k) + ay :w'y: if w'y < 0 
This is called the relaxation algorithm. 
Many algorithms of this type have been developed 
and are limited only by the ability to provide meaningful 
criterion functions. 
The classifiers considered above are recursive 
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schemes which are designed by processing one feature vector 
at a time and making adjustments to the weights only if 
the pattern is misclassified. In nonseparable situations, 
the process does not converge. Even in linearly separable 
cases, the number of steps required to reach a solution may 
be very large. In practice one is seldom able to know in 
advance whether the set is linearly separable. This gives 
rise to the obvious problem of deciding when to stop the 
operation of the algorithm. In the separable case one may 
stop too soon; in the nonseparable case one may stop at a 
point where the weight vector is far from its optimal 
value. Moreover, "good" choices for the initial weight 
vector, w(l), and the correction constant, a, as well as 
proper scaling of the components of the feature vectors, 
significantly affect the ability of these classifiers to 
move rapidly toward a solution. Finally, the solution 
vector depends on the order in which the feature vectors 
are presented to the algorithm. 
The minimum squared error classifier developed below 
overcomes most of the perceptron's disadvantages by 
analytically determining a unique weight vector using all 
feature vectors simultaneously. 
THE MINIMUM SQUARED ERROR CLASSIFIER 
The presentation and programming of the minimum 
squared error classifier is simplified by matrix notation 
(Anscombe, 1981; Helzer, 1983). Uppercase bold letters at 
the end of the alphabet represent matrices; thus X and 
Yare matrices. The transpose of a matrix X is denoted 
X' and its inverse, if defined, is X-I. 
With this notation let Y represent a matrix the 
rows of which are the vectors y', previously defined. 
The classification problem requires that a solution vector 
w be found such that 
(22) Yw > 0 
where 0 is the zero vector. Now consider the more 
stringent, but mathematically and computationally more 
tractable task of finding a vector w that satisfies the 
set of simultaneous linear equations 
(23) Yw = a 
where ai > 0 for all i. Clearly a solution to (23) 
is a solution to (22). 
Let the matrix Y be of size (t x n+1), that 
let there be t equations in n+l unknowns (wl 1 w2 1 
is, 
... , 
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Wn+l) where, in general, t is significantly greater than 
n+1. In other words, there are t patterns of known 
classification, each represented by a vector of n features 
and the augmentation constant 1. The system of equations 
(23) will generally be overdetermined and no exact solution 
will exist. Consequently, an approximate solution that 
minimizes some function of the errors, defined as 
(24) 
is required. An obvious goal would be to minimize the sum 
of the absolute values of the errors, 
(25) sum i : (a i - w' y ( i ) ) : 
but this is computationally difficult. A somewhat less 
satisfactory alternative is to minimize the sum of the 
squared errors, represented by the criterion function, 
(26) Js(w) = sumi (ai - w'Y(i»2 = (a - Yw)'(a - Yw) 
The gradi~nt of J s is 
(27) grad J s = -2(Y'a - Y'Yw) 
Since there are no constraints, the gradient can be set 
equal to zero and the equations solved for the vector w 
which minimizes the criterion function. Hence, equating 
the gradient to 0 and manipulating, 
(28) w = (y'y)-lY'a 
The matrix (y'y)-ly' is sometimes called the 
pseudo inverse or generalized inverse of Y and will be 
denoted by y#. The vector w is the solutlon to the 
so-called normal equations of ordinary least squares 
regression. If a is set equal to 1, the unit vector, 
Duda and Hart (1973) show that (28) yields an asymptotic 
approximation to an optimal classifier. 
An equivalent formulation, using the original 
feature vectors x, is 
( 29) 
where the rows of X are the vectors x' and b is a 
vector such that b i = 1 if xCi) is a member of class 
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C1 and b i = -1 if x(i) is in class C2 • 
The weight vector determined by this classifier is 
not guaranteed to correctly classify the patterns even 
when they are linearly separable. The algorithm provides a 
unique solution, however, and represents a reasonable 
compromise for separable and nonseparable pattern 
classification problems. The minimum squared errpr 
algorithm ~as received wide attention in the literature. 
With certain modifications, it will be applied here to the 
interest rate forecasting problem. 
To illustrate the operation of the minimum squared 
error classifier, reconsider the example presented above. 
The matrix X and its generalized inverse X# are, 
respectively, 
X = 
X# = (.009) 
:-1 -2 1: 
I 0 1 1: I 
:-1 -3 1: 
I 0 0 1: I 
I 2 2 1: I 
:-14 -63 31 -IS 64: 
: -3 42 -33 12 -IS: 
: 21 39 9 27 15: 
and the vector b is (1, -1, 1, 1, -1)'. The solution 
vector is 
w = (-.OlS, -.432, .027)' 
The example is presented graphically in Figure 5. 
Different solutions can be provided by the percept ron and 
the minimum squared error classifier, particularly when 
only a few points are to be separated. 
-4 -2 
x 
x 
4 
I 
2 
-2 
-4 
o 
2 
Figure 5. Partition boundary for the minimum squared error 
algorithm in a two-dimensional feature space. 
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WEIGHTED LINEAR CLASSIFIERS 
It was suggested in Chapter II that actual pattern 
recognition problems seldom come so nicely packaged that 
standard approaches can be routinely applied. Rather, each 
problem has its unique aspects that may demand the creative 
use of ad hoc procedures and specially designed algorithms. 
Now it becomes necessary to leave behind the textbook 
techniques "that have characterized the PR presentation so 
far and develop methods that help with the actual interest 
rate forecasting problem. 
What should be the objective of an interest rate 
forecaster? Ideally one would prefer an accurate point 
forecast of the interest rate at some future date. An 
alternative, which suffices equally well in many practical 
decision situations, is to forecast instead the direction 
of change in interest rates. Given this more modest 
objective, how might performance be judged? One frequently 
used measure is the probability of error, but this is too 
limited since all errors are not equally costly. In other 
words, it is possible to conceive of situations where the 
direction of change is forecast correctly when the amount 
of change is small, but incorrectly when the amount of 
change is large. Clearly some weighting scheme is needed. 
An initially reasonable demand on an interest rate 
forecaster is that he be required always to have a 
forecast about the direction of future interest rate 
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movement, i.e., "no opinion" is not allowed. An initially 
reasonable utility function is linear, so that the 
marginal utility (disutility) of a gain (loss) is 
constant. Under such conditions the forecaster will try to 
forecast so as to maximize the sum of the gains less the 
sum of the losses incurred by following the forecasts. An 
initially reasonable assumption is that gains and losses 
are propor~ional to the amount of change in the interest 
rate. 
A criterion function, J Nf incorporating these 
conditions and assumptions is 
(30) sumi I I I () , ) I IVillsgn vi - sgn (w x I 
where :Vi: is the magnitude of the change in the interest 
rate and the rest of the symbols are as previously defined. 
If sgn (vi) = sgn (w'x), then the forecast of the 
direction of change is correct, the second term in the 
expression above is zero, and the contribution to the 
criterion function by the first term is :Vi:' the gain 
achieved by the forecast. If the signs are not equal, the 
forecast is in error and the net contribution to I N is 
-lVi:' the amount lost by following the forecast. Thus 
maximizing I N maximizes the net gain. 
It is equivalent to minimize the sum of the losses. 
The appropriate criterion Eunction to be minimized is 
( 31 ) 
Unfortunately, the presence of the term, sgn (w'x(i», 
makes either of these two criterion functions, (30) or 
(31), discontinuous. Consequently, the gradient is not 
everywhere defined and the optimization methods previously 
used cannot be directly applied. One way of overcoming the 
difficulty is to substitute a continuous approximation for 
sgn (w'x(i». Many functions might serve satisfactorily. 
A particularly convenient choice uses the hyperbolic 
tangent 
exp(z) - exp(-z) 
(32) tanh z = ----------------
exp(z) + exp(-z) 
Let s be an arbitrary positive constant and let 
tanh (sw'x(i» replace sgn (w'x(i» in (31) above. 
(33) 
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Call this the hyperbolic tangent algorithm. It is easy to 
show that J T approaches J L in the limit as s approaches 
infinity. Figure 6 illustrates the approximation of sgn (z) 
by tanh (sz). 
The gradient of J T is 
(34) grad J T = -.5s sumi :vi:x(i)sech2 (sw'x(i» 
Conceptually it is easy to set the gradient equal to zero 
and solve the simultaneous equations for a minimum. In 
practice, this is difficult. Because the criterion function 
has many local minima, other optimization techniques 
encounter problems as well. These minimization difficul-
ties, particularly the possibility of achieving a local 
1.0 I 
( 
0.5 
-3.0 -2.0 -1.0 i.O 2.0 3.0 
Figure 6. Hyperbolic tangent approximation to the sign function. 
Tanhlsx} for s m .5, i. 3, and 9. 
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rather than a global minimum, motivate the search for an 
alternate formulation which assures that a global optimum 
will be found. The guarantee of a global optimum is 
achieved only at the cost of some misspecification of the 
objective. 
Recall the criterion function for the minimum square 
error classifier 
(35) 
Following the weighting scheme used with the hyperbolic 
tangent algorithm, insert into the summation of (35) an 
additional term representing the absolute value of the 
change in interest rates, :Vi:' and define a new 
criterion. function 
(36) 
If ui is set equal to the positive square root of 
then ui can be taken inside the squared term and 
distributed, giving 
(37) 
Define a diagonal matrix, U, with nonzero elements, ui. 
The matrix equivalent of (37) is 
(38) Jw(w} = (Ua - UYw) '(Ua - UYw) 
The gradient of J w is 
(39) grad J w = -2Y'U'Ua + 2Y'U'UYw 
Setting the gradient equal to 0 and solving for w gives 
w = (Y'U'Oy)-lY'U'Ua 
(40) = (YU) #Ua 
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This is the weighted least sguares algorithm, and is 
sometimes denoted WLS. 
If class C1 is defined by vi > 0 (i.e., interest 
rates increase) and class C2 by vi < 0, then sgn (vi) 
specifies the class of xCi). Let b = sgn (vi). With 
these definitions, an equivalent formulation in terms of 
the original feature vectors is 
(41) w = (XU)#Ub 
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A pattern is assigned to C1 if w'x > 0 or to C2 if w'x < O. 
The device of weighting the individual terms by the 
amount of the change in interest rates was motivated by 
the desire to achieve the defined objective. An 
alternative viewpoint may be taken, namely that those 
feature vectors which lead to greater changes are somehow 
more informative (i.e., contain more information, are less 
subject to error) than those which correspond to smaller 
interest rate changes. 
The solution to (41) is straightforward. All vectors 
are considered simultaneously and the result is unique 
since the matrix is almost never singular. But the price 
in terms of distortion of the objective has been paid. 
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SELF-ADAPTATION OF THE CLASSIFIERS 
Many PR problems concern processes that are 
inherently stable. This means that if a classifier giving 
adequate performance can once be developed, it need not 
later be changed. A reasonable approach under such 
circumstances is to select a large, representative sample 
of feature vectors, present them to the classifier, accept 
the resulting weight vector as definitive, and put the 
classifier into operation. In PR terminology the first 
phase of this process (when the weight vector is being 
determined) is called training--whether it be multi-step, 
as with the perceptron, or one-step, as with the minimum 
squared error classifier. The separation of the training 
phase from the operating phase is a matter of convenience 
and practicality. There is no conceptual reason that the 
classifier could not continue to learn and modify its 
weight vector on the basis of feedback about its operating 
performance. 
Indeed, the author has emphasized the necessity of a 
classifier being able to use such feedback to continually 
modify itself when the system or environment is undergoing 
change. However, to reduce mathematical and conceptual 
complexity while the algorithms were being derived above, 
that ability was not stressed. For the same reason the 
crucial distinction between retrospective and prospective 
performance was allowed to remain blurred. It is time to 
correct the first of these lapses and examine how the 
classifiers are expected to change themselves as new 
information becomes available during their operation. 
The easiest way to view the adaptation process is 
to assume that, as each new pattern of known 
classification becomes available, the classification 
problem is created de novo and that a new solution must 
be found without reference to prior results. The 
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sequence of solutions (weight vectors) so determined 
represents the adaptation of the classifier over time. 
Depending on the algorithm, it may turn out that that this 
formulation of the adaptation process is highly 
inefficient computationally, but for now it keeps the 
concepts straight. 
Consider a sequence of augmented feature vectors, 
x(i), i = 1, 2, . . . , m. Consider also a sequence of 
problems, P j , j = 1, 2, ••. , m. The problems are related 
to the vectors as follows: problem Pj consists of finding 
a weight vector, w<j>, which classifies the vectors 
x(k), for k less than or equal to j. (Conceptually and 
notationally, w<j> is distinct from w(k) used in 
conjunction with the perceptron and relaxation algorithms: 
w<j> is a final solution to problem Pj, w(k) is an 
interim result occurring only if certain kinds of algorithms 
are u~ed: w<j> is the result of a major loop or iteration, 
w(k) is the result of a minor loop or iteration.) Let the 
matrix, W, be constructed such that its rows are the 
weight vectors, w'<j> , sequentially obtained by solving 
the problems, Pj. The matrix provides a history of the 
evolution of the classifier. 
Refer back to the example illustrating the 
perceptron. The matrix W for th2t case is 
-1 -3 3: 
0 -2 1: 
W = 0 -2 1: 
0 -2 1: 
0 -2 1: 
because w<l> = (-1, -3, 3)', (not previously computed) 
correctly classifies x(l) if presented by itself; 
w<2> = (0, -2, I)' correctly classifies x(l) 
and x(2);·w<3> = (0, -2, 1)' correctly classifies 
x(l), x(2) and x(3); w<4> = (0, -2, 1)' correctly 
classifies x(l), x(2), x(3) and x(4)i finally 
w<5> = (0, -2, I)' correctly classifies all five 
vectors. 
A special convention is required for the minimum 
squared error and weighted least squares algorithms since 
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a solution vector is not defined by the algorithm when the 
number of vectors is less than the number of elements in 
the augmented feature vector (when, in other words, the 
number of equations in (23) is less than the number of 
unknowns to be determined). Arbitrarily let the 
undetermined rows of W be set equal to 0'. For the 
minimum squared error example above, let the first two 
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rows be 0'. Additional computation shows that the third 
and fourth rows are, respectively, (-2, 0, -1) and 
(2, -1, .5). The last row is the solution vector of the 
problem as initially given, (-.018, -.432, .027). Hence the 
matrix is 
I 
.000 .000 .000: I 
I 
.000 nnn .000: I .vuv 
W = :-2.000 .000 -1.000: 
I 2.000 -1.000 .500: I 
! 
-.018 -.432 .027: I 
This adaptation is illustrated in Figures 7, 8 and 9. 
In problems with a large number of feature vectors, 
examination of the matrix W provides worthwhile insight 
into the evolution of the coefficients of the classifier. 
It is also sometimes desirable to standardize the rows of 
w so that the length of all the vectors is 1. 
The computational burdens imposed by starting over 
from the beginning each time a new observation becomes 
available can be severe. Naturally, the efficient approach 
is to use the final solution vector of the previous major 
iteration as the starting point for the new problem. This 
is a trivial matter for algorithms like the perceptron 
where a recursive formulation is already being used. It 
is not immediately obvious how to proceed with either 
minimum squared error or weighted least squares algorithms. 
Fortunately, recursive schemes have been devised so that 
the repeated matrix inversions seemingly called for by 
(29) and (41) are unnecessary. Adapting Harvey (1981) to 
4 
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-4 
Figure 7. Partition boundary for minimum squared error algorithm 
-- first three pOints. 
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/ -41 
Figure B. Partition boundary for minimum squared errQr algorithm 
-- first four points. 
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Figure 9. Partition bGundary for minimum squared error algorithm 
-- all five points. 
92 
the notation used here, let 
(42) w<j-l> = (X'<j-l>X<j-l»-l X'<j-l> b<j-l> 
= X#<j-l> b<j-l> 
represent the solution vector obtained from the minimum 
squared error algorithm using only the first j-l feature 
vectors. Now assume the jth feature vector and its 
classification become available. Then the updated solution 
vector w<j> i9 
(43) w<j> = w<j-l> + 
(X'<j-l>X<j-l»-l x(j) (b j - w'<j-l>x(j»/f(j) 
where 
(44) f(j) = 1 + x'(j) (X'<j-l>X<j-l»-l x(j) 
93 
The inverted cross-product matrix needed for the next cycle 
is 
(X'<j>X<j»-l = (X'<j-l>X<j-l»-l 
(45) 
- (X'<j-l>X<j-l»-l x (j) x'(j) (X'<j-l>X<j-l»-l/f(j) 
While notationally formidable, this method is actually not 
difficult to implement computationally and it saves a large 
amount of computer time. Harvey also shows how to compute 
w without any direct matrix inversion. 
Extension of these procedures to the weighted least 
squares algorithm is straightforward. 
In operation, the recursively updated weighted least 
squares algorithm is used to obtain reasonable estimates 
for the weight vector. These estimates can then be refined 
using the hyperbolic tangent algorithm. The former has an 
analytic solution and is computationally efficient; the 
latter requires the use of numeric search techniques that 
are slow and may not converge. For these reasons the 
recursively updated weighted least squares algorithm is 
the one used here. An example of the use of the hyperbolic 
tangent algorithm to improve the WLS classifier is given 
in Appendix C. 
SUMMARY 
94 
This chapter shows how, starting from basic principles, 
it is possible to derive mathematical algorithms that will 
act as pattern classifiers. Three traditional classifiers 
were derived: the perceptron, the relaxation algorithm, and 
the least mean squared error classifier. Then two 
additional algorithms were developed to deal with the 
specific problem at hand. The recursively updated weighted-
least-squared-error algorithm is a combination of known 
mathematical techniques here applied to the classification 
problem. The hyperbolic tangent algorithm was developed by 
the author following techniques suggested by Highleyman 
(1962) • 
CHAPTER IV 
INTEREST RATE FORECASTING 
This chapter reports the substance of the research. 
PRELIMINARY MATTERS 
What Is a Forecast? 
There is a proverb, variously attributed, as follows: 
To prophesy is difficult -- especially about the 
future. 
It may be inscrutable Chinese wisdom; more likely it is 
wry commentary on what passes, these days, as economic 
forecasting; certainly it is more tactful than the 
alternative: 
To prophesy is easy -- especially about the past. 
Much of the literature on interest rate forecasting 
concerns prophecy about the past. 
Any article on interest rates appearing in an 
economic journal is likely to exhibit equations of the 
form 
(46) 
where Rt is the interest rate at time t and Xt , Yt and Zt 
are the values of explanatory variables contemporaneous 
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with the interest rate, i.e., at time t. If the goal of 
research is the understanding, explanation, or verification 
of the economic factors that determine interest rates, this 
formulation may be appropriate~ see, for example, Hamburger 
and Silber (1969) and Feldstein and Eckstein (1970). 
Rewrite equation (46) with different subscripts 
(47) Rt +h = ao + a1Xt+h + a2Yt+h + a3 Zt+h 
where Rt+h.is the forecast (made at time t)of what the 
interest rate will be h periods ahead (at time t+h) and 
Xt+h' Yt +h and Zt+h are estimates (made at time t) 
of what the explanatory variables will be at time t+h. 
Obviously the forecaster proposing to use equation (47) is 
required to provide these estimates. It may be that the 
equation is part of a multi-equation structural model 
which itself generates the needed estimates (Hunt, 1976)~ 
if so, the formulation is not to be faulted. Of course, the 
quality of the forecast then depends as much on the quality 
of the estimates as on the validity of the equation. 
As a single equation for forecasting, however, (47) 
simply will not do. Unfortunately many articles on interest 
rate forecasting use just this form with no hint whatsoever 
as to how to obtain estimates of the explanatory variables 
used in the equation. When the actual values of X, Y and Z 
become available, they are duly entered into the equation 
and, with straight face, the forecaster pronounces his 
"forecast" a success. 
A possibly proper form for a single forecasting 
equation is 
(48) Rt +h = ao + a1X t + a2 Yt + a3 Zt 
where Rt +h is the forecast (made at time t) of what the 
interest rate will be at time t+h, and Xt , Yt and Zt 
are the values of relevant variables at time t. 
This discussion suggests the concept of an 
information set, a term used informally earlier. An 
information set at time t, denoted It, consists of all 
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the data, knowledge, theories and assumptions available as 
of time t (Granger and Newbold, 1977). Economic data from 
the future cannot really be included in the information 
set. It; in forecasting fantasy land it often is. 
Frequently, economic time series relating to time t 
may not actually be compiled and published until some time 
thereafter. In such cases the forecasting formula must 
inccrporate the appropriate lags so that the proper 
equation becomes 
(49) Rt+h = ao + a1X t - k + a2 Yt-k + a3 Zt-k 
where the subscript t-k refers to data relating to time 
t-k which does not become available until time t. 
Sometimes future data sneak into the information set 
through the back door. If, for example, a data series is 
standardized to zero mean and unit variance, the value at 
t+h influences the transformed value at time t. Similarly, 
if a series is detrended, there is a danger that the 
future will be permitted to influence the past. 
The models developed here produce real forecasts. 
They are not contingent or conditional in any sense. In 
particular, they do not require the use of an information 
set that does not exist when the forecast is being made. 
There is no retrospective forecasting here, only 
prospective forecasting. 
What Rate to Forecast? 
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The interest rate variable considered in this study 
is a yield rate on long-term U.S. government securities, in 
particular, the interest rate on twenty-year, constant-
maturity U.S. government bonds. This series is computed 
daily by the U.S. Treasury and published by the Federal 
Reserve Board in statistical releases H.lS and G.13 (Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, various dates). 
The rate is shown, for the years 1967 though 1982, in 
Figure 10. 
"Information About the Treasury Constant Maturity 
Yield Series" (U.S. Treasury, no date) explains the 
process by which the series is computed. First the 
Treasury obtains quotations on all actively traded 
government issues as reported to the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York by five U.S. government securities dealers. 
The bid price quotes are converted to yield rates and 
plotted on a graph. The horizontal axis shows the maturity 
date of each security and the vertical axis measures the 
15 
12 
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9 
6 
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70 73 76 79 
Figure 10. Interest rate on 20-year constant-maturity U.S. 
government bonds. 1967-82. 
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'\ 
82 
yield rate. A yield curve (see Figure 11) is derived with 
the greatest weight being given to the more recently 
issued, most actively traded securities. In particular, 
so-called flower bonds which have low coupons, which sell 
at deep discounts, and which possess inheritance tax 
advantages receive very little weight. From the curve it 
is possible to obtain the yield for a twenty-year bond 
even if no actual issue with that exact maturity is being 
traded. 
Because of legislatively imposed interest rate 
ceilings, no Treasury bonds with maturities exceeding 
seven years were sold between June 1965 and August 1971, 
and no bonds with maturities exceeding fifteen years 
were issued between June 1965 and December 1972. As a 
result of increasing coupon rates and higher yields over 
that period, the twenty-year series increasingly 
understated the "true" level of rates. When a new 
twenty-year bond was again auctioned in January 1973, a 
discontinuity of about 75 basis points (.75%) appeared 
and is evident in Figure 10. This aberration has been 
removed by the simple expedient of increasing all rates 
prior to January 1973 by 75 basis points. The resulting 
distortion in the change in rates for any month 
probably does not exceed one or two basis points and is 
properly ignored. 
The series described above is artificial, in 
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Figure i1. The yield curve shows interest rates as a function 
of tlme-to-maturity. 
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the sense that it is not the rate on any actual bond, and 
consequently it does not represent an actual security that 
could be bought or sold. It does, however, have many 
favorable attributes. It is closely representative of many 
government bonds at the long end of the maturity spectrum 
and thus is less subject to random fluctuations influencing 
any particular bond. By its nature, it eliminates time-to-
maturity as .a variable affecting rate changes. Moreover, 
the use of government securities eliminates variation in 
rates due to changes in the credit quality of the issuer. 
Once a series has been chosen, there remain a number 
of other important practical questions to be answered. Over 
what time-period is the forecast to be made: a day, week, 
month, quarter or year? A one-month forecast horizon is 
used here. It coincides with the reporting interval of a 
very large number of economic time series and allows a 
reasonable number of data points for statistical analysis. 
While many users of an interest rate forecast 
would prefer an accurate point estimate, the direction of 
change in interest rates between month-ends is forecast 
here. Knowledge of the direction of change would serve just 
as well in many practical situations (Fraser, 1977; 
McCracken, 1976). For example, the following decisions could 
be made on the basis of a binary forecast: 
Whether or not to hedge a fixed-income 
portfolio. 
Whether to buy long-term bonds or invest in 
short-term cash-equivalents. 
Whether to issue debentures currently or 
borrow from a bank and await possibly lower 
rates. 
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An important practical reason for forecasting the direction 
of change is that it is easier than forecasting the amount 
of change. Tpis follows from a formal result in information 
theory and cybernetics, called the law of requisite 
variety (Ashby, 1964; Hare, 1967). The law is of wide 
applicability, but interpreted for the context at hand it 
says that complexity of the forecasting system can be 
reduced if the range of outcomes to be forecast is 
smaller. 
The decision to forecast the difference between 
month-end values {rather than changes in monthly averages} 
is motivated by statistical considerations. Changes in the 
monthly average of a series will be correlated even if the 
individual daily values are uncorrelated (Working, 1960). 
The existence of correlation in changes of monthly averages 
can lead the unsuspecting to assert the existence of 
patterns in data that are really spurious; and even if 
recognized, it makes evaluation of the forecasting results 
much more difficult. 
To summarize: the objective of this study is to 
forecast the direction of change between month-end values 
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of the interest rate on twenty-year, constant-maturity u.s. 
government bonds. 
THE OBJECTIVE FUNCTION 
One way to approach the interest rate forecasting 
problem is to search for a set of variables, Xi' (which 
have been called features) and a set of weights, Wi' such 
that, when a new feature vector is presented, the weighted 
sum 
(50) 
is always greater than zero when interest rates increase 
and is always less than zero when rates decrease. 
Unfortunately such a perfect classifier is not to be 
found. Given the inevitability of errors, what lesser goal 
should be sought? It was argued above that under 
reasonable conditions the objective should be to forecast 
so as to maximize the sum of the gains less the sum of the 
losses that would be incurred by following the forecasts 
or, equivalently, to minimize the sum of the losses. A 
criterion function that expresses this latter objective is 
(51) JL(w) =.5 sumi :Vi: :sgn (vd - sgn (w'x(i»: 
where Vi is the change in the interest rate, 
its absolute value and the sign function, sgn(z), is defined 
as 
sgn (z) = 1 if z > 0 
( 52) 
= -1 if z < a 
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If sgn (vi) = sgn (w'x(i», then the forecast of the 
direction of change is correct and the contribution to the 
criterion function is zero. If the signs are not equal, the 
forecast is in error and the contribution to J L 
the amount lost by following the forecast. Thus minimizing 
J L minimizes the sum of the losses. 
Now a crucial temporal distinction: the forecaster 
wishes to mi~imize J L for future new pattern vectors; 
his hope is that the set of weights that would have 
minimized J L for past patterns will continue to give 
good performance on new patterns. Thus the criterion 
function serves two purposes--a statement of the future 
forecasting objective and a mathematical expression to be 
minimized in computing the weight vectors from past data. 
Finding a set of weights that minimizes J L is a 
difficult analytical and computational problem. 
Consequently J L is replaced by a mathematically more 
tractable criterion function. The hope and reasonable 
expectation is that the solution to the new problem will 
not differ greatly from the solution of the old (or, more 
importantly, that the weight vector established by 
minimizing the new criterion function on past data will 
perform adequately in minimizing the old criterion 
function for new patterns). The new criterion function is 
( 53) 
where b i = sgn (vi). This is a problem of weighted least 
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squares which has the solution 
w = (X'U'UX)-lX'U'Ub 
( 54) 
where U is a diagonal matrix with nonzero elements 
equal to the positive C!rI'11::a rQ 
-"'::1---- root of 
To make the forecasting system adaptive and take 
advantage of new information as it becomes available, w 
is recomputeq when the the true outcome for the most 
recent previous pattern becomes known. In other words, 
each month the feature vector is assembled and combined 
with the most recently computed weight vector to make a 
forecast using (50). When the actual result becomes known 
at the end of the month, the weight vector is revised using 
(54) and the process continued. This recursive weighted 
least squares algorithm will be used as the forecasting 
method in all of what follows. As a further refinement, 
the gradient of (34) can be used as the basis of a 
numerical search for a weight vector that achieves an even 
lower score on the objective function J L• An example is 
given in Appendix c. 
EVALUATION STANDARDS 
The most obvious and crucial point about evaluating a 
forecasting model is that it should never be judged on the 
basis of the data used to develop it. In the pattern 
recognition field this mistake is often called testing on 
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the training data. Consequently, the models developed here 
are to be judged not on the basis of how well they were 
able to classify the training patterns used to estimate the 
weight vectors, but only on how well the estimated weight 
vectors were able to classify patterns subsequently 
presented to the classifier. The former information is not 
relevant to the forecasting task. 
It is e~sy to define the perfect forecast; it always 
equals the actual result. Here that requires that J L 
equal zero. In a less than fully predictable world some 
other measures are needed. 
When the half dozen or so classical statistical 
assumptions underlying ordinary least squares regression 
are satisfied, there are a number of statistics with well 
known properties that can guide the forecaster. But these 
standard measures are not appropriate here because the 
underlying assumptions are invalid. The dependent variable 
is dichotomous, not continuous; the objective function is 
not the usual unweighted quadratic form: and the regression 
is run recursively. These considerations lead to the 
development of evaluation measures that appeal to common 
sense: 
1. Net profit. If the direction of change 
in interest rates is forecast correctly 
for any month, call the amount of change 
a profit. Otherwise, call it a loss. 
Let the sum of the profits less the sum of 
the losses over the entire fourteen-year 
forecasting period (1969-1982) be called a 
net profit (or a net loss, if negative) 
Profits and losses are measured in basis 
points (one basis point equals .01%). 
Profits and losses are expressed in basis 
points. merely as a matter of convenience. 
The "IO-for-l" rule can be used to convert 
basis point profits (losses) into dollar 
profits (losses). This rules says that a one 
percent increase in the interest rate reduces 
the present value of a long series of future 
cash flows by about ten percent. Thus a one 
basis point change in the yield to maturity 
changes the price of a $1000 bond by about $1. 
Consequently, on a $1 million bond portfolio 
a 500 basis point net profit translates 
into about $500,000. The actual dollar value 
corresponding to a one basis point change 
depends on the coupon rate and yield to 
maturity. 
2. Profit/loss ratio. Call the ratio of the 
sum the profits to the sum of the losses the 
profit/loss ratio. 
3. Number of hits. If the direction of change 
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is forecast correctly call the forecast a hit. 
Otherwise, it is a miss. Months for which 
the interest rate did not change (there were 
three such months during the forecasting 
period) are arbitrarily counted as misses. 
4. Rate of return. Another statistic, 
especially usef~l in testing the efficient 
market ,theory; is the rate of return earned 
by assets invested in accordance with a 
specified strategy. The rate of return for 
any month depends on how funds are assumed 
to have been invested during that month. 
Two alternatives are assumed to be available: 
to invest in long-term government bonds or to 
invest in federal funds, the choice determined 
by whether rates are forecast to increase or 
decrease. If rates are forecast to increase, 
funds are assumed to be invested in federal 
funds and the rate of return is the monthly 
average rate on federal funds. If rate~ 
forecast to decrease, funds are assumed to 
be invested in long-term bonds and the return 
is composed of two pieces: interest earned 
on the bond during the month, and the capital 
gain or loss incurred because of changes in 
the bond's price. All rates of return are 
expressed here as monthly effective rates, 
i.e., the rates have not been annualized. 
5. Worst computed loss. The worst computed 
loss is the answer to the following question: 
Suppose the model had been implemented just 
before and discontinued just after its 
worst interim performance during the 
fourte~n-year period (judged on a net profit 
basis and measured only at month-ends), how 
much would the net loss have been over that 
period? This figure is important because it 
measures the risk incurred in following the 
forecasts of a given model. 
110 
All of these are absolute indicators: and others of 
the same type, such as the probability of error, might be 
derived. Relative or comparative measures are also 
desirable. When there are no published alternative 
forecasts to measure against, how can one tell whether a 
forecast is "good" or "bad" compared to others? The usual 
approach is to set up a straw man, a naive forecast which 
seems obvious, and then try to improve upon it. Two 
reasonable naive standards are derived below. 
A Random Rule. 
One way to assess the forecasting power of the models 
developed here is to compare their performance with what 
might have been achieved if the random walk hypothesis were 
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true. One way to implement a random walk is to suppose the 
following rule: Flip an unbiased coin. If the result is 
heads interest rates are forecast to increase; if the 
result is tails interest rates are forecast to decrease. 
Implementing the rule 168 times (once for each month in the 
fourteen-year period, 1969-82) would provide one sample 
of the action of the rule. By repeating the whole process 
many times, a distribution of results can be obtained. This 
method of simulated sampling is sometimes called Monte 
Carlo simulation. Obviously, a good forecasting rule 
should outperform most of the random walks. 
A computerized analogue of the coin-flipping rule was 
developed-to simulate a random walk. The model was run 
through 10,000 trials. Each trial consists of the 
following steps: 
A random number generator produces a series 
of 168 digits from the set (+1,-1) corres-
ponding to months in the fourteen-year period. 
If the digit is +1, the random decision 
function forecasts that rates will increase 
during that month. 
If the digit is -1, the opposite forecast 
is made. 
The net profit, the profit/loss ratio, the 
number of hits, the rate of return, and the 
worst computed loss are calculated and 
retained. 
These sets of values form five vectors, each with 
10,000 elem2~ts. The vectors can be sorted and various 
statistics computed. 
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S-shaped cumulative frequency functions for the net 
profit, the profit/loss ratio, the number of hits, the rate 
of return, and the worst computed loss as generated by the 
simulation are,shown in Figures 12 through 16. The 
bell-shaped curves superimposed on these graphs are the 
corresponding relative frequency functions, which have been 
rescaled in the vertical dimension to improve visual 
presentation. 
Entries in Tables I through V correspond to the 
values of the cumulative relative frequency functions of 
Figures 12 through 16 (or equivalently, to the areas under 
the relative frequency functions). It is anticipated that 
the net profit, the number of hits, and the rate of return 
follow a normal distribution; thus Tables I and III 
also provide expected frequencies under the normality 
assumption. Table VI provides selected rank data for each 
of the five variables. 
A Bayesian Rule. 
A second standard against which the models might be 
measured is the result that would have been achieved by 
1.0 
O.B 
0.6 
-2000.0 -1000.0 1000.0 2000.0 
Figure 12. Relative frequency {rescaled} and cumulative relative 
frequency for the net profit in the Monte Carlo simulation. 
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Figure 13. Relative frequency {rescaled} and cumulative relative 
frequency for the profit/loss ratio 1n the ~unte Carlo simulation. 
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62.5 72.5 92.5 102.5 
Figure 14. Relative frequency (rescaled} and cumulative relative 
frequency for the number of hits 1n the Monte Carlo simulation. 
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Figure 15. Relative frequency {rescaled} and cumulative relative 
frequency for the rate of return in the Monte Carlo simulation. 
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Figure 16. Relative frequency (rescaled} and cumulative relative 
frequency for the worst computed loss in the Monte Carlo simulation 
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TABLE I 
FREQUENCY DATA FROM A 10,000-TRIAL 
MONTE CARLO SIMULATION 
NE'I' PROFIT 
Net Profit Observed Expected 
p~ Frequency Frequency 
-2000 10000 10000 
-1600 9988 9992 
-1200 9898 9908 
-800 9411 9418 
-400 7841 7838 
0 5044 5000 
400 2215 2162 
800 588 582 
1200 96 93 
1600 10 8 
2000 0 0 
Mean 3.8514 0.0000 
Std. Dev. 512.76 509.46 
Minimum -1861.00 
Maximum 1985.00 
TABLE II 
FREQUENCY DATA FROM A 10,OOO-TRIAL 
MONTE CARLO SIMULATION 
PROFIT/LOSS RATIO 
Profit/LoSS Ratio 
plr~ 
.4 
.6 
.8 
1.0 
1.2 
1.4 
1.6 
1.8 
2.0 
2.2 
2.4 
2.6 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Observed 
Frequency 
10000 
9863 
8397 
5044 
2145 
700 
191 
52 
15 
3 
2 
o 
.419 
2.551 
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TABLE III 
FREQUENCY DATA FROM A 10,000-TRIAL 
MONTE CARLO SIMULATION 
NUMBER OF HITS 
Number of Hits Observed Expected 
h> Frequency Frequency 
57.5 9999 10000 
62.5 9991 9991 
67.5 9905 9903 
72.5 9399 9403 
77.5 7797 7819 
82.5 5065 5000 
87.5 2209 2182 
92.5 626 598 
97.5 115 98 
102.5 8 10 
107.5 0 1 
Mean 82.57 82.50 
Std. Dev. 6.48 6.42 
Minimum 55.00 
Maximum 106.00 
TABLE IV 
FREQUENCY DATA FROM A 10,000-TRIAL 
MONTE CARLO SIMULATION 
RATE OF RETURN 
Rate of Return 
rr> 
.2 
.3 
.4 
• 5 
.6 
.7 
.8 
.9 
1.0 
1.1 
Mean 
Std. Dev. 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Observed 
Frequency 
10000 
9948 
9629 
8320 
5712 
2644 
754 
109 
17 
o 
.621 
.125 
.217 
1. 074 
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Rank 
1 
10 
100 
250 
500 
1000 
2500 
5000 
7500 
9000 
9500 
9750 
9900 
9990 
10000 
TABLE V 
FREQUENCY DATA FROM A 10,000-TRIAL 
MONTE CARLO SIMULATION 
WORST COMPUTED LOSS 
Worst Computed Observed 
Loss Frequency 
wcl> 
100 10000 
300 8913 
500 5326 
700 2714 
900 1215 
1100 467 
1300 159 
1500 47 
1700 14 
1900 4 
2100 1 
2300 0 
TABLE VI 
RANK DATA FROM A 10,000-TRIAL 
MONTE CARLO SIMULATION 
Net Profit/Loss Number Rate of 
Profit Ratio of Hits Return 
-1861 .419 55 .217 
-1645 .478 63 .255 
-1207 .580 68 .330 
-995 .641 70 .378 
-835 .690 72 .416 
-651 .749 74 .462 
-341 .860 78 .535 
7 1.003 83 .621 
351 1.167 87 .705 
663 1. 342 91 .782 
849 1.459 93 .826 
997 1. 563 95 .863 
1193 1.713 98 .905 
1585 2.102 102 1. 020 
1985 2.551 106 1. 074 
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Worst 
C.:Jmputed 
Loss 
111 
162 
198 
224 
253 
294 
380 
521 
720 
944 
1082 
1212 
1386 
1784 
2126 
following a simple Bayesian rule. Consider the following 
problem. 
A coin is flipped and one is required to bet $1 
on whether the outcome will be heads or tails. 
A correct guess yields a payoff of $2, an incorrect 
guess yields nothing. How should one bet? 
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A Bayesian forecaster is likely to proceed as 
follows. Initiqlly he will assume equal probabilities for 
heads and tails either on the basis of his prior 
experience with coins or on the basis of an assumption of 
"noninformative priors." Then he will maintain a frequency 
count of the results and always bet in favor of the 
outcome having shown the greater frequency. 
A similar strategy might be followed in forecasting 
the direction of change in interest rates: maintain a count 
of the number of increases and decreases in rates and 
forecast that they will move in the direction of the more 
frequent change. For the case at hand, the number of 
interest rate increases always exceeded the number of 
decreases (arc sine law?!), so this rule always called for 
a forecast that interest rates would increase. The overall 
results of the Bayesian rule, evaluated using the measures 
previously discussed, are: 
Net Profit: 
Profit/Loss Ratio: 
Number of Hits: 
389 basis points 
1.19 
93 
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Rate of Return: .690 percent 
Worst Computed Loss: S16 basis points 
Figures 17 and 18, respectively, show the net profit 
and profit/loss ratio as they developed over time and Table 
VII gives the month-by-month profit or loss in basis 
points. 
Although the Bayesian rule is extremely simple, one 
should not assu~e that its performance is easily bettered. 
After all, the effective investment strategy of many 
financial intermediaries has been to buy bonds and hold 
them to maturity; this strategy, to a close approximation, 
is the opposite of what the profitable Bayesian rule would 
have called for. 
DATA SOURCES 
Historical data for the interest rate series were 
obtained directly from the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System. Weekly and monthly updates are 
provided in the Board's statistical releases, H.lS and 
G.13. 
All other series were obtained from Citibase~ a 
machine readable economic database maintained by the 
Economics Department of Citibank (1983). Citibase 
contains about SOOO monthly, quarterly, and annual 
time series, covering the period after 1945. The data are 
national aggregates and are obtained from over a hundred 
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Figure 17. Cumullt1~e net profit -- Bayesian model. 
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Figure 1B. Profit/loss ratio -- Bayesian model. 
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TABLE VII 
MONTH BY MONTH PROFIT OR LOSS -- BAYESIAN RULE 
Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Tot 
1969 16 3 5 -24 45 -15 -5 9 50 -24 22 14 96 
1970 2 -41 13 39 39 -35 -20 9 -19 9 -51 6 -49 
1971 -38 17 -41 27 17 17 -1 -34 -12 -10 8 4 -46 
1972 10 -6 8 1 -16 9 -7 1 10 -16 -11 21 4 
1973 8 4 -1 2 14 8 50 -28 -30 25 -8 16 60 
1974 10 9 32 30 -6 4 16 31 -15 -37 -16 -3 55 
1975 -11 -10 52 20 -24 -11 22 11 19 -46 19 -30 11 
1976 -4 2 -12 9 20 -17 2 -23 -6 -3 -28 -27 -87 
1977 44 12 -1 0 -4 -11 11 -15 8 15 -1 23 81 
1978 18 5 10 6 13 17 -8 -16 20 27 -10 19 101 
1979 -9 -78 95 19 -18 -26 16 12 21 109 -30 6 117 
1980 100 96 32 -152 -46 -38 72 62 42 54 0 -29 193 
1981 37 72 -23 92 -56 28 72 84 63 -103 -162 91 195 
1982 17 -12 -20 -32 6 55 -55 -104 -94 -86 0 -17 -342 
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U.S. government and private publications. All revisions of 
the data, concepts, and coverage made by the source 
agencies are incorporated into the databank. Each 
individual series in the bank is consistent, continuous, 
and up to date. All series which have seasonal 
fluctuations have been adjusted either by the source 
agency or by Citibank. 
The database is maintained by what Citibank calls "a 
group of well trained and experienced data experts." It is 
available through a number of commercial computer 
time-sharing services as well as on a computer tape 
supplied directly by the bank. An alternative source for 
many of the series is Business Conditions Digest, a 
monthly publication of the U.S. Department of Commerce 
(1983). A computer tape containing this data can be 
purchased at moderate cost from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. 
DYNAMIC DETRENDING 
Recall the univariate ordinary least squares 
regression of Y on X 
(55) Yi = a1X i + a2 + ei 
where the objective is to minimize the sum of the squared 
errors 
(56) sumi ei 2 = sumi (Y~ - a1Xi - a2)2 
This gives rise to the normal equations 
(57) 
sumi XiYi = al sumi Xi + a2 sum i Xi 2 
where X and ~ are, respectively, the means of X and Y. 
These equations are solved simultaneously for al and a2. 
The usual geometric interpretation of this 
formulation is shown in Figure 19 where the regression 
line is located so as to minimize the sum of the squared 
vertical distances from the points to the line. Different 
insight is obtained by considering the problem in 
deviation form. Define 
(58) yl = y - y and XI = X -X 
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Then the coefficients of the regression equation of yl on XI 
(59) yl = a'1X ' + a ' 2 
turn out to be all = al and a ' 2 = O. In other words, 
through an axis translation, deviations of Y from its mean 
are explained by deviations of X from its mean (see Figure 
20). So viewed, the original parameter al is the one of 
interest and the original constant a2 is nothing more 
than a mean adjustment factor with no "explanatory force." 
All of this, of course, is standard, first chapter 
regression theory (Maddala, 1977). 
Suppose now that y and X are values of two given 
time series so that the sequence of values has meaning. 
Suppose, too, that the mean of Y does not change much over 
the period, but that the mean of X increases. In other 
words, the X-series trends upward, but the Y-series is 
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Figure 19. Ordinary least squares regression. 
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Figure 20. Axis translation for regression in deviations-from-
means forI!. 
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flat. In such a situation one might postulate that 
deviations of Y from its mean are explained by deviations 
of X from its trend, not from its mean. This encourages 
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an examination of methods for determining the trend in a 
series, since once the trend is found the detrended series 
is immediately available by subtraction. 
Of the many methods of determining the trend of a 
series, a common~y employed approach is to smooth the 
series using a filter. Filters are simply linear 
transformations or moving averages of the series. In 
general, there is no reason why filters cannot be 
two-sided, using both past and future values of the series. 
But to maintain the integrity of the information set, only 
past values can be used for forecasting purposes; 
consequently one-sided, left-handed filters must be 
employed. Finite-memory filters use only a fixed number of 
historical values; infinite-memory filters take into 
account all past values of the series. While infinite 
memory filters contain more information, their performance 
may deteriorate over time if there are changes in trend. A 
useful compromise which ultimately captures changes in 
trend yet uses all past information is an infinite-memory 
filter that gives greater weight to recent data and lesser 
weight to older data. A method having these attributes can 
be called dynamic detrending. 
An algorithm satisfying these requirements is the 
technique of weighted recursive least squares developed 
above. Applying the sequential method of equations (42), 
(43), (44), and (45) gives a sequence of two-element 
coefficient vectors a<j-l>, which may be used to project 
the trend of the series one month ahead 
(60) al<j-l>t(j) + a2<j-1> 
The detrended values, x*(j), are deviations from the 
projected trend, _i.e., 
(61) x*(j) = x(j) - (al<j-l>t(j) + a2<j-l» 
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All series used in this study (except the interest 
rate series itself) were detrended by equation (61) using a 
weight matrix U with diagonal elements equal to increasing 
integral powers of (1.0035); in other words, each 
succeeding value of the series is given approximately .7% 
more weight than the previous one. A somewhat arbitrary 
choice, this provides for weights which increase year-over-
year by about 8.7%. and it has the effect of maintaining & 
better balance between new and old points. In unweighted 
recursive regressions, each additional data point 
effectively receives less weight. For example, when there 
are 19 data points, the next contributes about 5%, but when 
there are 99 points the next contributes only about 1%. Use 
of the .7% weighting factor assures that all new terms 
contribute at least 2% to the regression regardless 
many data points are being used. Figure 21 compares the 
relative weights assigned to new points in the weighted 
10 
8 
5 
4 
2 
e" 
,JU 
....... 
~uu i5\i 
Figure 21. Relative weights assigned to new pOints in weighted 
and unweighted regressions {in percent}. 
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and unweighted recursive regressions. 
Starting values are always a problem when dealing 
with infinite memory filters (Makridakis and Wheelwright, 
1978). A good solution is simply to obtain extra data at 
the beginning of the series, detrend that extended series, 
then drop the early values. In this study the detrending 
algorithm was applied to values of the series for the years 
1967 through 1982. Any detrended values not needed to 
estimate the model for January, 1968, were dropped. 
ECONOMIC THEORY 
There is no single, generally accepted theory of 
interest rates. In fact, agreement cannot even be reached 
on what interest is. Boehm-Bawerk (1922, 1923) and 
Conrad (1963) each outline scores of competing interest 
rate theories; a reasonable synthesis remains elusive. The 
models developed here follow from classical economic 
theory. 
Take it as given that the rate of interest, 
representing in some sense the price paid for the use of 
credit (or the reward received for lending money), reflects 
the interaction between the supply of credit and the demand 
for it. Supply comes from a willingness by income earners 
or other wealth holders to forego current consumption in 
favor of greater expected consumption in the future; thus 
the ratio of expected future consumption to foregone current 
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consumption, sometimes called the rate of time preference, 
is closely related to the rate of interest. 
Demand for credit comes from the choice by some 
consumers to borrow for current consumption, from 
governments' need to finance deficits, and from the 
decision of business firms to invest in inventory and plant 
and equipment. Business' demand for credit relates interest 
rates to the marg~nal efficiency of real investment. Time 
preference and the marginal efficiency of investment are 
generally viewed as aspects of the II real'i sector of the 
economy. They determine the IIrealli interest rate. 
Market interest rates, however, are monetary or 
financial 'phenomena. Interest rates quoted daily in the 
business press are IInominal" returns on financial, not 
real, assets. The relationship of nominal rates to real 
rates involves inflation. Lenders, seeking to protect and 
enhance the real purchasing power of the funds they have 
lent, will demand a premium over and above the real rate 
of interest if they anticipate inflation will erode the 
value of the dollars that are repaid. Borrowers, expecting 
to repay the funds in depreciated currency, will be 
prepared to pay the higher nominal interest rate. These 
inflation-related considerations are summarized in an 
equation named after Irving Fisher (1930), who gave the 
classical Exposition of these ideas: 
( 62) n = r + p 
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where n is the nominal or market rate of interest, r 
is the real rate, and p represents the anticipated rate of 
inflation. Humphrey (1983) discusses the Fisher equation 
and its historical antecedents in detail. 
Although this discussion of the theory of interest 
rates is very brief, it is sufficient to carry the weight 
of most of the empirical models developed below. There are, 
of course, many o~her factors that affect interest rates. 
Three short articles in the Review of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis clearly present the basic principles from 
a monetarist perspective (Bowsher, 1980; Santoni and Stone, 
1981a and 1981b). The papers by Hamburger and Silber (1969) 
and Feldstein and Eckstein (1970) have been mentioned 
earlier and are recommended. Pring's (1981) book and the 
treatment by the Conference Board (1973) look at the 
question from a forecaster's viewpoint. 
Another point needs emphasis: it is one thing to say 
that the factors discussed affect interest rates contem-
poraneously; it is quite another to say that current 
values of these variables are useful in forecasting 
future interest rates. A judicious choice of the specific 
series used to represent these factors may, however, 
overcome this objection. 
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FORECASTING MODELS 
The Investment Model. 
An important and highly variable element of credit 
demand is borrowing by business for capital investment. One 
leading indicator of future capital spending is 
construction contracts awarded for commercial and 
industrial buildings, a copyrighted series published by the 
F. w. Dodge Division of McGraw-Hill Information Systems 
Company, used here by permission. Since this series 
represents current commitments by business to spend for 
future capital expenditures, it possesses the required 
element of futurity. 
The first model forecasts the direction of change in 
interest rates, DCR t +1l using only this variable (denoted 
by the symbol CC). Because of delays in collection and 
publication, values of the series cannot be incorporated 
into the information set except with a two-month or longer 
lag. (Lags can be measured either from the month that the 
forecast is made or from the month the forecast is for. 
The former usage is employed here. Thus in the following 
equation there is a two-month lag for data to enter the 
information set or a three-month lag for the information to 
enter the forecast. In the format of equation (49) the lag 
is k = 2 and the forecast horizon is h = 1.) 
The forecasting model is 
(63) DCR t +1 = sgn (w 1CC t - 2 + w2) 
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The reported and detrended construction contract 
series are shown in Figure 22, the net profit in Figure 23, 
the profit/loss ratio in Figure 24, and the month-by-month 
profits in Table VIII. The coefficients (tabulated in 
Appendix E) have the anticipated sign. 
Summary statistics for this model are: 
Net Profit: 1195 basis points 
Profit/L~ss Ratio: 1. 71 
Number of Hits: 101 
Rate of Return: .943 percent 
vlorst Cornpu ted Loss: 265 basis points 
The Price-Investment Model. 
The second model considers not only investment 
commitments but also inflation. This time investment 
commitments are measured by a different series, contracts 
and orders for plant and equipment, lagged two months (from 
McGraw-Hill and Bureau of the Census). This series, denoted 
CO, also represents current commitments for future capital 
expenditures and so can be expected to lead the actual 
credit demand. 
The second variable in this model is inflation 
(denoted IN), represented by the Commodity Research 
Bureau's index of spot prices on 22 commodities (a 
copyrighted series used by permission). The commodity 
price series is available daily so that no lag is required. 
Several of the references cited above provide evidence that 
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Figure 22. Construction contracts for commercial and industrial 
buildings -- reported and datrended series. {This is a 
copywrited series used by permission of F.W. Dodge Division, 
McGraw-Hill Information Systems Company.} 
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Figure 23. Cumulative net profit -- investment model. 
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Figure 24. Profit/loss ratio -- investment model. 
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TABLE VIII 
MONTH BY MONTH PROFIT OR LOSS -- INVESTMENT MODEL 
Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Tot 
1969 16 3 5 -24 45 -15 -5 9 50 -24: 22 14: 96 
1970 2 41 13 39 39 35 20 -9 19 -9 51 -6 235 
1971 38 -17 41 -27 -17 17 1 -34 -12 10 -8 4 -4 
1972 10 -6 8 1 -16 9 -7 1 10 -16 -11 21 4 
1973 8 4 -1 2 14 8 50 -28 -30 25 -8 16 60 
1974 10 9 -32 30 -6 4 16 31 15 37 -16 3 101 
1975 11 10 -52 -20 24 11 -22 -11 -19 46 -19 30 -11 
1976 4 -2 12 -9 -20 17 -2 -23 6 -3 -28 27 -21 
1977 -44 12 -1 0 -4 -11 11 -15 8 15 -1 23 -7 
1978 18 5 10 6 13 17 -8 -16 20 27 -10 19 101 
1979 -9 -78 95 19 -18 -26 16 12 21 109 -30 6 117 
1980 100 96 32 -152 -46 -38 72 62 42 54 0 -29 193 
1981 37 72 -23 92 -56 28 72 84 63 -103 -162 91 195 
1982 17 -12 -20 32 6 55 -55 104 -94 86 0 17 136 
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expectations about future rates of inflation are determined 
in part by past inflation; hence historical inflation may 
aid in forecasting the p term in equation (62). 
Moreover, this particular measure of inflation tends to 
lead the more widely followed indicators like the Consumer 
Price Index and the GNP implicit price deflator. 
The forecasting model using these variables is 
(64) DCR t +1 = sgn jw1CO t - 2 + w2 IN t + w3} 
The reported and detrended variables are shown in 
Figures 25 and 26, the net profit in Figure 27, the 
profit/loss ratio in Figure 28, and the month-by-month 
profits in Table IX. The coefficients are tabulated in 
Appendix E and have the anticipated sign most of the time. 
Summary statistics for this model are: 
Net Profit: 1219 basis points 
Profit/Loss Ratio: 1.73 
Number of Hits: 101 
Rate of Return: .957 percent 
Worst Computed Loss: 373 basis points 
The Labor Model. 
For many years the conventional wisdom had it that 
there is a trade-off between the rate of unemployment and 
the rate of inflation: by permitting (or causing) the rate 
of unemployment to rise, policymakers believed they could 
reduce the rate of inflation. The supposed trade-off is 
graphically presented as the Phillips curve, which is a 
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Figure 25. Contracts and orders for plant and equipment 
-- reported and detrended series. 
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Figure 26. Commodity Research Bureau index of spot prices on 22 
commodlties -- reported and de trended serles. {This is 8 
copywrited series used by permission of the Commodity Research 
Bureau. Inc.} 
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Figure 27. Cumulative net profit -- price-investment model. 
146 
5 
4 
3 
2 
. ~r 
vv 
72 75 78 81 
Figure 28. Profit/loss ratio -- price-investment model. 
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TABLE IX 
MONTH BY MONTH PROFIT OR LOSS -- PRICE-INVESTMENT MODEL 
Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Tot 
1969 16 3 5 -24 45 -15 -5 9 50 -24 22 14 96: 
1970 2 -41 13 39 39 -35 -20 -9 19 -9 51 -6 43 
1971 38 -17 41 -27 -17 -17 1 34 12 10 -8 -4 46 
1972 -10 6 B 1 -16 9 -7 1 10 -16 -11 21 -4 
1973 8 4 -1 2 14 8 50 -28 -30 25 -8 16 60 
1974 10 9 32 30 -6 4 16 31 -15 -37 -16 -3 55 
1975 -11 -10 52 20 24 11 22 11 19 46 19 30 233 
1976 4 -2 12 9 20 -17 2 23 -6 -3 -28 -27 -13 
1977 44 12 -1 0 -4 -11 11 -15 8 15 -1 23 81 
1978 18 5 10 5 13 17 -8 _'C 20 27 -, .'\ , , ... , ", .... v "'v L;;1 LV"" 
1979 -9 -78 95 19 -18 -26 16 12 21 109 -30 6 117 
1980 100 96 32 -152 -46 -38 -72 62 42 54 0 -29 49 
1981 37 72 -23 92 -56 28 72 84 63 -103 -162 -91 13 
1982 -17 12 20 32 -6 -55 55 104 94 86 0 17 342 
148 
plot of the rate of inflation on the vertical axis versus 
the rate of unemployment on the horizontal axis. The 
transmission mechanism from the unemployment rate to the 
inflation rate is supposed to be through aggregate demand: 
if more people were unemployed, it is argued, aggregate 
demand would fall and the upward pressure on prices would 
lessen. About the time the term stagflation was coined in 
the 1970's, the Phi~lips curve became a Phillips cloud. 
Geoffrey Moore (1979) of the National Bureau of 
Economic Research has attempted to revitalize the theory, 
although in modified form. He claims that the deficiency is 
in the variable used to measure aggregate demand, not in 
the assumed transmission mechanism itself. The problem, 
Moore argues, has been the shifting relationship between 
employment and the unemployment in recent years. In the 
1950's and early 1960's the working population was 
increasing at a relatively slow pace, so that only about 
two new jobs needed to be created per year in order to 
reduce unemploy~ent Dy the late 1970's, 
however, the working-age population was expanding more 
rapidly so that six additional jobs were required to take 
one person off the unemployment rolls. Consequently, Moore 
suggests, the Phillips curve should be redrawn with the 
percentage of the working-age population, not the 
unemployment rate, on the horizontal axis. The result is 
an upward sloping curve associating higher employment 
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ratios with higher inflation rates. 
All of this suggests that the employment ratio, the 
ratio of the employed civilian population to the total 
civilian population (both counting only persons 16 years 
and older), might serve as a leading indicator of inflation 
and hence of interest rates. Letting the ratio be 
represented by the symbol ER, the forecasting equation is 
(65) DCRt+l = sgn ( w1ER t - 2 + w2) 
The reported and detrended employment ratio is shown 
in Figure 29, the net profit in Figure 30, the profit/loss 
ratio in Figure 31, and the month-by-month profits in 
Table X. The sign of the coefficients (tabulated in 
Appendix E) is in accordance with the theory. 
Summary statistics are: 
Net Profit: 1193 basis points 
Profit/Loss Ratio: 1. 71 
Number of Hits: 95 
Rate of Return: .932 percent 
Worst Computed Loss: 265 basis points 
An Atheoretical Model. 
The three previous models have had the support of 
economic theory; this one does not. Nonetheless it rests 
solidly on a long tradition of atheoretical economics going 
back probably to th~ the birth of the science, enhanced by 
the efforts of Burns and Mitchell in the 1930's, and 
continued currently in such works as Sargent and Sims' 
60 
55 
50 
70 76 79 
Figure 29. C1v1la1n employment ratio--reported and de trended 
series {rescaled}. 
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Figure 30. Cumulative net prof1t--labor model. 
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Figure 31. Profit/loss ratio--labor model. 
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TABLE X 
MONTH BY MONTH PROFIT OR LOSS -- LABOR MODEL 
Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Tot 
1969 16 3 5 -24 45 -15 -5 9 50 -24 22 14 96 
1970 2 -41 13 39 39 -35 -20 -9 19 -9 51 -6 43 
1971 38 -17 41 -27 -17 -17 1 34 12 10 -8 -4 46 
1972 10 -6 8 1 -16 9 -7 1 10 -16 -11 21 4 
1973 8 4 -1 2 14 8 50 -28 -30 25 -8 16 60 
1974 10 9 32 30 -6 4 16 31 -15 -37 -16 -3 55 
1975 -11 10 -52 -20 24 11 -22 -11 -19 46 -19 30 -33 
1976 4 -2 12 -9 20 -17 2 -23 -6 -3 -28 -27 -77 
1977 44 12 -1 0 -4 -11 11 -15 8 15 -1 23 81 
1978 18 5 10 6 13 17 -8 -16 20 27 -10 19 101 
1979 -9 -78 95 19 -18 -26 16 12 21 109 -30 6 117 
1980 100 96 32 -152 -46 -38 72 62 42 54 0 -29 193 
1981 37 72 -23 92 -56 28 72 84 63 -103 -162 91 195 
1982 17 -12 -20 32 -6 -55 55 104 94 86 0 17 312 
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(1977) "Business Cycle Modeling Without Pretending to Have 
Too Much a Priori Economic Theory." Economic empiricism 
needs no apology--more often than not, theories were 
developed to explain observed regularities. 
Three of the most watched economic series were 
discussed briefly in Chapter III: the leading, coincident 
and lagging indexes of economic activity. The first differ-
ence of the ratio of the coincident index to the lagging 
index (denoted DRCL) , is combined with construction contract 
series (CC) to produce a model superior to the three 
developed above. 
(66) DCRt +1 = sgn (w1DRCL t - 1 + w2CCt-2 + w3) 
The reported and detrended ratio of coincident to 
lagging indicators is shown in Figure 32, the net profit 
in Figure 33, the profit/loss ratio in Figure 34, and the 
month-by-month profits in Table XI. The coefficients are 
tabulated in Appendix E. 
Summary statistics for this model are: 
Net Profit: 1477 basis points 
Profit/Loss Ratio: 1.96 
Number of Hits: 102 
Rate of Return~ 1.024 percent 
Worst Computed Loss: 190 basis points 
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Figure 32. Ratio of coincident to lagging 1nd1cators--reported 
and detrended series. 
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Figure 33. Cumulative net profit--atheoret1cal model. 
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Figure 34. Profit/loss rBtio--Btheoretical model. 
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TABLE XI 
MONTH BY MONTH PROFIT OR LOSS -- ATHEORTICAL MODEL 
Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Tot 
1969 16 3 5 -24 45 -15 -5 9 50 -24 22 14 96 
1970 2 41 13 39 39 35 20 -9 19 -9 51 -6 235 
1971 38 -17 41 -27 -17 17 1 -34 -12 -10 -'3 4 -24 
1972 10 -6 8 1 -16 9 -7 1 10 -16 -11 21 4 
1973 8 4 -1 2 14 8 50 -28 -30 25 -8 16 60 
1974 10 9 -32 30 -6 4 16 31 15 -37 -16 3 27 
1975 11 10 -52 -20 24 11 -22 -11 -19 46 -19 30 -11 
1976 4 -2 12 -9 -20 17 -2 -23 6 -3 28 27 35 
1977 44 12 -1 0 -4 -11 11 -15 8 15 -1 23 81 
1978 18 5 10 6 13 17 -8 -16 20 27 -10 19 101 
1979 -9 -78 95 19 -18 -26 16 12 21 109 -30 6 117 
1980 100 96 32 -152 46 38 72 62 42 54 0 -29 361 
1981 37 72 -23 92 -56 28 -72 84 63 -103 162 -91 193 
1982 17 12 20 -32 -6 -55 -55 104 94 86 0 17 202 
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EVALUATING THE FORECASTING MODELS 
How well do the models developed here perform in 
comparison with their naive competitors, the random walk 
model and the simple Bayesian rule? Figures 35 through 39 
are graphs of cumulative relative frequency functions from 
the Monte Carlo simulation described earlier for each of 
the five variables: the net profit, the profit/loss ratio, 
the number of hits, the rate of return, and the worst 
computed loss. The results achieved by each of the decision 
rules are indicated on the frequency graphs by B (for 
the Bayesian rule), I (for the investment model), P (for 
the price-investment model), L (for the labor model) and A 
(for the atheoretical model). When one symbol is placed 
above another on the graphs, that indicates that both 
models achieved approximately equal results. 
One measure of a model's ability to forecast is 
the level of confidence at which one can reject the 
following null hypotheses in favor of their alternatives. 
Ho: Net profit = 0 H1 : Net profit> 0 
HO: Number of hits = 82,S H1 : Number of hits> 82,5 
HO: Rate of return = .616 H1 : Rate of return> .616 
Only the last of these, the one related to the rate of 
return, is a proper test of the efficient market theory; 
under certain circumstances the three other hypotheses 
tests may contain biases and might improperly reject the 
EMT, For example, the number of hits achieved by a given 
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F1gure 35. Relat1ve frequency {rescaled} and cumulative relative 
frequency for the net profit in the Monte Carlo simulation. 
comparing the models. 
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Figure 36. Relat1ve frequency {rescaled} and cumulat1ve relat1ve 
frequency for the profit/loss ratio 1n the Monte Carlo simulation, 
comparing the models. 
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Figure 37. Relative frequency ~escaled} and cumulative relative 
frequency for the number of hits in the Monte Carlo simulation. 
comparing the models. 
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Figure 38. Relative frequency {rescaled} and cumulative relative 
frequency for the rate of return in the Monte Carlo simulation. 
comparing the models. 
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Figure 39. Relative frequency {rescaled} and cumulative relative 
frequency for the worst computed loss in the Monte Carlo 
simulation, comparing the models. 
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model could be significantly above that expected by chance 
without the rate of return achieving a significantly higher 
level. This could occur if the model were successful in 
calling the direction of change when the amount of change 
was small, but calling it incorrectly when the amount was 
large. Similar, but more subtle, biases could affect the 
net profit and profit/loss ratio measures. It is shown in 
Appendix B that two o~her possible sources of bias, 
transaction costs and differential risk, do not alter the 
conclusion. 
Table XII summarizes the hypothesis tests. Because 
the Monte Carlo simulation produced distributions with 
slightly larger means, fatter tails and larger standard 
deviations than expected under the normality assumption, 
statistics from the simulation were used to test the 
hypotheses. This is conservative in that it slightly 
reduces the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis. 
Also shown in the table are the number of simulation trials 
that produced results less than that of the rule being 
tested. All null hypotheses are rejected at high confidence 
levels. 
An evaluation of forecasting methods on the basis of 
historical data must be viewed with merciless skepticism 
since there are many opportunities for faulty reasoning. 
Chicanery need not be involved as the errors may be 
unconscious. "A universal human problem," says Watzlowick 
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TABLE XII 
HYPOTHESIS TEST STATISTICS 
HO: Net Profit= 3.85 vs. Hl: Net Profit> 3.85 
Number of Standard 
Net Simulations Deviations Confidence 
Rule or Model Profit Less Than from Mean Level 
Bayesian 389 7724 .75 .774 
Investment 1195 9900 2.32 .990 
Price-Investment 1219 9912 2.37 .991 
Labor 1193 9899 2.32 .990 
Atheoretical 1477 9980 2.87 .998 
HO: Number of Hits = 82.57 vs. HI: Number of Hits> 82.57 
Number of Standard 
Number Simulations Deviations Confidence 
Rule or Model of Hits Less Than from Mean Level 
Bayesian 93 9374 1. 61 .946 
Investment 101 9973 2.84 .998 
Price-Investment 101 9973 2.84 .998 
Labor 95 9665 1. 92 .972 
Atheoretical 102 9981 3.00 .998 
HO: Rate of Return = .621 vs. Hl: Rate of Return> .621 
Number of Standard 
Rate of Simulations Deviations Confidence 
Rule or Model Return Less Than from Mean Level 
Bayesian .690 7073 .55 .7l0 
Investment .943 9957 2.59 .995 
Price-Investment .957 9969 2.70 .996 
Labor .932 9943 2.50 .994 
Atheoretical 1. 024 9992 3.24 .999 
(1976), is that 
once we have arrived at a solution--and in the 
process of getting there have paid a fairly high 
price .•• --our investment in this solution becomes 
so great that we may prefer to distort reality to 
fit our solution rather th&n to sacrifice the 
solution. 
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The L-Method Test. 
This study has avoided the obvious trap of testing 
on the training data, ,i.e., directly evaluating the 
classifiers on the basis of the data used to develop them. 
There is, however, a related but more subtle form of data 
mining. Sometimes called training on the testing data, 
"it arises when a classifier undergoes a series of 
refinements guided by the repeated testing on the same test 
data." (Duda and Hart, 1973) 
In principle, the solution to either problem 
is simple: obtain a new set of testing data. But when the 
samples are limited, as here, there is a real dilemma. If 
data are reserved for testing, the classifier will not 
be well designed. If all data are used for design, one 
cannot have confidence about the classifier's performance 
on an independent set. Lachenbruch and Mickey (1968) and 
Fukunaga and Kessell (1971) provide an ingenious escape, 
called the method of leaving one out or simply the ~ 
method. This method gives an almost unbiased es~imate of 
the performance of the classifier while utilizing the 
available data as effectively as possible. 
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The method involves developing not one classifier 
but n of them (where 11 is the number of data points in the 
sample). The first classifier is designed in the usual 
way using a subset of n-l data points. It is then tested to 
see whether it correctly classifies the one omitted data 
point. Similarly, the second classifier is designed using a 
different subset of n-l points and tested on the one left 
out. This process con~inues until all n distinct subsets of 
n-l points have been used in the design process. The 
aggregate result of the n one-at-a-time classifications of 
the points left out closely approximates the performance 
to be expected of the final classifier on an independent 
sample from the same population. 
The method utilizes the data set effectively 
but at the considerable cost of designing n different 
classifiers. Its major advantage, however, is 
psychological. It gives the designer considerable 
confidence that he did not "distort reality to fit his 
solution." 
The L method was used to estimate the performance 
of the models developed here, with the results shown in 
Table XIII. 
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TABLE XIII 
COMPARISON OF MODEL PERFORMANCE WITH THE L-METHOD TEST 
Actual Performance L-Method Test 
Model Net Profit Hits Net Profit Hits 
Investment 1195 101 1219 
Price-Investment 1219 101 853 
Labor 1193 95 1099 
Atheoretical 1477 102 1095 
That the L-method test ever shows superior 
performance is at first surprising but is explained by 
recalling that the classifiers actually used for 
forecasting were predicated only on the data available 
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prior to making the forecast. The classifier used to make 
the first forecast, for example, was based on only twelve 
data points. The L-method test, on the other hand, is 
based on all the points (with, of course, one left out). 
The results of the L-method test are comforting, but 
one should exercise caution before assuming that the future 
performance of the models would be as favorable. Even if 
the economy were statistically stable, the results above 
are only estimates and, like all statistical estimates, 
are surrounded by a region of uncertainty (favorable and 
unfavorable). Another important caveat is that mutations 
or shocks to the economy could render the models 
unreliable. Finally, there is the question (considered more 
fully below) whether the success of the models might lead 
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to their widespread use, thereby rendering them 
ineffective. 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Two prominent spikes are apparent in all of the 
graphs of the cumulative net profit: one spike appears in 
early 1980, the other in late 1981. None of the models were 
able to forecast well during these periods. Why? 
The 1980 failure is easy to explain. It was caused 
by a major discontinuity or shock to the monetary system. 
On March 14, 1980, President Carter announced a series of 
unprecedented monetary and credit controls. Responding to 
the president's action the 
Board of Governors imposed reserve requirements 
and special deposit requirements on certain 
types of consumer credit and managed liabilities 
of commercial banks, a surcharge of 3 percent 
on frequent borrowers from the discount window, 
a special deposit requirement on money market 
funds, and a voluntary restraint program for the 
growth of total loans of commercial banks .... 
This program was later viewed as having played 
a greater role than had been anticipated by 
affecting the demand for credit and the flow of 
funds between financial institutions (Gilbert 
and Trebing, 1981). 
With the demand for credit falling, interest rates 
dropped precipitously. But by July all controls had been 
removed or were scheduled to expire and interest rates 
resumed their upward course. 
The 1981 failure is not so easily explained. 
Perhaps the most that can be said is that during the 
immediately preceding months interest rates had risen 
rapidly to levels not reached in modern u.s. history 
(Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1983). 
Maybe yields had overshot their equilibrium. Since the 
models had forecast correctly the earlier rise and 
benefited thereby, the subsequent loss was less serious 
than otherwise (unless, of course, the forecasting model 
were being implemented.just then). 
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The point of this analysis is not to justify or 
excuse the errors made by the forecasting models, rather it 
is to emphasize that no forecasting system is likely to 
perform well all the time, particularly in the presence of 
unprecedented economic shocks. 
The empirical evidence having been presented, 
it is time to reconsider the theory it rejects, the 
efficient market theory. Why is it that this study has 
found highly significant evidence that the market for 
long-term government bonds is inefficient, whereas 
many other investigators have concluded differently? 
The simple explanation is that the information sets, 
forecasting methods, and statistical hypotheses used in 
this research differ from those used by other 
investigators. 
Tests of the efficient market theory must be 
made with respect to a specified information set which, in 
turn, must be manipulated some way into a statistically 
testable hypothesis. Consequently, 9Y employing different 
information sets, different manipulation techniques, and 
different statistical hypotheses, two investigators can 
reach contradictory conclusions. 
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Others have found the same type of divergence. Hafer 
(19B3), for example, found that forecasters attempting 
to estimate changes in the money supply were efficient in 
using one information s,et but inefficient in their use of 
another. Shiller (1979) found inefficiency in the long-term 
bond market when he used a new type of statistical 
hypothesis called the "variance bounds" test. 
Most reported tests of the efficient market theory 
have employed more or less "standard" information sets and 
have tested more or less "standard" statistical hypotheses. 
Most conclusions, therefore, have been "standard," i.e.; 
markets are efficient. 
Indeed, the author's first forecasting efforts only 
confirmed all this--when the usual methods (Box-Jenkins 
ARlMA models and ordinary least squares regression, for 
example) were applied to the usual variables (past interest 
rate changes and the money supply, for example), the usual 
conclusion emerged--markets are efficient. 
The preceding "standardization" argument only 
explains why many tests of the efficient market theory 
agree. To explain what they agree on requires another 
step. This insight is gained by remembering that there is a 
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duality between price forecasting and the efficient market 
theory; they are but different sides of the same coin. The 
variables chosen by market participants, on the basis of 
conventional wisdom, to help them forecast future interest 
rates are just those same obvious ones that the economists 
frequently pick when they test the efficient market theory. 
The same point can be made with respect to the methods used 
to transform the variables and methods used to forecast. 
What happens is this: since the limited number of 
variables and methods being considered are poured over by 
many market participants, their usefulness as forecasting 
tools is rapidly diminished. Since "everyone" thinks these 
variables· and methods are important, they become, in the 
self-defeating nature of things, unimportant. It is not 
surprising, then, that when economists conduct tests using 
the same set of variables and methods, they find the 
markets to be highly efficient. The result of all this 
is a self-defeating prophecy on the part of the market 
participants which becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy for 
investigators who expect to find efficient markets. 
The author found evidence to reject the EMT only when 
he redefined the problem (from forecasting the amount of 
change in interest rates to forecasting the direction of 
change) and changed the forecasting technique (frem 
regression to pattern recognition). Obviously, an estimate 
of the amount of change developed using ordinary least 
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squares is also an estimate of the direction of change, but 
it is not· immediately clear why the regression estimate 
should be inferior to an estimate of the direction of 
change developed using pattern recognition. The superiority 
of PR to OLS in drawing distinctions is discussed, and 
demonstrated by example, in Appendix B. 
An important question remains: Is it to be expected 
that if these models we~e to become widely used in interest 
rate forecasting, would they, too, begin to fail? Catch 
22? The following answer incorporates several of the 
points made by Felsen (1975a). 
The self-defeating-forecast argument applies as much 
to the models developed here as to any other temporarily 
successful price forecasting technique: Markets tend to be 
efficient and tend to eliminate any possibility of excess 
profits if the methods of generating them become known. 
Thus if only a few well known institutional investors were 
to compile superior investment records on the basis of 
these models; their use might quickly proliferate with a 
resulting deterioration in performance. possibly inhibiting 
this process is the relative complexity of the models (with 
their weighting and recursive-updating features) and the 
general lack of familiarity of most investment managers 
with the approach. 
However, even if the current models were to fail, the 
algorithms might continue to forecast well using different 
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information sets. In other words, the existing models might 
cease to work, but other successful ones might be developed 
using the same technique. The development of new models 
clearly requires higher levels of skill than the 
maintenance of existing ones. Even more demanding is the 
development of new pattern recognition techniques and 
algorithms. Felsen speculates that by staying on the 
leading edge of pattern ,recognition development, one might 
continue to earn superior returns. 
A parallp.l can be drawn to technological advance: A 
firm can obtain a business advantage by being the first to 
develop and exploit a new scientific technique; to maintain 
the advantage, however, requires the firm to continue to 
make new advances in the process since other firms will be 
quick to copy the superior technology. Not many firms are 
capable of continuous innovation. 
COMBINING FORECASTS 
It is well established that an appropriate 
combination of two forecasts prepared using different 
information sets and/or different forecasting methods will 
frequently outperform either of the component forecasts. 
Bates and Granger (1969) have presented several methods 
for computing the coefficients, kif in the formula 
(67) C = klFl + k2F2 
where C is the composite forecast and Fl and F2 
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are its components. Pearson (1981) has proposed a method 
for computing k i in cases when there are more than two 
forecasts; Bunn (1979) and Reinmuth and Guerts (1979) 
consider alternative procedures. All of these, however, 
attend only to forecasts of a continuous variable, not the 
binary type developed here. Several possible rules for 
generating a single forecast from binary components are 
considered below. 
It is obvious that if the two or more forecasts agree 
in predicting an increase or decrease in rates, the problem 
of choosing among them disappears. When the binary 
forecasts disagree, the problem is one of deciding which 
to follow. 
One reasonable approach is to choose that model 
which has demonstrated the best recent performance, 
measured, say, by a moving sum of net profits. Let the 
moving su~ of net profits (MSNP) be 
(68) MSNPt(j) = sumi vi sgn (w'<i>x(i») 
where the summation runs over the most recent j terms and 
the other symbols are as previously defined. Then the 
composite forecast at any time t is taken to be the one 
with the the larger MSNPt (ties for any given month can 
be broken by recomputing MSNP with a larger value of j, 
the number of terms in the summation). The initial value of 
j could be [ixeo arbitrarily; but after some experience 
with the models has been accumulated, the value of j could 
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be chosen as that which would have maximized past profits. 
Summary results from forecasting by this rule (called the 
moving sum model) using various values of j are given in 
Table XIV~ 
If there were an odd number of forecasts to be 
combined, a one might follow the decision given by the 
majority. The results of forecasting by this majority 
model are shown in Table xv. 
If the forecaster were already holding a portfolio of 
long-term bonds, he might feel it appropriate to hedge this 
portfolio only when all of the forecasting models agreed 
that interest rates were about to increase~ otherwise he 
would maintain an unhedged position. The results of this 
hedge model are given in Table XVI. 
A speculator, on the other hand, might wish to expose 
himself to risk only when all of his models agreed on the 
future direction of interest rates. This permits a new kir.d 
of strategy since up to this point it has always been 
required that the forecasting models come forth with some 
estimate of the direction of change, i.e., "no opinion" has 
not been allowed. With that restriction relaxed, the 
classifier is not forced to render forecasts when it 
"thinks" it inappropriate to do so. Clearly this is a more 
advanced form of behavior and more closely resembles the 
range of response exhibited by human decisionmakers. Of 
course, the decision not to make a forecast is not the same 
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TABLE XIV 
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE MOVING-SUM MODELS 
Worst 
Net Profit/LOSS Computed 
Model* Profit Ratio Hits Loss 
I P 1 1399 1.89 106 265 
I P 2 1531 2.02 106 265 
I P 3 1315 1.81 105 273 
I P 6 1511 2.00 106 265 
I L 1 1185 1. 71 101 265 
I L 2 1365 1.86 102 265 
I L 3 1181 1. 70 101 265 
I L 6 1139 1.67 99 265 
I A 1 1065 1.61 101 363 
I A 2 1153 1.68 102 363 
I A 3 1137 1.67 102 379 
I A 6 1165 1. 69 102 356 
p L 1 1113 1.65 99 360 
P L 2 1073 1.62 98 400 
P L 3 1073 1. 62 98 400 
P L 6 1073 1.62 98 400 
P A 1 1475 1. 96 105 373 
P A 2 14~5 1. 94 106 356 
P A 3 1367 1.86 105 400 
P A 6 1449 1. 94 107 480 
L A 1 1175 1. 70 . 97 424 
L A 2 1167 1. 69 98 424 
L A 3 1169 1. 69 100 440 
L A 6 1267 1. 77 101 400 
*I = Investment Model 1 = 1 Month 
P = Price-Investment Model 2 = 2 Months 
L = Labor Model 3 = 3 Months 
A = Atheoretical Model 6 = 6 Months 
TABLE XV 
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE MAJORITY-RULE MODELS 
Models Net Profit/Loss Number 
Included* Profit Ratio of Hits 
I 
I 
I 
P 
P L 
P A 
L A 
L A 
*1 
P 
L 
A 
= 
= 
= 
= 
1193 1. 71 
1157 1.68 
1275 1. 78 
1075 1.62 
Investment Model 
Price-Investment Model 
Labor Model 
Atheoretical Model 
TABLE XVI 
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE 
Models Net Profit/Loss 
Included* Profit Ratio 
I P 1163 1. 69 
I L 1421 1. 91 
I A 1547 2.03 
P L 935 1. 52 
P A 1581 2.07 
L A 1721 2.22 
I P L 1163 1. 69 
I P A 1567 2.05 
I L A 1707 2.20 
P L A 1581 2.07 
I P L A 1567 2.05 
*1 = Investment Model 
95 
101 
100 
96 
HEDGE-RULE 
Number 
of Hits 
101 
101 
104 
95 
104 
105 
1'" UJ. 
104 
105 
104 
104 
P = Price-Investment Model 
L = Labor Model 
A = Atheoretical Model 
Worst 
Computed 
Loss 
265 
391 
273 
356 
MODELS 
Worst 
Computed 
Loss 
373 
265 
152 
373 
152 
152 
373 
152 
152 
152 
152 
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as a forecast of no change in interest rates. 
When the decision rule permits the forecaster not to 
take a market position, the profit/loss ratio may increase 
even while the sum of the actual profits is decreasing. 
One such rule is very simple: If the forecasts of all 
the models agree, that is the forecast; if they do not 
agree, there is no forecast. The results of this rule, 
called the veto model are shown in Table XVII. The 
profit/loss ratios in that table reflect the fact that 
these composite models did not make a forecast at every 
opportunity. 
Figures 40 through 53 show the net profit and 
profit/loss ratio for selected composite models. 
When several forecasts are available, the possible 
strategies become more varied and sophisticated than those 
explored so far. It turns out, for example, that some 
models seem relatively more successful in forecasting 
increases in rates while others do better when forecasting 
decreases. A composite rule taking these differences into 
account might performance. 
At some point analysis must give way to conclusions and 
action. This seems like a good point to end the discussion 
of new decision rules and assemble together the conclusions 
reached and see what they imply. 
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TABLE XVII 
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE VETO-RULE MODEL 
Worst 
Models Net Profit/Loss Computed 
Included* Profit Ratio Loss 
I P 1207 2.03 265 
I L 1194 1.86 265 
I A 1336 2.09 152 
P L 1206 1.82 294 
P A 1348 2.24 233 
L A 1335 2.14 152 
I P L 1207 2.03 265 
I P A 1367 2.53 152 
I L A 1295 2.20 152 
P L A 1407 2.42 164 
I P L A 1367 2.53 152 
*1 = Investment Model 
P = Price-Investment Model 
L = Labor Model 
A = Atheoretical Model 
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Figure 40. Cumulative net profit--investment model, labor model 
and atheoretical model combined according to the majority rule. 
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Figure 41. Profit/loss ratio--investment model. labor model and 
atheoretical model combined according to the majority rule. 
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Figure ~2. Cum~let!ye net profit--investment model and labor 
model combined according to the hedge rule. 
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Figure 43. Profit/loss ratio--investment model and labor model 
combined according to the hedge rule. 
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Figure 44. Cumulative net profit--price-investment model and 
labor model combined according to the hedge rule. 
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Figure 45. Prof1t/loDS rat1o--pr1ce-1nvestment model and labor 
model combined accDrd!ng to the hedge rule. 
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Figure 46. Cumulative net profit--labor model and atheoretical 
model combined according to the hedge rule. 
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Figure 47. Profit/loss ratio--labor model and atheoret1cal 
model combined according to the hedge rule. 
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Figure 48. Cumulative net profit--investment model, price-
investment model and labor model combined according to the 
veto rule. 
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rlgure 49. Profit/loss rat1o--investment model. price-investment 
model and labor model combined according to the veto rule. 
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Figure 50. Cumulative net profit--investment model. price-
investment model and atheoretlcal model combined according 
to the veto rule. 
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Figure 51. Profit/loss ratio--investment model. price-investment 
model and atheoretical model combined according to the veto rule. 
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Figure 52. Cumulative net profit--pr1ce-investment model, labor 
model and atheoret1cal model combined according to the veto rule. 
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Figure 53. Profit/loss ratio--pr1ce-investment model, labor 
model and atheoretical model combined according to the veto rule. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND 
DIRECTIONS FOR SUBSEQUENT RESEARCH 
This final chapttr looks backward and forward: back 
to summarize what has been done and to gather in one place 
the major conclusions that have been drawn; ahead to the 
implications of the work, and beyond to the directions 
subsequent research might take. 
SUMMARY 
The introductory chapter explains the motivation for 
wanting to forecast interest rates, showing the growing 
importance of interest as an element of national income and 
describing the usefulness of an interest rate forecast to 
portfolio managers, corporate borrowers, speculators and 
policymakers. 
Chapter II looks at the interest rate forecasting 
problem from several perspectives. The major theoretical 
impediment to forecasting--the efficient market theory--is 
discussed at length. The nature of the economic 
environment in which forecasting takes place is considered. 
Different views of the securities markets and different 
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approaches to price forecasting are discussed. The chapter 
concludes with a nontechnical overview of pattern 
recognition, a new approach to forecasting. 
Chapter III starts from basic principles and 
develops the subject of pattern recognition just far 
enough to derive the classifiers needed to forecast the 
direction of change in interest rates. The important 
results are recursively updated weighted-least-squared-
error algorithm and the hyperbolic tangent algorithm. 
Chapter IV reports the substance of the research 
project. First, it provides unambiguous notions of what a 
forecast is and which interest rate is to be forecast. It 
then proposes a reasonable forecasting objective and 
suggests standards by which forecasting success can be 
judged. A brief discussion of the economic theory 
underlying the choice of variables is followed by the 
development of a rnethcd of detrending those variables so 
as to better capture information useful in forecasting 
interest rates. Four specific forecasting models are then 
presented and their performance is evaluated in comparison 
with a random walk simulation and with a Bayesian 
alternative. These forecasts are then combined in several 
different ways to yield composites which are superior in 
performance to their components. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The major conclusions emerging from this research are 
these. 
The nation's economic system is complex and evolving 
and it sometimes exhibits irrational behavior. In such an 
environment, forecasting interest rates is not likely to 
be an easy task. 
In most fields hard work combined with creativity and 
a superior technology usually outperforms lesser effort 
combined with poorer technology. Interest rate forecasting 
is not an exception. 
Pattern recognition is an interdisciplinary endeavor 
and represents a relatively new and potentially powerful 
intellectual technology. When systems are statistically 
unstable, pattern recognition appears to offer a superior 
forecasting method. This is so because the algorithms 
permit the forecasting system to learn from its errors and 
adapt to changing conditions. 
The potential for self-delusion in economic 
forecasting is great. A clear understanding of the 
available information set avoids "forecasting the past." 
The method called "leaving-one-out" protects against the 
trap of data mining. 
The efficient market theory, while probably useful 
to economists as a first approximation i suffers serious 
problems. It is contradicted by findings from fields as 
varied as physiology and sociology. More important, the 
empirical economic evidence presented here requires one 
to reject the theory at the highest levels of confidence. 
Since the market for long-term U.S. government bonds is 
one of the broadest, deepest and best informed in the 
world, failure to find confirmation here seems fatal to 
the theory in its "operational form." 
The reason this study rejects the efficient market 
theory, while some others have not, is the use here of 
different information sets, different forecasting 
techniques, and different statistical hypotheses. 
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Four simple models indicate that one should be able 
to forecast the direction of change in interest rates 
correctly about 60% of the time. If the results are dollar 
weighted and the forecaster is allowed more sophisticated 
strategies (including the right to refuse to forecast when 
uncertainty is greatest), then performance exceeding 70% 
may be possible. These percentages compare favorably with 
the 45% historically achieved by a buy-and-hold strategy, 
the 50% expected from a random decision rule, or the 55% 
that the Bayesian rule would have scored. 
Another conclusion, one supported by the whole of the 
research rather than just the portion described here, is 
that the greatest profit/loss ratios are achieved by 
combining many individual models together. For risk-adverse 
speculators, variations on the veto rule will prove most 
attractive; for those who must always have an opinion on 
the future course on interest rates, variations on the 
majority rule or the hedge rule are the methods of 
choice. 
IMPLICATIONS 
There are implications from this research for each 
of the audiences identified in the first chapter. 
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Portfolio managers who use the forecasting methods 
developed here can expect to make significant improvements 
in their investm~nt performance. The case of a financial 
institution with a hypothetical $1 million fixed-income 
portfolio that was always invested in twenty-year constant-
maturity U.S. government bonds is considered in Appendix D. 
The appendix shows that over the fourteen years covered by 
this research, that portfolio would have yielded 
approximately $1.2 million in interest but would have 
incurred capital losses of nearly $300,000, for a net gain 
of about $900,000. On the other hand, had the lender 
followed a hedging strategy indicated by any of the 
forecasting models developed here, the interest income 
would have been about the same, but the capital loss would 
have been replaced by a profit of more than $350,000; so 
the net gain would have been $1.55 million, about 70% 
greater than that generated by the naive strategy. This 
represents a major increase in total investment return. 
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It is easy for the owners of financial assets to buy 
and sell them in securities markets or to hedge them in 
the futures markets. It is much more difficult and 
expensive for corporations to issue and redeem their debt 
instruments. Nevertheless, those ~orporations that 
frequently raise large amounts of borrowed capital, 
utilities for example, could expect to make meaningful 
reductions in their interest costs if they were to time 
their bond offerings in accordance with the forecasting 
models. 
There are two lessons here for speculators. The most 
important is that it may possible to make large profits 
following the buy- and sell-signals generated by the 
pattern recognition techniques. But the relatively large 
amount of the worst computed loss should lead speculators 
to understand that important losses are probably 
inevitabl: from time to time, so careful management of 
speculative capital is essential if ruin is to be avoided. 
I 
In other words, since a "fail-safe" strategy is probably 
impossible to achieve, speculators should adopt a strategy 
that is "safe-fail" (Holling, 1976, 1977). 
Economic policymakers, more than most lenders, 
borrowers, or speculators, need point estimates of the 
economic variables they follow. Moreover, they want their 
models to make predictions conditional on certain policy 
action being implemented. For these reasons pattern 
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recognition models that give unconditional direction-of-
change forecasts do not really conform to the needs of 
economic policymakers. The forecasts may still be useful in 
reducing uncertainty and may lead to better policy 
actions. 
Economic theorists need to reconsider the efficient 
market theory in view of the evidence--psychological and 
sociological as well as economic--presented here. If 
markets are seriously inefficient, then the whole 
structure of those economic theories built around the 
concept of rational expectations may be faulty. Modifying 
these theories will be difficult, says Lester Thurow 
(1983), because "it involves abandoning a beautiful 
sailing ship--the price-auction model--that happens to be 
torn apart and sinking in a riptide" of contrary evidence. 
Teweles, Harlow, and Stone (1974) use a different 
metaphor: "The greatest tragedy in all history is the 
murder of a beautiful theory by a gang of brutal facts." 
The demonstrated effectiveness of pattern 
recognition as a forecasting method should encourage its 
use by other economic forecasters, particularly those 
concerned with the so-called turning point problem~ 
All should be aware that economic shocks, mutations 
of the economy, or the self-defeating-forecast phenomenon 
could render the models developed here less effective in 
in the future. 
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DIRECTIONS FOR SUBSEQUENT RESEARCH 
This work is not the last word on the application of 
pattern recognition techniques to interest rate fore-
casting; it is only the first chapter. Much remains that 
could be done. 
The range of variables entering the pattern 
classifier could be extended to include other economic 
series and combinations and transformations thereof. It 
might be more fruitful, however, to include variables 
suggested by some of the other perspectives discussed in 
Chapter II (this is not, of course, equivalent to adopting 
those other perspectives). The variable being forecast 
could also be changed. For example, different forecasting 
horizons might be considered, or the forecast might relate 
to different financial instruments, say Treasury bills or 
municipal bonds. 
Other criterion functions would be more appropriate 
in circumstances where the utility function of the 
decision maker was neither linear nor symrrletric. Different 
numerical methods for optimizing the criterion functions 
could be considered. For example, it seems likely that the 
criterion function J L might be expressed and solved as a 
linear programming problem, albeit one involving an 
extremely large simplex matrix. 
Preliminary computations indicate that it may be 
possible to exploit the fact that some classification 
models excel when forecasting rate increases while other 
models perform better when forecasting decreases. This 
suggests yet other methods of combining forecasts. 
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Graphic presentations can reveal much in a data 
structure that would otherwise go undetected. Competent 
researchers in statistics (Anscombe, 1973) and pattern 
recognition (Friedman and Tukey, 1974; Stanley, Nieno~, and 
Lendaris, 1969) have discredited the idea that "performing 
intricate calculations is virtuous, whereas actually 
looking at the data is cheating" (Anscombe). When the 
graphs are on a computer screen under user control, their 
power is multiplied. Future research should certainly take 
full advantage of whatever graphics capabilities are 
available. 
Nonlinear classifiers frequently perform better than 
linear o~es. With the aid of interacti7E computer 
graphics, it may be feasible to tackle the greater 
complexity these nonlinear decision functions entail. 
The adoption of new intellectual tools depends on 
their ready availability and ease of use. When that use 
requires computations that only a computer can feasibly 
perform, "packages" are needed. There seems to be ~ need 
for a well-thought-out set of interactive computer 
programs for use in pattern recognition. A serious 
difficulty, of course, is that many problems require that 
the algorithms be specially designed, rather than called 
from a standard set of routines • 
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. ~ll of these advances might make it easier to answer 
lithe most crucial question facing the world economy: Where 
will interest rates gO?" 
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APPENDIX A 
SUMMARY OF NOTATION 
The principal symbols used in this report are listed below 
together with a brief explanation and the number of the 
equation ,near where they are first defined. Primes (') 
always indicate vector or matrix transposition. 
Eqn Symbol and Explanation 
Feature vector 
(7) x = (xl' X2' ••• , x n ' 1)' 
Augmented feature vector 
( 8 ) w = ( wi' w2' •.. , wn ' wn+ 1) , 
Augmented weight vector 
(10) w(i) 
Estimate of w after i iterations of the 
perceptron algorithm 
(42) w<j> 
(42) 
Solution vector to problem P j 
Pj 
Pattern classification problem consisting 
of the first j features 
(5) d(x) = w'x 
Decision function 
(4) d(x) = w'x = 0 
Partition boundary 
(10) y(i) = x(i) if x(i) is in class C1 
= -x(i) if x(i) is in class C2 • 
Modified feature vector 
(13) Jp(w) = .5 (:w'y: - w'y) 
Perceptron criterion function 
(19) JR(w) = .125 (:w'y: - w'y)2 
Relaxation criterion function 
(26) Js(w) = sumi (ai - w'y(i»2 
Minimum squared error criterion function 
(30) 
Net profit criterion function 
( 31 ) J L ( w) = • 5 sum i : Vi: : s g n (v 1> - s 9 n (w ' x ( i ) ) : 
Minimum loss criterion function 
(33) (sw' x( i) ) : 
Hyperbolic tangent criterion function 
(36) Jw(w) = sumi (uiai - uiw'y(i»2 
Weighted least squared criterion function 
(23) a 
A positive vector, sometimes equal to 1, the 
unit vector 
(29) b 
A vector with elements equal to 1 if x is in 
class C1 or -1 if x is in class C2 
(13) 0 
The zero ve·::::tor 
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(28) 1 
The unit vector 
Change in the interest rate in period i 
The positive square root of the absolute value of vi 
(29) X 
A matrix with rows equal to x' 
(22) X-l 
The inverse of X, if defined 
(28) X# = (X'X)-lX' 
The generalized inverse of X 
(22) Y 
A matrix with rows equal to y' which rows 
equal x(i) if x is in class Cl or -x(i) if 
x(i) is in class C2 (37) u 
A diagonal matrix with nonzero elements equal to ui 
(42) W 
A matrix with rows equal to w'<j> 
df (z) 
(14) grad f{z) = -------
dz 
( df df dE ) , 
= (-=---, ----- ... , ----- ) 
( 
.9.z 1 ~z2 ~zn ) 
The gradient of the function f 
(17) sgn (w'y) = 1 if w'y > 0 
= -1 if w'y < 0 
-
The sign function 
APPENDIX B 
TECHNICAL NOTES 
1. Notes. To these technical notes the author 
has relegated material that y for any rEason, might have 
tended to interrupt the flow of the main body of the 
report. 
2. The mathematics of interest and the lO-for-l 
rule. A bond is a promise to pay a stipulated amount of 
money on a specified future maturity date together with 
stipulated semiannual interest payments to the maturity 
date. This payment schedule is portrayed in the time 
diagram below. 
iii i i i i i iP 
----- ---- --- ---- ----
where i represents the interest payments and P represents 
the principal payment at maturity. 
The price or value of the bond is simply the 
discounted value of the future payments (Rider and 
Fischer, 1962): 
Bond value = 
Discounted 
value of 
interest 
payments 
+ 
Discounted 
value of 
principal 
For example, if a $1000 twenty-year bond bearing 6% 
coupons (i.e., one paying interest at the rate of $30 
every six months) is discounted to return 10%, the value 
is 
656.82 = 514.77 + 142.05 
The lO-for-l approximation is a rule of thumb 
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for estimating the change in the present value of a long 
series of deferred payments when the rate used to discount 
them changes. For example, the twenty-year bond bearing 6% 
semiannual coupons is worth only $598.84 when revalued to 
yield 11%. Thus the 1% change in the interest rate, from 
10% to 11%, changed the value of the bond by $57.98, or by 
about 9.7% 
3. Commissions and transaction costs. The 
efficient market theory assumes zero commision, i.e., 
there are no costs to buy or sell in the market. 
Consequently, a challenge to the efficient market theory 
should not be upheld if commissions alone account for the 
"failure ll of the theory. 
Commission costs were not considered in the models 
derived in Chapter IV because the fees are small 
compared to the excess rates of returns generated by the 
models, and because incorporating them into the models 
would have added an unnecessary layer of complexity. This 
note demonstrates that transaction costs are minor and that 
their consideration does not invalidate any of the 
conclusions reached in this study. 
The typical bid-asked spread on actively traded 
long-term U.S. government bonds is $1.25 per $1000 face 
amount. Thus if a model generated a buy or sell signal 
every month, the rate of return (calculated on a monthly 
basis consistent with the the method used in Chapter IV) 
would have decreased by .125%. However, even the "most 
active" model generated fewer than 40 signals calling for 
a change in position: consequently, the average reduction 
in the rate of return would have been less than .030% 
(.0125 x 40 x 1/168). This .030% reduction is less than 
one-quarter of a standard deviation, so even the poorest 
forecasting model would continue to reject the efficient 
market theory at the 99% level of confidence. 
It might even be argued that the discussion in the 
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preceding paragraph is unnecessary and that the consider-
ation of commissions should increase the confidence one 
has in rejecting the EMT. The argument runs as follows: If 
commissions are to be subtracted in computing t.he rates of 
return generated by the forecasting models, a similar 
subtraction should be made to the rates of return generated 
by the simulation. Since the simulation, on average, would 
call for 84 position changes, the reduction in the average 
simulation rate of return would exceed the reduction 
models' rates of return, and the confidence level at which 
one rejects the EMT would be higher. 
4. Risk and the use of federal funds. This note 
considers the use of federal funds as the alternative 
investment medium employed when computing the rate of 
return, the measure used to test the efficient market 
theory. The preferred alternative would have been U.S. 
Treasury bills having one month remaining to maturity. 
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Like the long-term bonds, these instruments are backed by 
the full faith and credit of the U.S. government, and the 
one-month maturity matches exactly the investment time 
horizon used in the study. The necessary data for this 
series was not available. The next most obvious alternative 
is three-month T-bills, but in order to properly compute 
capital gains and losses at the end of the month, the rate 
on T-bills with two months to maturity would be required--
another series not available. 
These data difficulties lead to the use of federal 
funds as the alternative to long-term bonds. Having a 
maturity of one day, Federal funds are the most liquid of 
all assets except cash (and note that the daily maturity 
makes the use of the monthly average yield appropriate in 
computing the rate of return). They are exchanged between 
commercial banks and certain other financial institutions. 
The closely related market for repurchase agreements 
effectively makes the federal funds market available to all 
large financial institutions. Federal funds entail some 
credit risk, i.e., there is some risk that the borrower 
will default, but actual default is virtually unknown and 
so the risk must be considered minimal. 
Now consider the qnestion of risk more generally. 
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Could it be that the models give evidence for the rejection 
of the efficient market theory because they incur greater 
risk? The answer is no, and in fact the risk borne by 
following the models is much less than the risk of the 
simulated random strategy. On average, the simulation had 
the investor committed to bonds half the time and to 
federal funds half the time: in contrast f the models had 
the investor committed to bonds less than one-third of the 
time. Now since the monthly variance of the return on bonds 
is more than 100 times as great as the variance of the 
return on federal funds, investors following the trading 
rules implied by the models accepted much less risk but 
achieved superior returns. Additional evidence that the 
models incurred less risk comes from the statistics on the 
worst computed loss. Hence any bias is on the side of the 
efficient market theory, not on the side of the models. 
5. Profit discounting and accumulation. Many 
would argue that the unweighted sum of net profits is not 
an appropriate measure by which to judge or compare models. 
Some would say that the profits should be accumulated dt 
some rate of interest, perhaps the rate on Treasury bills. 
Others would argue that the hypothetical profits from ~~2 
distant past should be discounted because the economy has 
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probably changed and so it is the more recent profits that 
deserve greater weight in choosing between forecasting 
models. Both views have merit. The author has taken the 
easy decision to do neither. Provided with the month-by-
month profit, the user is free to accumulate or discount 
at any rate thought appropriate. 
6. Terminology. The terminological terrain gets 
treacherous from time to time even within a given field. 
For example, those pattern recognition techniques that make 
assumptions about underlying statistical distributions are 
frequently called Bayesian or statistical, while those 
that make no such assumptions are called deterministic. 
The distinction between the methods is better conveyed by 
the words parametric and nonparametric. So-called 
deterministic methods are frequently used on nondeter-
ministic problems and often are just as Bayesian and just 
as statistical in spirit as the so-called Bayesian or 
statistical methods. It is, however, twenty years too 
late to complain about usage so firmly established in the 
literature. 
When terminology becomes so jumbled and contradictory 
that even experts and authorities disagree on the meaning 
of words, that terminology is best avoided. For this reason 
the terms ex-post and ex-ante have not been used here. 
Compare, for example, the discussion of these words by 
Theil (1978) with that by Pindyck and Rubinfe1d (1981). 
232 
A third type of terminology problem appears not 
through a poor choice of words nor because of disagreement 
by experts over their meaning, but because the same word is 
used in different senses in different fields. Linstone, for 
example, uses "technical" to refer to a perspective that is 
"rational" and II scientific." In the investment field, 
"technical" methods are generally considered the least 
"scientific." 
7. Notation. Without good notation advanced 
mathematical thought is impossible. Without a positional 
number system, long division is very difficult (try 
dividing cmxxv by xxxvii without converting). Without 
Ricci's tensor notation, even Einstein could not have 
produced the general theory of relativity (Coxeter, 1961). 
And without Iverson's (1962) algorithmic notation and its 
implementation as a computer language, APL, (Gillman and 
Rose, 1976) the research here could not have been cOQpleted 
in reasonable time. Consider, for example, the following 
problem: 
Given an n-vector of values of a dependent 
variable and an (n x 2) matrix of observations 
on two independent variables, obtain estimates 
of the ordinary least squares regression 
parameters. Also examine the residuals for 
heteroscedasticity related to the first 
independent variable. Do this by sorting the 
observations on that variable and comparing 
the residuals (sorted in the same order). 
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A program to solve this problem, written in a 
language like BASIC or FORTRAN, would require pages of 
coding and would require several hours to develop and 
debug. In APL, the code takes five lines and three minutes. 
See Figure 54. 
8. Error types. At least four types of e~rors can 
be distinguished. First are the two standard statistical 
types: predicting that interest rates will rise when they 
actually fall, and predicting that they will decrease when 
they actually increase. The probabilities of making these 
kinds of errors can be estimated from the data. The third 
kind of error is misspecifying the forecasting model 
(Kendall, 1979). The probability of making this kind of 
error is close to unity when one deals with systems as 
complex as the economy. The fcurth type of error is 
solving the wrong problem (Mitroff, 1977). 
Errors of the last two types usually receive insuf-
ficient attention. In the present instance, for example, 
the author's motivation to pursue this research came from 
a desire to find a method of improving investment perform-
ance. Initially this was translated to mean, "Find a 
method to estimate the future values of interest rates." 
Only when this goal seemed impossible to achieve, did it 
become apparent that the operational goal was to forecast 
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[OJ I RtGHSSc.ON X;XX;B;RES;S;SX1;SnSJF 
(1) "0 'REGU:SSIOt~ COEffICIENTS: '" 'F6.3' aFM! Bf-YaXXt-1,X 
(2) " ¢ 'RESl~UALS : ',,<Ft-'F6.2')D1HT iISt-Y-XX+.xB 
(3) "~ 'SORTtD rnST VARIABLE : '.,r DFIiT SX1'"xt;1J[St-'xt;1)J 
[~) 'COiRISPOtiDltiC nSIDUALS: '"F DFMT SRIS~RtStSJ 
X 
13.1 8.86 
15.3 11.18· 
H.S 10.88 
14.8 9.88 
17.2 17.46 
19.4 H.64 
19.1 15.32 
17.2 18.32 
20.5 15.3 
y 
14.214 19.182 17.712 15.812 25.594 24.936 25.428 27.368 2~.97 
I P.l:GRESSl>ON X 
RESI DUALS -0.09 0.91 0.11 ·0.75 ·0.57 0.17 O.it. 0.31 ·0.26 
SOETED Fl~ST VARIABLE 13.10 14.80 14.80 15.30 17.20 17.20 19.10 19.'0 20.50 
CC.RESPOtn'lt~G F:ESnUALS: -(i.09 ·':>.75 0.11 0.91 ·0.57 O.3~ (1.16 0.17 ·0.26 
Figure 54. An ordinary least regression program written in the 
notation of AFL. 
the direction of change of interest rates. Redefined, the 
problem seems to have a solution. 
9. Ashby's law of reguisite variety. The law of 
requisite variety is a mathematical theorem about the 
relationship of entries in a rectangular table or matrix 
(Ashby: 1964). 
One effect of Ashby's law, says Hare (1967), is to 
direct our attention, as students o~ systems, 
to the study of two types of techniques and 
methods: those that increase the possible variety 
of actions available to us in a given situation, 
and those that we use to simplify, restrict, 
partition or otherwise cut the system variety as 
the need arises. 
In the context of forecasting, the two types of 
action correspond to increasing the complexity of the 
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forecasting system and to reducing the range of events or 
outcomes that must be forecast. By restricting the range of 
outcomes to two--interest rates increase or interest rates 
decrease--the forecasting problem becomes more manageable. 
10. Other versions of the EMT. Chapter II 
described tW0 versions of the efficient market theory: the 
"weak" version which states that price history alone is 
useless in forecasting price changes; and the "strong" 
form that no publicly available information can help in 
forecasting price changes. There are two other versions: 
the "very strong" version asserts that even inside, 
nonpublic information is useless; and the "very weak" 
version, which says only that profitable arbitrage is 
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impossible. 
11. PR vs. OLS. It was argued in Chapter IV that 
this study rejects the efficient Hlarket theory while some 
others have not, because of the use here of different 
forecasting techniques and different information sets. This 
note demonstrates the superiority of pattern recognition 
over the usual application of ordinary least squares 
regression in making certain types of ~stimates. 
As usually applied, regression is designed to make 
estimates of a continuous dependent variable based on 
information about a related independent variable, which is 
also usually measured continuously. The parameters of the 
estimating equation are computed in such a way as to obtain 
the "best fit", the term being defined, for ordinary 
least squares, as the minimum of the sum of the squared 
deviations. Mathematically, the problem is to find the set 
of coefficients w that gives the "best" solution to the 
set of inconsistent simultaneous linear equations 
Xw = z 
The OLS solution is 
w = (X'X)-lX' z 
where z is the dependent variable and the rest of the 
notation is that previously established. 
But it should be noted that there is nothing sacred 
about the least squares definition of best fit. Other 
definitions have been used, though not as widely. Perhaps 
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the best known alternative to OLS is the so-called MAD 
regression where the best fit is defined as the minimum of 
the absolute deviations. It is not at all clear that the 
quadratic loss function of OLS is superior in any given 
application to the linear one of MAD, but the solution to 
the former is certainly easier computationally. 
Pattern recognition has a different objective than 
OLS. It seeks only to make a binary.estimate (on/off, 
yes/no, up/down, malignant/benign), not a continuous 
one. The parameters of the estimating equation are computed 
in a manner to obtain the best separation between the two 
classes. Mathematically, the problem is to find the set of 
coefficients w that give the "best" solution to the set 
of inconsistent simultaneous inequalities 
Yw > 0 
Again, "best" can be variously defined. A frequently used 
defin~tion is the minimum probability of error, i.e., best 
means to solve the greatest number of inequalities 
simultaneously. Unfortunately, there is no known analytic 
solution to the mathematical problem just posed, and in 
fact the literature of pattern classification is largely 
devoted to finding approximate solutions to the set of 
inequalities. 
Some problems lend themselves to OLS estimates, some 
to PR estimates: the birth weight of a fetus is to be 
estimated by OLS regression, the s~x of the fetus by PR 
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techniques. Some other problems lend themselves to bothe 
The direction of change in interest rates can be 
estimated using either technique since the OLS estimate of 
the amount of change also provides an estimate of the 
direction of change. The question is: if one is interested 
only in the direction of change, which technique--OLS or 
PR--will give the better estimate. 
Mathematically, it would be suprising if the para-
meters that best solved the set of inconsistent equations 
also gave the best solution to the set of inconsistent 
inequalities. 
The following example illustrates the superiority of 
PR over OLS when the objective is binary estimation. Let 
the values of the dependent variable (Y) and the 
independent variable (X) be given by 
Y = -10 -3 -2 -1 -1 15 17 13 10 20 when 
x ~ 5 8 8 9 10 12 13 13 13 15 
The OLS equation is 
Y = -28.09 + 3.20X 
with a coefficient of determination equal to .92. If the 
classification task is to estimate whether the variable Y is 
greater or less than zero, however, use of the regression 
estimates misclassifies 2 of the 10 points for an error 
rate of 20%. 
the minimum squared error classifier discussed 
in Chapter III is applied to the problem, the decision 
function is 
d(X) = .30X - 3.19 
which correctly classifies all points. 
Ashby's law of requisite variety, mentioned above, 
may provide some insight. A generalized version of one 
formulation of Ashby's law is 
V(O) ~ V(D) - log k - VCR) 
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where V(O) is the variety of the outcom~ (which one wants 
to reduce to zero), V(D) is the variety of the disturbances 
(the complexity of the economy), VCR) is the variety of the 
regulator (the complexity of the forecasting system), and 
log k is related to the number of repetitions in the 
outcome that arise from any given action by the regulator. 
The effect of using pattern recognition is to increase the 
value of k~ when k is large the regulator has less variety 
to control and hence it might be expected that the variety 
of the outcome would be less. This is what Hare (supra) 
means when he speaks of "those [methods] that we use to 
simplify, restrict, partition or otherwise cut the system 
variety as the need arises." 
A less sophisticated, but perhaps more telling 
argument is an analogy drawn from the experience of those 
who hunt rabbits. When shooting for "sport" the marksman 
will carry a .22 caliber rifle and aim for a point in the 
midsection~ when dinner is the obje~tive, he will carry a 
shotgun and fire along the rabbit's apparent trajectory. 
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Precision is sacrificed for effectiveness. 
APPENDIX C 
USE OF THE HYPERBOLIC TANGENT ALGORITHM 
This appendix reports on the use of the hyperbolic 
tangent algorithm (HTA) derived in Chapter III to refine 
estimates of the parameters in the investment model 
used in Chapter IV. 
Rather than start the iteration of the hyperbolic 
tangent algorithm with an arbitrary weight vector, it is 
much more convenient to use the weight vector from the 
corresponding iteration of the recursively updated weighted 
least squared error algorithm (WLSA). This starting vector 
is known to give reasonable results, so the job of th~ 
ETA is to refine the values of the vector so as to 
maximize tte criterion function of equation (31). 
In 1965, Powell proposed a search technique for 
finding the 0ptimum of a multivariate function without 
using derivatives. Neave and Shaftel (1978) improved th~ 
method and gave computer programs for its implementation in 
their paper, "An Accelerated Technique for Ridge Following 
Using Conjugate Directions." The details are unimportant 
here, but the method is considered highly efficient 
(Beveridge and Schechter, 1970). 
The HTA estimates of the parameters of the investment 
model were superior to those of the WLSA as the following 
summary results demonstrate: 
Net Profit 
Number of Hits 
WLSA 
1195 
101 
HTA 
1331 
107 
Only one model has been refined this way because 
the computational burdens are several orders of magnitude 
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greater with the hyperbolic tangent algorithm than with the 
weighted least square algorithm. For example, the computer 
used to make the calculations reported here performs an 
ordinary least square regression involving 168 observations 
on one independent variable in 1.8 seconds; the recursively 
updated weighted least square algorithm uses 38 seconds: 
but the hyperbolic tangent takes 3.2 hours, about 300 times 
as long as the WLSA. To use the HTA for all the models and 
conduct L-method tests would mean that the same computer 
would need to run 24 hours a day for more than 5 months. 
APPENDIX D 
USING THE MODELS TO HEDGE A FIXED-INCOME PORTFOLIO 
The models developed in Chapter IV were designed to 
forecast the direction of change of interest rates on 
long-term government bonds. But forecasts are not ends in 
themselves, they are made to improve decision making. This 
appendix examines how a hypothetical investment manager 
might use the models to improve investment performance. 
On January 1, 1969, a small group of private 
investors. establishes a mutual fund with unconventional 
provisions. Together the investors put up $1 million 
dollars. All money is invested in twenty-year, constant-
maturity U.s. government bonds. What makes the fund 
unconventional is its monthly accounting and pay-out/ 
pay-in procedure. At the end of each month the value of 
the fund is determined. This value is the then-current 
market value of the bond portfolio including interest 
accrued and received during the month. If the fund value 
exceeds $1 million, the excess is paid out to the investors 
(bonds are sold if necessary to raise cash for this 
purpose). If the fund value is less than $1 million 
(because interest rates rose and the value of the bonds 
fell), then the investors agree to pay in the amount 
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necessary to restore the fund to $1 million. Consequently, 
the value of the fund at the beginning of each month is 
exactly $1 million. Interest is assumed to be earned at the 
rate in effect at the beginning of the month, and capital 
gains or losses are computed based on the change in rates 
during the month. Operated this way, the fund would have made 
a net cumulative pay-out (all pay-outs less all pay-ins) of 
$911,000 by December 31, 1982, and the fund would still be 
worth the original $1 million. 
Now let the fund manager adopt a fully hedged 
strategy, that is, he balances his long bond portfolio by 
selling an equivalent amount of bonds in the futures 
market. Assume that the gain (loss) on the futures 
contracts exactly offsets the loss (gain) on the 
actual bonds (the so-called perfect hedge). Therefore 
there can be no net capital gain or loss, just interest 
earniIlgs. This s tra te;jY is both less risky (bE~causE. 
capital loss is impossible) and more profitable because 
the cumulative pay-out by December 31, 1982, totaled 
$1,210,000 
Next let the fund manager adopt a different hedge 
strategy, one based on the investment model developed in 
Chapter IV. If the model forecasts that interest rates will 
increase during the next month, then the manager hedges the 
portfolio by selling futures contracts for $1 million. 
Again assume that the gain (loss) on the futures contracts 
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exactly offsets the loss or (gain) on the actual bonds. 
Therefore, any month that the portfolio is hedged, there 
can be no net capital gain or loss, only interest earnings. 
If the model forecasts that interest rates will fall during 
the month, the portfolio is held unhedged, so that any 
gain or loss is fully reflected in its value. Operated this 
way, the fund would have made a net cumulative pay-out 
of $1,566,000 by December 31, 19~2, and the fund would 
still have its original $1 million. ~he risk accepted is 
more than that of the fully hedged strategy, but less than 
that of the unhedged. 
The cumulative pay-outs under these three strategies 
are compared graphically in Figure 55. 
The manager might have based his hedge strategy on 
any of the other simple models developed in Chapter IV. The 
financial results would have been very similar as the 
fo:lo~ing table shows: 
Unhedged $ 911,000 
Full Hedge 
Investment Model Hedge 
Price-Investment Model Hedge 
Labor Model Hedge 
1,210,000 
1,566,000 
1,594,000 
1,547,000 
Atheoretical Model Hedge 1,700,000 
These results are fairly impressive, particularly 
since the models were not specifically designed to 
accommodate a hedging strategy. That is to say, rate 
1800 
1500 
1200 
900 
600 
300 
Figure 55. Cumulative pay-out under three fixed-income portfolio 
investment strategies {in $i000s} 
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f 
increases and decreases were given equal weight in the 
model design; had the models been designed with greater 
weight being given to identifying those cases where rates 
decreased, better hedging performance could have been 
expected. 
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APPENDIX E 
DATA 
This appendix contains the series used in the fore-
casting models (both as reported by the source and as 
detrended) as well as the coefficients of the models as 
they developed over time. 
The following legend explains the meaning of the 
column headings. 
YR Year of the series 
MO Month of the series 
CC Construction contracts series 
CO Contracts and orders series 
IN Commodity price series 
ER Employment ratio series 
RCL Ratio of coincident to lagging indicators 
INT Interest rate series 
CON Constant term in the forecasting models 
The construction series (CC) is reproduced by 
permission of the F.W. Dodge Division of McGraw-Hill 
Information Systems and the price series is used by 
pennission of the Commodity Research Bureau. 
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TABLE XVIII 
SERIES AS REPORTED BY THE SOURCE 
YR MO CC CO IN ER RCL INT 
1967 1 51.27 5.30 105.0 55.69 100.1 4.48 1967 2 57.84 5.69 104.1 55.57 99.2 4.70 1967 3 54.68 5.81 102.0 55.37 98.6 4.56 1967 4 60.36 5.70 100.1 55.64 98.9 4.81 1967 5 54.67 5.88 101.0 55.53 98.8 4.85 1967 6 61. 55 6.11 100.8 55.78 98.8 5.08 1967 7 57.71 6.05 99.1 55.88 99.0 5.06 1967 8 61.17 6.26 98.7 55.94 100.5 5.14 1967 9 62.89 6.09 97.9 55.92 100.1 5.19 1967 10 58.87 6.19 96.9 55.99 100.2 5.52 1967 11 60.06 6.22 96.9 55.97 102.4 5.65 1967 12 60.85 6.40 98.1 56.15 103.7 5.56 1968 1 63.08 7.74 98.1 55.51 103.0 5.37 1968 2 59.78 7.81 96.4 55.83 103.1 5.40 1968 3 66.95 9.63 99.0 55.88 103.7 5.62 1968 4 54.03 7.97 98.0 55.95 103.3 5.50 1968 5 62.20 7.32 96.7 56.27 103.6 5.50 1968 6 64.66 7.24 96.1 56.25 104.1 5.36 1968 7 71. 99 8.30 95.4 56.10 105.0 5.19 1968 8 67.83 8.39 95.6 55.98 104.5 5.22 1968 9 65.91 7.77 96.4 55.99 104.5 5.32 1968 10 75.31 9.29 97.1 55.96 105.0 5.46 1968 11 69.40 7.98 100.1 56.07 105.1 5.66 1968 12 71. 06 8.75 100.8 56.20 104.4 5.98 1969 1 84.15 8.98 102.9 56.14 104.0 6.14 1969 2 70.98 9.33 105.1 56.47 104.1 6.17 1969 3 67.37 8.69 106.2 56.41 104.3 6.22 1969 4 71. 45 9.93 107.8 56.45 103.6 5.98 1969 5 82.47 9.35 109.8 56.28 102.6 6.43 1969 6 81. 66 8.85 111. 3 56.54 102.0 6.28 1969 7 70.30 8.83 111.3 56.52 102.6 6.23 1969 8 72.35 8.75 113.2 56.65 102.4 6.32 1969 9 73.69 9.93 113.9 56.57 102.0 6.82 1969 10 78.65 8.84 113.6 56.62 101. 6 6.58 1969 11 61. 78 8.81 114.2 56.61 100.5 6.80 1969 12 84.18 8.95 114.6 56.68 100.2 6.94 
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TABLE XVIII {continued} 
SERIES AS REPORTED BY THE SOURCE 
YR 110 CC CO IN ER RCL INT 
1970 1 82.65 9.20 116.1 56.64 96.5 6.96 
1970 2 81.53 8.86 116.6 56.50 96.5 6.55 
1970 3 71.78 6.37 116.9 56.53 96.3 6.68 
1970 4 66.91 8.00 116.3 56.50 97.2 7.07 
1970 5 55.79 8.10 115.0 56.15 96.9 7.46 
1970 6 58.91 7.80 113.8 55.97 96.2 7.11 
1970 7 65.39 8.15 112.9 56.09 96.7 6.91 
1970 8 64.81 7.72 112.9 55.92 95.8 7.00 
1970 9 58.80 7.94 112.0 55.74 96.0 6.81 
1970 10 52.68 7.04 110.9 55.78 94.0 6.90 
1970 11 53.37 8.11 109.2 55.66 93.8 6.39 
1970 12 53.53 8.90 107.2 55.53 96.9 6.45 
1971 1 53.75 8.21 107.1 55.63 99.5 6.07 
1971 2 51. 66 8.94 109.9 55.43 99.7 6.24 
1971 3 67.01 9.02 109.3 55.26 100.5 5.83 
1971 4 57.86 8.89 109.7 55.45 101. 8 6.10 
1971 5 63.04 8.65 108.8 55.47 102.1 6.27 
1971 6 62.66 9.73 108.1 55.11 104.4 6.44 
1971 7 58.75 8.00 108.3 55.40 103.4 6.43 
1971 8 57.09 8.88 108.3 55.48 102.1 6.09 
1971 9 64.47 9.39 107.4 55.49 103.0 5.97 
1971 10 61.98 8.49 106.7 55.55 103.6 5.87 
1971 11 69.84 9.25 105.8 55.73 104.7 5.95 
1971 12 65.84 9.54 106.7 55.76 105.9 5.99 
1972 1 63.71 8.75 110.3 55.71 109.2 6.09 
1972 2 65.86 9.23 112.4 55.72 109.8 6.03 
1972 3 68.12 9.94 114.4 55.96 110.7 6.11 
1972 4 65.59 9.81 115.6 55.95 111.4 6.12 
1972 5 85.60 10.79 119.2 56.02 111. 5 5.96 
1972 6 69.61 9.39 119.1 56.06 110.4 6.05 
1972 7 66.67 10,47 119.8 56.06 111. 8 5.98 
1972 8 70.71 9.69 121. 0 56.21 113.6 5.99 
1972 9 71. 36 11. 07 122.7 56.09 114.3 6.09 
1972 10 77.00 10.65 124.5 56.05 115.9 5.93 
1972 11 76.52 10.98 126.2 56.21 117.2 5.82 
1972 12 80.83 11. 21 130.8 56.39 118.8 6.03 
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TABLE XVIII (continued) 
SERIES AS REPORTED BY THE SOURCE 
YR MO CC CO IN ER RCL INT 
1973 1 90.73 11.25 134.4 56.14 118.2 6.86 
1973 2 88.09 11. 95 143.0 56.57 118.4 6.90 
1973 3 88.28 12.01 149.9 56.84 118.4 6.89 
1973 4 84.53 12.16 152.9 56.82 116.3 6.91 
1973 5 81.81 12.85 161.1 56.79 116.3 7.05 
1973 6 84.05 12.73 171. 2 57.06 115.4 7.13 
1973 7 93.16 13.04 181. 9 57.04 114.9 7.63 
1973 8 89.80 13.11 207.8 56.89 114.1 7.35 
1973 9 80.88 13.02 194.9 56.98 113.7 7.05 
1973 10 91.60 14.41 192.0 57.22 114.5 7.30 
1973 11 87.38 14.55 192.1 57.35 115.1 7.22 
1973 12 73.02 13.90 204.3 57.31 113.4 7.38 
1974 1 75.89 13.88 213.3 57.32 112.3 7.48 
1974 2 84.49 14.27 232.0 57.36 111.9 7.57 
1974 3 77.05 14.64 233.0 57.32 112.5 7.89 
1974 4 85.92 13.93 230.8 57.12 110.4 8.19 
1974 5 75.91 15.34 221.6 57.17 109.9 8.13 
1974 6 72.49 14.17 224.4 57.11 109.6 8.17 
1974 7 73.37 16.64 236.9 57.16 109.5 8.33 
1974 8 85.19 15.12 240.8 56.99 108.6 8.64 
1974 9 73.48 15.61 230.5 56.91 106.7 8.49 
1974 10 58.95 14.94 231. 5 56.78 105.5 8.12 
1974 11 57.97 13.52 227.8 56.45 102.1 7.96 
1974 12 56.95 14.71 213.1 56.04 97.8 7.93 
1975 1 53.68 13.38 2'05.1 55.62 96.0 7.82 
1975 2 49.74 12.45 201. 9 55.29 96.3 7.72 
1975 3 42.90 12.03 198.6 55.17 95.3 8.24 
1975 4 54.06 13.77 201. 2 55.09 98.4 8.44 
1975 5 45.17 14.34 194.5 55.17 101. 2 8.20 
1975 6 50.17 14.15 187.2 55.01 105.8 8.09 
1975 7 47.89 13.24 195.5 55.24 107.0 8.31 
1975 8 43.86 14.G3 205.6 55.36 109.7 8.42 
1975 9 51. 36 12.53 206.3 55.30 111.5 8.61 
1975 10 50.61 12.52 201. 4 55.28 111. 8 8.15 
1975 11 42.38 12.76 191.7 55.25 113.6 8.34 
1975 12 52.37 12.04 189.7 55.29 114.2 8.04 
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TABLE XVIII (continued) 
SERIES AS REPORTED BY THE SOURCE 
YR MO CC CO IN ER RCL INT 
1976 1 44.59 14.47 190.4 55.67 116.4 8.00 
1976 2 50.10 14.15 193.2 55.77 118.4 8.02 
1976 3 52.62 14.90 196.0 55.88 119.7 7.90 
1976 4 51.77 14.81 202.3 56.08 120.9 7.99 
1976 5 52.70 13.66 202.8 56.23 120.5 8.19 
1976 6 52.53 15.97 207.4 55.99 121. 3 8.02 
1976 7 53.45 17.16 216.0 56.24 121. 4 8.04 
1976 8 52.50 15.32 206.9 56.23 121.6 7.81 
1976 9 45.74 16.55 203.1 56.11 120.9 7.75 
1976 10 51. 30 16.98 196.5 56.10 120.2 7.72 
1976 11 56.11 16.23 197.2 56.24 122.2 7.44 
1976 12 53.03 16.49 200.6 56.27 123.2 7.17 
1977 1 54.91 16.66 207.3 56.27 123.6 7.61 
1977 2 53.92 16.61 213.0 56.45 123.9 7.73 
1977 3 63.42 16.06 218.4 56.66 125.6 7.72 
1977 4 55.88 17.46 220.8 56.87 125.7 7.;2 
1977 5 63.02 19.14 218.7 57.07 126.0 7.68 
1977 6 58.53 18.83 208.5 57.10 125.7 7.57 
1977 7 59.64 16.84 204.1 57.08 126.5 7.68 
1977 8 73.25 18.92 200.8 57.22 125.6 7.53 
1977 9 66.59 20.29 201.3 57.29 126.1 7.61 
1977 10 66.05 18.34 203.3 57.42 126.1 7.76 
1977 11 68.58 18.86 205.9 57.78 125.9 7.75 
1977 12 72.79 20.96 212.7 57.91 126.2 7.98 
1978 1 80.68 20.20 218.0 58.00 123.1 8.16 
1978 2 69.58 22.43 220.3 58.00 123.9 8.21 
1978 3 67.01 20.54 226.4 58.07 124.7 8.31 
1978 4 76.04 20.56 228.0 58.39 128.1 8.37 
1978 5 89.34 22.89 228.1 58.53 126.9 8.50 
1978 6 84.54 21.22 229.7 58.78 126.8 8.67 
1978 7 79.20 22.97 228.9 58.54 126.9 8.59 
1978 8 80.35 24.17 236.2 58.66 127.1 8.43 
1978 9 87.28 24.91 243.0 58.72 126.6 8.63 
1978 10 84.95 28.26 251. 0 58.90 127.8 8.90 
1978 11 86.12 25.33 252.2 59.03 126.7 8.80 
1978 12 82.87 22.78 250.8 59.00 126.9 8.99 
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TABLE XVIII (continued) 
SERIES AS REPORTED BY THE SOURCE 
YR MO CC CO IN ER RCL INT 
1979 1 85.78 25.43 255.3 59.14 125.3 8.90 
1979 2 104.38 27.22 268.1 59.28 124.8 8.12 
1979 3 94.15 29.81 277.4 59.27 127.3 9.07 
1979 4 96.06 27.48 276.3 59.01 122.5 9.26 
1979 5 89.32 24.74 277.1 59.03 124.5 9.08 
1979 6 86.61 26.29 278.1 59.16 123.1 8.82 
1979 7 92.79 26.62 281. 2 59.27 123.5 8.98 
1979 8 84.75 25.36 279.5 59.06 122.4 9.10 
1979 9 91.05 26.36 281.1 59.31 120.6 9.31 
1979 10 95.23 26.29 283.8 59.21 119.5 10.40 
1979 11 81. 97 28.14 281.0 59.23 118.7 10.10 
1979 12 84.18 27.63 286.2 59.36 119.0 10.16 
1980 1 99.43 28.47 287.1 59.23 119.4 11.16 
1980 2 82.08 25.74 294.1 59.20 117.7 12.12 
1980 3 78.31 26.24 285.3 58.95 113.7 12.44 
1980 4 72.76 26.23 272.5 58.60 109.7 10.92 
1980 5 67.35 23.46 264.1 58.36 109.9 10.46 
1980 6 71. 59 25.34 260.3 58.19 112.4 10.08 
1980 7 74.62 27.09 274.6 58.12 115.6 10.80 
1980 8 71.41 26.52 288.7 58.06 117.2 11. 42 
1980 9 64.15 26.75 292.8 58.15 119.5 11.84 
1980 10 73.46 26.74 296.6 58.21 121.2 12.38 
1980 11 90.80 27.61 298.4 58.29 121.0 12.38 
1980 12 87.75 28.70 287.7 58.27 118.8 12.09 
1981 1 83.72 28.70 281.7 58.38 120.6 12.46 
1981 2 83.86 25,75 273.4 58.43 122.0 13.18 
1981 3 83.79 28.23 275.1 58.58 123.7 12.95 
1981 4 79.64 30.24 276.0 58.80 123.6 13.87 
1981 5 84.75 28.54 270.1 58.72 120.2 13.31 
1981 6 81. 01 28.38 267.9 58.31 120.5 13.59 
1981 7 73.46 28.62 274.2 58.44 120.5 14.31 
1981 8 78.67 28.27 272.6 58.36 119.5 15.15 
1981 9 68.12 27.92 266.4 57.94 117.5 15.78 
1981 10 74.26 26.96 260.5 58.02 115.6 14.75 
1981 11 70.77 27.88 254.8 57.88 114.9 13.13 
1981 12 70.65 26.66 249.4 57.51 113.3 14.04 
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TABLE XVIII (continued) 
SERIES AS REPORTED BY THE SOURCE 
YR MO CC CO IN ER RCL INT 
1982 1 58.18 26.62 251. 5 57.46 109.8 14.21 
1982 2 63.29 28.51 252.6 57.41 111.7 14.09 
1982 3 61.15 25.78 247.2 57.29 111.3 13.89 
1982 4 58.93 25.48 245.8 57.17 109.7 13.57 
1982 5 53.71 23.33 248.6 57.40 110.9 13.63 
1982 6 64.87 23.31 240.0 57.17 109.9 14.18 
1982 7 57.80 23.33 241. 0 57.06 109.8 13.53 
1982 8 59.78 23.03 238.4 57.06 110.6 12.59 
1982 9 55.95 24.54 237.7 56.92 110.7 11. 65 
1982 10 54.65 23.51 232.8 56.65 109.6 10.79 
1982 11 50.69 23.82 228.0 56.57 Ill. 9 10.79 
1982 12 49.55 24.84 226.8 56.50 113.4 10.62 
255 
TABLE XIX 
SERIES AS DE TRENDED 
YR MO CC CO IN ER RCL 
1967 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1967 2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1967 3 -9.7300 -0.2700 -1.2000 
-0.0800 0.3000 
1967 4 2.3760 -0.4094 -0.5972 0.4169 1. 0993 
1967 5 -7.3920 
-0.0733 2.4035 0.0486 0.6458 
1967 6 3.0228 0.0844 1.9520 0.2940 0.5448 
1967 7 -3.7675 -0.1488 0.1389 0.2213 0.6673 
1967 8 0.5073 0.0183 0.5747 0.1360 1.9924 
1967 9 1. 0224 -0.2735 0.3851 0.0056 0.7231 
1967 10 -4.4489 
-0.1646 0.0641 0.0199 0.4668 
1967 11 -2.5151 
-0.1634 008643 
-0.0618 2.3975 
1967 12 
-1. 6095 -0.0095 2.5676 0.0863 2.7060 
1968 1 0.4697 1.2549 2.4792 
-0.6348 0.8710 
1968 2 
-3.6110 0.8528 2.6831 
-0.1709 0.3741 
1968 3 3.9632 2.3031 3.0979 
-0.1048 0.5118 
1968 4 -10.5809 
-0.1310 1. 7717 -0.0349 
-0.3920 
1968 5 -0.3459 
-0.9528 0.4568 0.2680 
-0.3690 
1968 6 1. 7935 -1. 0050 0.1450 0.1580 -0.1483 
1968 7 8.3166 0.1016 -0.1989 
-0.0588 0.4246 
1968 8 1.9236 0.0049 0.4308 
-0.1996 -0.5257 
1968 9 -0.9596 -0.7825 1.5318 
-0.1810 
-0.7824 
1968 10 8.0342 0.7251 2.3137 
-0.2050 
-0.4858 
1968 11 0.0300 
-0.8772 5.2409 
-0.0836 
-0.6411 
1968 12 1.0028 -0.1138 5.3297 0.0369 -1.5662 
1969 1 13.2371 
-0.0189 6.7811 
-0.0531 
-2.0285 
1969 2 -2.8294 0.1806 8.0701 0.2617 
-1.9077 
1969 3 -6.8073 
-0.6418 8.0280 0.1362 
-1.6990 
1969 4 -2.4703 0.5425 8.4653 0.1292 -2.4161 
1969 5 8.1800 
-0.2683 9.2120 
-0.0871 -3.3208 
1969 6 5.4686 -0.8834 9.3259 0.1574 
-3.6876 
1969 7 -7.4361 
-0.9317 7.8984 0.0880 
-2.7939 
1969 8 -5.1945 
-1. 0312 8.5403 0.1775 -2.8118 
1969 9 -3.9397 0.1447 7.8783 0.0451 -3.0206 
1969 10 0.7867 
-1.0974 6.2811 0.0592 
-3.1961 
1969 11 -16.8958 
-1.1253 5.7652 0.0114 -4.0431 
1969 12 6.8290 
-0.9776 5.0986 0.0493 -3.9811 
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TABLE XIX (continued) 
SERIES AS DETRENDED 
YR MO CC CO IN ER RCL 
1970 1 3.8624 -0.7351 5.5991 -0.0273 -7.3183 
1970 2 1.6335 -1.1086 5.0325 -0.1952 -6.5649 
1970 3 -8.9827 -1. 5889 4.3194 -0.1742 -6.0827 
1970 4 -13.5614 -1. 8949 2.7755 -0.2152 -4.5419 
1970 5 -23.8866 -1.6955 0.6893 -0.5716 -4.3557 
1970 6 -18.8734 -1. 9140 -1.0835 -0.7204 -4.5817 
1970 7 -10.9758 -1. 4577 -2.3766 -0.5532 -3.5782 
1970 8 -10.8991 -1. 8241 -2.6390 -0.6916 -4.0682 
1970 9 -16.2448 -1. 5028 -3.7726 -0.8258 -3.4053 
1970 10 -21.1744 -2.3297 -4.9941 -0.7262 -5.0005 
1970 11 -18.8110 -1.1072 -6.6963 -0.7948 -4.6418 
1970 12 -17.1688 -0.2742 -8.5358 -0.8663 -1.0099 
1971 1 -15.5923 -0.9950 -8.3016 -0.7004 1. 8001 
1971 2 -16.4456 -0.2317 -5.1783 -0.8481 1.9626 
1971 3 0.2325 -0.1836 -5.7170 -0.9523 2.7091 
1971 4 -8.9943 -0.3493 -5.2043 -0.6867 3.8897 
1971 5 -3.1182 -0.6110 -6.0286 -0.6123 3.9687 
1971 6 -3.2770 0.4692 -6.5798 -0.9234 6.0372 
1971 7 -6.9499 -1.3474 -6.1805 -0.5587 4.6344 
1971 8 -8.0772 -0.4099 -6.0069 -0.4321 3.0377 
1971 9 -0.0700 0.0855 -6.7412 -0.3850 3.7618 
1971 10 -2.5428 -0.8670 -7.2136 -0.2911 4.1274 
1971 11 5.5221 -0.0872 -7.8444 -0.0840 4.9620 
1971 12 1.1265 0.1650 -6.6220 -0.0422 5.8308 
1972 1 -1. 0801 -0.6813 -2.7832 -0.0833 8.7317 
1972 2 1.1525 -0.1964 -0.7176 -0.0615 8.:176 
1972 3 3.3363 0.4844 1.1026 0.1889 8.9978 
1972 4 0.5754 0.2774 1.9951 0.1717 9.0518 
1972 5 20.5439 1.1944 5.2249 0.2355 8.4955 
1972 6 3.1442 -0.3315 4.5319 0.2648 6.7708 
1972 7 -0.0440 0.7248 4.6822 0.2520 7.6569 
1972 8 3.9582 -0.1491 5.3194 0.3899 8.8792 
1972 9 4.3071 1.1940 6.4116 0.2485 8.9161 
1972 10 9.6208 0.6500 7.5295 0.1961 9.8449 
1972 11 8.4710 0.8901 8.4716 0.3469 10.4085 
1972 12 12.1781 1. 0146 12.2494 0.5080 11. 2304 
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TABLE XIX (continued) 
SERIES AS DETRENDED 
YR MO CC CO IN ER RCL 
1973 1 21.2382 0.9508 14.7858 0.2288 9.7946 
1973 2 17.1912 1. 5303 22.1582 0.6466 9.2410 
1973 3 16.2092 1.4439 27.3720 0.8787 8.5155 
1973 4 11. 3368 1.4519 28.3586 0.8064 5.7287 
1973 5 7.7762 1. 9985 34.4713 0.7280 5.2034 
1973 6 9.3794 1. 7022 42.1082 0.9538 3.8060 
1973 7 17.7551 1.8521 49.8815 0.8760 2.8874 
1973 8 13.1728 1.7525 72.3848 0.6722 1. 7198 
1973 9 3.2830 1.4976 54.7790 0.7196 1. 0173 
1973 10 13.5847 2.7362 48.1308 0.9140 1. 5536 
1973 11 8.3697 2.6549 44.8272 0.9872 1.8595 
1973 12 -6.7038 1.7868 53.7832 0.8859 -0.1523 
1974 1 -3.7267 1.5950 59.0283 0.8397 -1. 4549 
1974 2 4.8222 1.8227 73.6647 0.8255 -1.9869 
1974 3 -3.1253 2.0175 69.7901 0.7318 -1. 4898 
1974 4 5.6567 1.1211 62.8883 0.4827 -3.7181 
" 
1974 5 -4.9013 2.3910 49.3188 0.4963 -4.2287 
1974 6 -8.3223 1.0143 48.4285 0.3990 -4.5112 
1974 7 -7.2650 3.3475 57.2633 0.4165 -4.5773 
1974 8 4.6819 1.5712 57.0269 0.2130 -5.4382 
1974 9 -7.5027 1.8934 42.5792 0.1096 -7.2536 
1974 10 -21. 8984 1. 0388 40.1328 -0.0387 -8.2759 
1974 11 -22.0261 -0.5241 33.0912 -0.3797 -11.4445 
1974 12 -22.1790 0.5996 15.3808 -0.7839 -15.3540 
1975 1 -24.5660 -0.8514 5.2219 -1.1782 -16.5683 
1975 2 -27.4992 -1.8324 0.3486 -1.4632 -15.6181 
1975 3 -33.1827 -2.2561 -4.3929 -1. 5241 -16.0073 
1975 4 -20.5860 -0.4989 -3.0091 -1.5415 -12.2724 
1975 5 -28.6212 0.0062 -10.9889 -1.3975 -9.0078 
1975 6 -22.3835 -0.2721 -19.1946 -1. 4998 -4.0915 
1975 7 -23.7051 -1.2576 -11.4159 -1. 2068 -2.8001 
1975 8 -26.7082 0.1024 -2.1884 -1. 0368 -0.0667 
1975 9 -18.0363 -2.0892 -2.7781 -1. 0541 1.6430 
1975 10 -17.9981 -2.0917 -8.9404 -1.0303 1.7753 
1975 11 -25.4356 -1.8433 -19.6250 -1.0172 3.4011 
1975 12 -14.3159 -2.5654 -22.1306 -0.9344 3.7538 
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TABLE XIX (continued) 
SERIES AS DETRENDED 
YR MO CC CO IN ER RCL 
1976 1 -21. 4497 -0.1049 -21.8191 -0.5149 5.6899 
1976 2 -14.9760 -0.5016 -19.4143 -0.3935 7.3399 
1976 3 -11.7676 0.1890 -17.1074 -0.2673 8.2162 
1976 4 -12.0633 0.0099 -11.3943 -0.0564 8.9523 
1976 5 -10.5627 -1.2215 -11.7213 0.0956 8.0544 
1976 6 --10.2225 1.0595 -7.9309 -0.1489 8.3920 
1976 7 -8.8035 2.1243 -0.2973 0.1069 8.0130 
1976 8 -9.3112 0.1142 -10.6821 0.0920 7.7475 
1976 9 -15.6052 1.2572 -15.3337 -0.0323 6.5907 
1976 10 -9.3158 1.5529 -22.5896 -0.0415 5.4797 
1976 11 -4.0308 0.6561 -22.2428 0.0997 7.1125 
1976 12 -6.8490 0.8055 -19.2039 0.1251 7.6770 
1977 1 -4.5918 0.8586 -12.9822 0.1195 7.6167 
1977 2 -5.2937 0.6894 -8.0061 0.2941 7.4568 
1977 3 4.5238 0.0267 -3.5256 0.4916 8.7012 
1977 4 -3.0879 1. 3402 -2.2212 0.6812 8.2942 
1977 5 4.2801 2.8818 -5.4675 0.8532 8.1010 
1977 6 -0.2704 2.3725 -16.6857 0.8483 7.3132 
1977 7 0.9555 0.2024 -21.6649 0.7934 7.6540 
1977 8 14.6340 2.1858 -25.3470 0.9003 6.2799 
1977 9 7.5153 3.3827 -25.0817 0.9330 6.3567 
1977 10 6.7855 1.2132 -23.3203 1. 0241 5.9290 
1977 11 9.1517 1.5955 -21.0199 1.3416 5.3161 
1977 12 13.1067 3.5430 -14.6007 1.4168 5.2249 
1978 1 20.5909 2.5570 -9.9179 1.4489 1. 7358 
1978 2 8.8023 4.5969 -8.4065 1. 3894 2.2759 
1978 3 5.9768 2.4405 -3.1490 1. 4018 2.7955 
1978 4 14.8535 2.2726 -2.5837 1.6635 5.8954 
1978 5 27.6730 4.4203 -3.5384 1.7352 4.2809 
1978 6 21.9212 2.4892 -2.9576 1. 9139 3.8239 
1978 7 15.8319 4.0471 -4.7972 1.5957 3.5826 
1978 8 16.4475 4.9982 1.5303 1. 6486 3.4491 
1978 9 22.8175 5.4543 7.1318 1.6392 2.6196 
1978 10 19.6965 8.5031 13.7330 1. 7498 3.5190 
1978 11 20.1814 5.1624 13.2984 1.8061 2.0859 
1978 12 16.2249 2.3178 10.2761 1. 7001 2.0026 
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TABLE XIX (continued) 
SERIES AS DETRENDED 
YR MO CC CO IN ER RCL 
1979 1 18.5631 4.7721 13.2572 1. 7674 0.1218 
1979 2 36.5062 6.2801 24.4319 1.8320 -0.5937 
1979 3 24.9920 8.5347 31.7157 1. 7440 1.7156 
1979 4 26.0083 5.7902 28.3427 1.4086 -3.3548 
1979 5 18.3345 2.7282 26.9792 1.3644 -1. 4512 
1979 6 14.9478 4.0598 25.8566 1. 4315 -3.0121 
1979 7 20.5627 4.1255 26.8667 1. 4759 -2.7195 
1979 8 11. 7645 2.5982 23.0375 1.1986 -3.9363 
1979 9 17.5987 3.3815 22.6320 1.3904 -5.8115 
1979 10 21.1149 3.0681 23.3355 1. 2255 -6.9231 
1979 11 7.0705 4.6844 18.5112 1.1858 -7.6965 
1979 12 8.9581 3.8865 21. 8425 1.2572 -7.3430 
1980 1 23.8220 4.4641 20.7602 1. 0660 -6.8996 
1980 2 5.5958 1.4520 25.8094 0.9808 -8.5694 
1980 3 1.5412 1. 7675 14.8895 0.6783 -12.4833 
1980 4 -4.1625 1.5625 0.3203 0.2854 -16.2682 
1980 5 -9.5417 -1.3962 -9.3797 0.0151 -15.7282 
1980 6 -5.0967 0.3902 -14.1669 -0.1766 -12.9026 
1980 7 -2.0026 1. 9896 -0.6988 -0.2620 -9.4648 
1980 8 -5.2465 1. 2178 12.1416 -0.3348 -7.7346 
1980 9 -12.4368 1.2701 14.5737 -0.2551 -5.3577 
1980 10 -2.8286 1.0806 16.6267 -0.2079 -3.6546 
1980 11 14.5091 1. 7769 16.6124 -0.1422 -3.9043 
1980 12 10.9132 2.6711 4.0957 -0.1785 -6.1455 
1981 1 6.4471 2.4470 -3.3330 -0.0836 -4.3161 
1981 2 6.2881 -0.7205 -12.8313 -0.0517 -2.9424 
1981 3 5.9229 1.6397 -12.0349 0.0793 -1. 3106 
1981 4 1. 4878 3.4572 -12.0609 0.2762 -1.5286 
1981 5 6.4480 1. 5086 -18.8841 0.1671 -5.0396 
1981 6 2.4062 1.1590 -21. 7967 -0.2687 -4.7431 
1981 7 -5.3236 1. 2198 -16.1175 -0.1513 -4.7548 
1981 8 -0.0594 0.6886 -18.5069 -0.2474 -5.7653 
1981 9 -10.7134 0.1732 -25.4215 -0.6806 -7.7446 
1981 10 -4.3570 -0.9368 -31.8253 -0.6007 -9.5634 
1981 11 -7.8192 -0.1336 -37.8333 -0.7431 -10.1266 
1981 12 -7.8075 -1.4943 -43.3570 -1.1111 -11.5714 
260 
TABLE XIX (continued) 
SERIES AS DETRENDED 
YR MO CC CO IN ER RCL 
1982 1 -20.1449 -1. 6344 -41.2107 -1.1481 -14.8717 
1982 2 -14.5362 0.1598 -40.1211 -1.1839 -12.6725 
1982 3 -16.3395 -2.7186 -45.5570 -1. 2884 -12.8359 
1982 4 -18.1677 -3.0826 -46.8273 -1.3896 -14.1924 
1982 5 -22.9399 -5.2855 -43.8534 -1.1377 -12.7073 
1982 6 -11.1904 -5.2938 -52.3588 -1.3530 -13.4633 
1982 7 -18.0081 -5.2611 --51.0109 -1. 4418 -13.2954 
1982 8 -15.5772 -5.5485 -53.2941 -1. 4178 -12.2304 
1982 9 -19.0235 -4.0168 -53.6038 -1.5343 -11.8939 
1982 10 -19.8387 -5.0683 -58.0967 -1.7772 -12.7653 
1982 11 -23.2878 -4.7491 -62.3533 -1. 8230 -10.2101 
1982 12 -23.8158 -3.7282 -62.8802 -1.8572 -8.5256 
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TABLE XX 
COEFFICIENTS FOR THE FORECASTING MODELS 
Investment Model Price-Investment Model 
YR MO CON CC CON CO IN 
1968 1 -0.0481 0.2140 
-0.1312 0.0216 
-0.3370 1968 2 3.6012 1.0342 56.1761 
-7.0217 
-22.7183 1968 3 2.2033 0.7135 60.9305 29.4428 
-22.2324 1968 4 0.1583 0.1249 -35.3640 
-5.4954 13.3507 1968 5 0.1587 0.1228 -0.8108 
-0.6968 0.3023 1968 6 -0.3489 
-0.0605 0.2797 -0.5397 
-0.1119 1968 7 -0.3398 0.0296 
-0.8379 -0.2275 0.2741 1968 8 -0.2813 0.0348 
-0.5817 
-0.3314 0.1859 1968 9 -0.1057 0.0588 
-0.2670 
-0.4821 0.0905 1968 10 -0.0071 0.0820 
-0.0979 
-0.5078 0.0772 1968 11 0.1252 0.0938 -0.0680 
-0.5455 0.1415 1968 12 0.3077 0.0913 
-0.0447 
-0.5379 0.1239 1969 1 0.3043 0.0902 
-0.1578 
-0.4486 0.1884 1969 2 0.3154 0.0901 -0.1421 
-0.4428 0.1795 1969 3 0.3308 0.0907 -0.1159 
-0.4476 0.1672 1969 4 0.1818 0.0065 0.2872 
-0.5400 
-0.0202 1969 5 0.3385 
-0.0085 0.0967 -0.4677 0.0619 1969 6 0.2564 0.0066 0.2023 
-0.3675 0.0145 1969 7 0.2337 0.0084 0.2332 
-0.3944 0.0038 1969 8 0.2527 0.0129 0.2246 
-0.4016 0.0098 1969 9 0.3364 0.0251 0.2078 
-0.4573 0.0213 1969 10 0.2480 0.0421 0.2002 
-0.3135 0.0050 1969 11 0.3068 0.0336 0.2262 
-0.3537 0.0034 1969 12 0.3365 0.0302 0.2436 
-0.3324 0.0060 1970 1 0.3397 0.0302 0.2469 -0.3360 0.0056 1970 " 0.2911 0.0512 0.0430 
-0.0781 0.0278 L.1970 3 0.3029 0.0526 0.0772 
-0.1086 0.0238 1970 4 0.3442 0.0559 0.1895 
-0.1683 0.0102 1970 5 0.3864 0.0577 0.3028 
-0.2420 
-0.0087 1970 6 0.3416 0.0659 0.0144 -0.0344 0.0481 1970 7 0.3314 0.0692 -0.0847 0.0353 0.0691 1970 8 0.3435 0.0567 
-0.0183 0.0063 0.0558 1970 9 0.3399 0.0587 -0.0855 0.0434 0.0701 1970 10 0.3529 0.0564 -0.0155 0.0310 0.0568 1970 11 0.3170 0.0627 -0.1213 0.0631 0.0788 1970 12 0.3229 0.0599 
-0.0735 0.0646 0.0698 
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TABLE XX (continued) 
COEFFICIENTS FOR THE FORECASTING MODELS 
Investment Model Price-Investment Moael 
YR MO CON CC CON CO IN 
1971 1 0.3225 0.0605 -0.0891 0.0711 0.0737 1971 2 0.3325 0.0535 0.0460 0.1193 0.0521 1971 3 0.3260 0.0564 
-0.0761 0.0542 0.0674 1971 4 0.3454 0.0505 0.0253 0.0813 0.0520 1971 5 0.3550 0.0468 0.0991 0.1233 0.0429 1971 6 0.3726 0.0477 0.1661 0.1626 0.0344 1971 7 0~3718 0.0477 0.1633 0.1611 0.0347 1971 8 0.3167 0.0464 0.0962 0.1320 0.0443 1971 9 0.2987 0.0460 0.0560 0.1028 0.0466 1971 10 0.2888 0.0462 0.0513 0.1050 0.0501 1971 11 0.2967 0.0459 0.0771 0.1187 0.0464 1971 12 0.3010 0.0461 0.0926 0.1295 0.0443 1972 1 0.3116 0.0464 0.1137 0.1344 0.0408 1972 2 0.2941 0.0450 0.1005 0.1263 0.0419 1972 3 0.3021 0.0455 0.1174 0.1379 0.0409 1972 4 0.3031 0.0455 0.1184 0.1379 0.0409 1972 5 0.2707 0.0437 0.0887 0.1237 0.0409 1972 6 0.2792 0.0443 0.1006 0.1329 0.0413 1972 7 0.2663 0.0436 0.0834 0.1209 0.0408 1972 8 0.2659 0.0436 0.0851 0.1225 0.0408 1972 9 0.2751 0.0442 0.0927 0.1241 0.0418 1972 10 0.2483 0.0429 0.0451 0.0838 0.0399 1972 11 0.2245 0.0412 0.0314 0.0800 0.0372 1972 12 0.2432 0.0426 0.0559 0.1040 0.0383 1973 1 0.2480 0.0430 0.0595 0.1068 J.0392 1973 2 0.2506 0.0433 0.0606 0.1078 0.0395 1973 3 0.2473 0.0429 0.0598 0.1069 0.0384 1973 4 0.2465 0.0428 0.0599 0.1069 0.0381 1973 5 0.2470 0.0429 0.0591 0.1048 0.0358 1973 6 0.2478 0.0430 0.0607 0.1054 0.0336 1973 7 0.2657 0.0448 0.0763 0.1165 0.0238 1973 8 0.2126 0.0404 0.1057 0.1258 0.0066 1973 9 0.1582 0.0353 0.1795 0.1946 
-0.0075 1973 10 0.1647 0.0362 0.1767 0.1950 
-0.0048 1973 11 0.1503 0.0346 0.1748 0.1921 
-0.0058 1973 12 0.1610 0.0351 0.1767 0.1938 
-0.0047 
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TABLE XX (continued) 
COEFFICIENTS FOR THE FORECASTING MODELS 
Investment Model Price-Investment Model 
YR MO CON CC CON CO IN 
1974 1 0.1648 0.0355 0.1803 0.2002 
-0.0044 1974 2 0.1694 0.0359 0.1815 0.2036 
-0.0041 1974 3 0.1940 0.0347 0.1563 0.1788 -0.0004 1974 4 0.2148 0.0343 0.1422 0.1638 0.0017 1974 5 0.2076 0.0339 0.1446 0.1656 0.0010 1974 6 0.2103 0.0339 0.1457 0.1670 0.0010 1974 7 0.2186 0.0344 0.1448 0.1639 0.0016 1974 8 0.2390 0.0338 0.1497 0.1722 0.0019 1974 9 0.2299 0.0344 0.1629 0.1920 
-0.0001 1974 10 0.2072 0.0358 0.0619 0.0514 0.0041 1974 11 0.1894 0.0347 0.0516 0.0431 0.0038 1974 12 0.1877 0.0348 0.0478 0.0392 0.0039 1975 1 0.1859 0.0355 0.0316 0.0271 0.0045 1975 2 0.1845 0.0360 0.0234 0.0287 0.0045 1975 3 0.2098 0.0262 0.0984 0.0817 0.0014 1975 4 0.2166 0.0226 0.1165 0.0798 0.0010 1975 5 0.2143 0.0245 0.1086 0.1035 0.0004 1975 6 0.2141 0.0251 0.1045 0.1136 0.0002 1975 7 0.2224 0.0228 0.1380 0.1306 
-0.0013 1975 8 0.2242 0.0210 0.1522 0.1392 -0.0019 1975 9 0.2299 0.0190 0.1694 0.1447 -0.0024 1975 10 0.2231 0.0219 0.1444 0.1668 -0.0026 1975 11 0.2261 0.0196 0.1658 0.1805 
-0.0036 1975 12 0.2182 0.0209 0.1485 0.1944 
-0.0034 1976 1 0.2172 0.0211 0.1460 0.1959 
-0.0033 1976 2 0.2175 0.0209 0.1480 0.1953 -0.0034 1976 3 0.2133 0.0213 0.1444 0.2031 -0.0034 1976 4 0.2157 0.0205 0.1554 0.2105 
-0.0040 1976 5 0.2235 0.0198 0.1752 0.2189 -0.0048 1976 6 0.2163 0.0201 0.1457 0.1974 
-0.0033 1976 7 0.2172 0.0201 0.1476 0.1986 -0.0034 1976 8 0.2068 0.0205 0.1394 0.2092 -0.0037 1976 9 0.2041 0.0206 0.1254 0.1957 -0.0029 1976 10 0.2026 0~0206 0.1149 0.1838 -0.0023 1976 11 0.1893 0.0210 0.0674 0.1468 0.0003 1976 12 0.1821 0.0219 0.0152 0.0922 0.0035 
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TABLE XX (continued) 
COEFFICIENTS FOR THE FORECASTING MODELS 
Investment Model Price-Investment Model 
YR MO CON CC CON CO IN 
1977 1 0.2024 0.0213 0.0648 0.1469 0.0005 1977 2 0.2086 0.0214 0.0745 0.1546 0.0000 1977 3 0.2080 0.0214 0.0734 0.1537 0.0000 1977 4 0.2080 0.0214 0.0732 0.1535 0.0001 1977 5 0.2056 0.0214 0.0694 0.1509 0.0002 1977 6 0.1944 0.0208 0.0609 0.1475 0.0005 1977 7 0.2001 0.0209 0.0696 0.1567 0.0000 1977 8 0.1854 0.0201 0.0421 0.1170 0.0019 1977 9 0.1896 0.0203 0.0487 0.1257 0.0015 1977 10 0.1976 0.0206 0.0611 0.1333 0.0008 1977 11 0.1961 0.0205 0.0597 0.1316 0.0009 1977 12 0.2080 0.0213 0.0708 0.1493 0.0001 1978 1 0.2170 0.0218 0.0805 0.1578 
-0.0004 1978 2 0.2193 0.0220 0.0829 0.1602 
-0.0005 1978 3 0.2237 0.0223 0.0854 0.1647 
-0.0007 1978 4 0.2256 0.0225 0.0873 0.1673 
-0.1)008 1978 5 0.2314 0.0229 0.0885 0.1699 
-0.0009 1978 6 0.2389 0.0233 0.0934 0.1762 
-0.0012 1978 7 0.2280 0.0224 0.0866 0.1680 
-0.0008 1978 8 0.1976 0.0192 0.0707 0.1333 0.0004 1978 9 0.2044 0.0198 0.0765 0.1406 0.0001 1978 10 0.2141 0.0206 0.0803 0.1489 
-0.0001 1978 11 0.2025 0.0197 0.0743 0.1308 0.0003 1978 12 0.2078 0.0202 0.0755 0.1347 0.0002 1979 1 0.1971 0.0192 0.0716 0.1060 0.0010 1979 2 0.1184 0.0118 0.0446 0.0275 0.0027 1979 3 0.1533 0.0147 0.0651 0.0403 0.0033 1979 4 0.1591 0.0152 0.0663 0.0457 0.0033 1979 5 0.1410 0.0126 0.0652 0.0297 0.0035 1979 6 0.1217 0.0105 0.0672 0.0019 0.0040 1979 7 0.1265 0.0111 0.0683 0.0078 0.0039 1979 8 0.1303 0.0114 0.0704 0.0090 0.0040 1979 9 0.1369 0.0119 0.0733 0.0136 0.0040 1979 10 0.1640 0.0144 0.0860 0.0345 0.0040 1979 11 0.1485 0.0136 0.0774 0.0308 0.0038 1979 12 0.1499 0.0137 0.0784 0.0316 0.0038 
-< 
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TABLE XX (continued) 
COEFFICIENTS FOR THE FORECASTING MODELS 
Investment Model Price-Investment Model 
YR MO CON CC CON CO IN 
1980 1 0.1695 0.0156 0.0926 0.0418 0.0040 1980 2 0.1935 0.0163 0.0981 0.0572 0.0037 1980 3 0.2007 0.0166 0.1002 0.0603 0.0038 1980 4 0.1355 0.0089 0.0759 0.0133 0.0054 1980 5 0.1182 0.0086 0.0570 0.0112 0.0059 1980 6 0.1041 0.0087 0.0418 0.0075 0.0066 1980 7 0.1266 0.0081 0.0718 0.0143 0.0050 1980 8 0.1467 0,0071 0.1032 0.0046 0.0050 1980 9 0.1588 0.0067 0.1158 0.0020 0.005::! 1980 10 0.1731 0.0065 0.1263 0.0033 0.0053 1980 11 0.1731 0.0065 0.1262 0.0033 0.0053 1980 12 0.1626 0.0071 0.1164 0.0043 0.0051 1981 1 0.1723 0.0069 0.1271 0.0043 0.0050 1981 2 0.1859 0.0079 0.1468 0.0089 0.0042 1981 3 0.1782 0.0075 0.1396 0.0047 0.0048 1981 4 0.1973 0.0079 0.1621 0.0158 0.0031 1981 5 0.1788 0.0075 0.1325 0.0210 0.0038 1981 6 0.1845 0.0076 0.1407 0.0234 0.0032 1981 7 0.2002 0.0076 0.1519 0.0360 0.0016 1981 8 0.2160 0.0080 0.1723 0.0402 0.0005 1981 9 0.2285 0.0080 0.1878 0.0423 
-0.0003 1981 10 0.1954 0.0092 0.1506 0.0350 0.0022 1981 11 0.1475 0.0097 0.0995 0.0294 0.0056 1981 12 0.1704 0.0033 0.1290 0.0304 0.0036 1982 1 0.1741 0.0082 0.1357 0.0295 0.0033 1982 2 0.1707 0.0083 0.1320 0.0295 0.0035 1982 3 0.1651 0.0086 0.1244 0.0312 0.0038 1982 4 0.1566 0.0095 0.1132 0.0336 0.0043 1982 5 0.1581 0.0094 0.1148 0.0338 0.0042 1932 6 0.1719 0.0082 0.1426 0.0246 0.0033 1982 7 0.1581 0.0095 0.1226 0.0313 0.0041 1982 8 0.1357 0.0121 0.0877 0.0482 0.0046 1982 9 0.1153 0.0133 0.0672 0.0580 0.0050 1982 10 0.0997 0.0148 0.0536 0.0645 0.0053 1982 11 0.0998 0.0148 0.0538 0.0644 0.0053 1982 12 0.0969 0.0151 0.0519 0.0649 0.0054 
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TABLE XX (continued) 
COEFFICIENTS FOR THE FORECASTING MODELS 
Labor Model Atheoretical Model 
YR MO CON .ER CON RCL CC 
1968 1 -0.9996 -0.0198 -0.0408 0.1814 -0.0787 
1968 2 -0.5136 -24.4979 0.9241 -0.2125 -1. 4862 
1968 3 -0.4617 12.5865 4.8201 1.6019 0.6767 
1968 4 0.0776 1.8699 -1.1403 -0.4148 -0.8312 
1968 5 0.0814 1.8660 -1.1371 -0.41~7 -0.8289 
1968 6 -0.0922 1.8768 -0.7598 -0.2666 -0.7187 
1968 7 -0.2697 1. 7089 -0.5946 -0.0239 -0.4578 
1968 8 -0.2299 1.8798 -0.5076 -0.0145 -0.4317 
1968 9 -0.1181 2.2447 -0.2073 0.0319 -0.3045 
1968 10 0.0332 2.2289 -0.1018 0.0567 -0.3008 
1968 11 0.1965 1.6210 0.0470 0.0712 -0.2794 
1968 12 0.3593 1.1262 0.2734 0.0757 -0.1889 
1969 1 0.4120 0.9028 0.2814 0.0784 -0.1847 
1969 2 0.4234 0.9096 0.2891 0.0779 -0.1926 
1969 3 0.4437 0.9689 0.3026 0.0781 -0.1968 
1969 4 0.2668 0.7452 0.1516 -0.0034 -0.3712 
1969 5 0.3818 1.3885 0.3250 -0.0188 -0.3349 
1969 6 0.2880 1. 0601 0.2354 0.0018 -0.2315 
1969 7 0.2605 0.9677 0.2125 0.0044 -0.1999 
1969 8 0.2852 0.9276 0.2307 0.0087 -0.2027 
1969 9 0.3682 1. 2634 0.3385 0.0250 -0.0409 
1969 10 0.2722 1.0504 0.2497 0.0421 -0.0360 
1969 11 0.3006 1.1875 0.3080 0.0337 -0.0542 
1969 12 0.3230 1.2045 0.3374 0.0303 -0.0621 
1970 1 0.3259 1. 2080 0.3403 0.0304 -0.0662 
1970 2 0.2011 1. 2361 0.2920 0.0512 -0.0738 
1970 3 0.2218 1. 2568 0.2944 0.0515 -0.0858 
1970 4 0.2875 1.1591 0.3435 0.0556 -0.0419 
1970 5 0.3563 0.6993 0.3871 0.0576 -0.0159 
1970 6 0.2847 1.1265 0.3501 0.0640 -0.0935 
1970 7 0.2534 1.3638 0.3393 0.0675 -0.0907 
1970 8 0.2668 0.9908 0.3532 0.0550 -0.1174 
1970 9 0.2613 1.2349 0.3509 0.0564 -0.1216 
1970 10 0.2706 1. 0307 0.3643 0.0540 -0.1381 
1970 11 0.2626 1. 3632 0.3331 ,0.0594 -0.1609 
1970 12 0.2627 1. 2134 0.3407 0.0566 -0.1913 
' .. 
267 
TABLE XX (continued) 
COEFFICIENTS FOR THE FORECASTING MODELS 
Labor Model Atheoretica1 Model 
YR MO CON ER CON RCL CC 
1971 1 0.2604 1.3395 0.3401 0.0574 
-0.1909 1971 2 0.2608 1.0761 0.3346 0.0530 
-0.0148 1971 3 0.2622 1.1725 0.3334 0.0542 
-0.0489 1971 4 0.2712 0.9677 0.3564 0.0472 
-0.0784 1971 5 0.2690 0.8145 0.3662 0.0435 
-0.0806 1971 6 0.2619 0.6572 0.3840 0.0450 
-0.0667 1971 7 0.2617 0.6603 0.3830 0.0451 
-0.0662 1971 8 0.2503 0.7467 0.3487 0.0414 
-0.1301 1971 9 0.2519 0.7819 0.3210 0.0420 
-0.1019 1971 10 0.2478 0.8007 0.3046 0.0431 
-0.0792 1971 11 0.2545 0.7893 0.3123 0.0429 
-0.0775 1971 12 0.2581 0.7855 0.3165 0.0431 
-0.0771 1972 1 0.2682 0.7838 0.3269 0.0436 
-0.0729 1972 2 0.2576 0.7734 0.3115 0.0420 
-0.0800 1972 3 0.2672 0.7842 0.3182 0.0432 
-0.0637 1972 4 0.2683 0.7854 0.3193 0.0432 
-0.0638 1972 5 0.2398 0.7550 0.2873 0.0414 
-0.0652 1972 6 0.2505 0.7740 0.2958 0.0419 
-0.0655 1972 7 0.2325 0.7427 0.2809 0.0415 
-0.0592 
1972 8 0.2337 0.7449 0.2802 0.0414 
-0.0589 1972 9 0.2449 0.7666 0.2890 0.0422 
-0.0548 1972 10 0.2020 0.6848 0.2676 0.0404 
-0.0705 1972 11 0.1694 0.6143 0.2~33 0.0388 
-0.0693 1972 12 0.19:::5 0.6598 0.2611 0.0406 
-0.0603 
1973 1 0.2021 0.6749 0.2660 0.C411 
-0.0589 
1973 2 0.2061 0.6834 0.2686 0.0414 
-0.0577 
1973 3 0.2030 0.6759 0.2645 0.0411 
-0.0556 1973 4 0.2051 0.6797 0.2637 0.0410 
-0.0556 
1973 5 0.2152 0.7059 0.2634 0.0410 
-0.0555 
1973 6 0.2181 0.7142 0.2619 0.0409 
-0.0542 
1973 7 0.2342 0.7593 0.2792 0.0425 
-0.0571 
1973 8 0.1669 0.5805 0.2152 0.0398 
-0.0119 
1973 9 0.1024 0.3818 0.1566 0.0359 0.0117 
1973 10 0.1179 0.4271 0.1635 0.0367 0.0098 1973 11 0.1064 0.3993 0.1488 0.0352 0.0119 
1973 12 0.1160 0.4237 0.1587 0.0359 0.0167 
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TABLE XX (continued) 
COEFFICIENTS FOR THE FORECASTING MODELS 
Labor Model Atheoretical Model 
YR MO CON ER CON RCL CC 
1974 1 0.1209 0.4387 0.1620 0.0364 0.0187 
1974 2 0.1248 0.4512 0.1679 0.0365 0.0121 
1974 3 0.1379 0.4899 0.1973 0.0333 
-0.0293 
1974 4 0.1485 0.5200 0.2190 0.0323 
-0.0440 
1974 5 0.1412 0.4996 0.2122 0.0317 
-0.0474 
1974 6 0.1427 0.5033 0.2150 0.0314 
-0.0525 
1974 7 0.1501 0.5153 0.2232 0.0319 
-0.0546 
1974 8 0.1633 0.5375 0.2436 0.0308 
-0.0654 
1974 9 0.1486 0.5180 0.2339 0.0317 -0.0604 
1974 10 0.1142 0.4700 0.2084 0.0345 
-0.0303 
1974 11 0.1009 0.4614 0.1897 0.0344 
-0.0075 
1974 12 0.0985 0.4608 0.1879 0.0346 
-0.0051 
1975 1 0.0901 0.4628 0.1862 0.0357 0.0058 
1975 2 0.0835 0.4720 0.1851 0.0365 0.0143 
1975 3 0.1283 0.3531 0.2074 0.0252 
-0.0487 
1975 4 0.1443 0.2892 0.2146 0.0217 
-0.0425 
1975 5 0.1348 0.3368 0.2125 0.0238 
-0.0366 
1975 6 0.1313 0.3554 0.2121 0.0242 
-0.0407 
1975 7 0.1458 0.2778 0.2224 0.0226 
-0.0067 
1975 8 0.1521 0.2482 0.2250 0.0216 0.0172 
1975 9 0.1618 0.1980 0.2308 0.0198 0.0219 
1975 10 0.1443 0.2632 0.2233 0.0218 
-0.0015 
1975 11 0.1535 0.2364 0.2264 0.0197 0.0037 
1975 12 0.1425 0.2692 0.2186 (;.O21~ 0.0094 
1976 ... 0.1411 0.2733 0.2176 0.C214 0.0083 
1976 2 0.1420 0.2707 0.2179 0.0212 0.0077 
1976 3 0.1376 0.2816 0.2136 0.0214 0.0025 
1976 4 0.1421 0.2774 0.2160 0.0208 0.0053 
1976 5 0.1522 0.2716 0.2238 0.0201 0.0070 
1976 6 0.1423 0.2740 0.2166 0.0204 0.0057 
1976 7 0.1433 0.2743 0.2174 0.0203 0.0047 
1976 8 0.1268 0.2651 0.2071 0.0208 0.0056 
1976 9 0.1231 0.2650 0.2044 0.C209 0.0073 
1976 10 0.1210 0.2638 0.2029 0.0210 0.0080 
1976 11 0.1018 0.2533 0.1902 0.0220 0.0225 
1976 12 0.0852 0.2485 0.1839 0.0233 0.0350 
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TABLE XX (continued) 
COEFFICIENTS FOR THE FORECASTING MODELS 
Labor Model Atheoretical Model 
YR MO CON ER CON RCL CC 
1977 1 0.1075 0.2545 0.2036 0.0235 0.0525 
1977 2 0.1135 0.2579 0.2096 0.0237 0.0539 
1977 3 0.1128 0.2575 0.2091 0.0237 0.0540 
1977 4 0.1127 0.2574 0.2091 0.0237 0.0540 
1977 5 0.1098 0.2547 0.2065 0.0236 0.0525 
1977 6 0.10l1 0.2434 0.1955 0.0231 0.0534 
1977 7 0.1065 0.2519 0.2012 0.0231 0.0524 
1977 8 0.0930 0.2272 0.1870 0.0225 0.0560 
1977 9 0.0969 0.2342 0.1911 0.0227 0.0567 
1977 10 0.1038 0.2463 0.1996 0.0228 0.0513 
1977 11 0.1029 0.2447 0.1981 0.0227 0.0510 
1977 12 0.1127 0.2638 0.2101 0.0234 0.0506 
1978 1 0.1197 0.2783 0.2192 0.0239 0.0496 
1978 2 0.1214 0.2825 0.2215 0.0241 0.0499 
1978 3 0.1244 0.2906 0.2267 0.0243 0.0443 
1978 4 0.1262 0.2952 0.2283 0.0245 0.0450 
1978 5 0.1298 0.3046 0.2337 0.0249 0.0470 
1978 6 0.1342 0.3159 0.2394 0.0256 0.0548 
1978 7 0.1265 0.2930 0.2289 0.0248 0.0583 
1978 8 0.1121 0.2487 0.1978 0.0213 0.0525 
1978 9 0.1163 0.2629 0.2039 0.0220 0.0537 
1978 10 0.1222 0.2797 0.2131 0.0228 0.0553 
1978 11 0.1149 0.2583 0.2016 0.0218 0.0563 
1978 12 0.1188 0.2695 0.2053 0.0223 0.0585 
1979 1 0.1127 0.2505 0.1348 0.0214 0.0616 
1979 2 0.0704 0.1140 0.1155 0.0133 0.0429 
1979 3 0.0909 0.1750 0.1535 0.0155 0.0192 
1979 4 0.0940 0.1850 0.1592 0.0160 0.0192 
1979 5 0.0873 0.1622 0.1415 0.0123 -0.0092 
1979 6 0.0780 0.1337 0.1223 0.0116 0.0265 
1979 7 0.0814 0.1409 0.1265 0.0123 0.0319 
1979 8 0.0839 0.1460 0.1304 0.0125 0.0302 
1979 9 0.0880 0.1550 0.1367 0.0131 0.0328 
1979 10 0.1057 0.1963 0.1644 0.0155 0.0268 
1979 11 0.0950 0.1795 0.1496 0.0151 0.0383 
1979 12 0.0959 0.1815 0.1511 0.0152 0.0380 
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TABLE XX (continued) 
COEFFICIENTS FOR THE FORECASTING MODELS 
Labor Model Atheoretical Model 
YR MO CON ER CON RCL CC 
1980 1 0.1125 0.2084 0.1705 0.0171 0.0391 1980 2 0.1268 0.2302 0.1938 0.0182 0.0481 1980 3 0.1309 0.2373 0.2005 0.0186 0.0514 1980 4 0.0832 0.1799 0.1377 0.0124 0.0829 1980 5 0.0695 0.1664 0.1269 0.0134 0.1100 1980 6 0.0569 0.1615 0.1199 0.0141 0.1269 1980 7 0.0787 0.1584 0.1414 0.0138 0.1319 1980 8 0.1000 0.1496 0.1553 0.0138 0.1468 1980 9 0.1154 0.1408 0.1610 0.0141 0.1551 1980 10 0.1352 0.1282 0.1710 0.0143 0.1627 1980 11 0.1352 0.1282 0.1708 0.0143 0.1625 1980 12 0.1226 0.1361 0.1588 0.0147 0.1568 1981 1 0.1353 0.1286 0.1693 0.0144 0.1548 1981 2 0.1582 0.1162 0.1873 0.0149 0.1400 1981 3 0.1488 0.1216 0.1775 0.0138 0.1279 1981 4 0.1755 0.1086 0.1908 0.0147 0.1391 1981 5 0.1541 0.1184 0.1700 0.0132 0.1186 1981 6 0.1613 0.1161 0.1757 0.0133 0.1186 1981 7 0.1773 0.1148 0.1997 0.0116 0.0831 1981 8 0.1965 0.1106 0.2144 0.0121 0.0871 1981 9 0.2138 0.0989 0.2267 0.0122 0.0876 1981 10 0.1761 0.1202 0.1970 0.0140 0.1033 1981 11 0.1206 0.1569 0.1604 0.0159 0.1358 1981 12 0.1500 0.1264 0.1867 0.0129 0.1109 1982 1 0.1550 0.1216 0.1905 0.01~8 0.11~0 1982 2 0.1508 0.1261 0.1880 0.0130 0.1118 1982 3 0.1436 0.1358 0.1852 0.0134 0.1167 1982 4 0.1326 0.1509 0.1742 0.0142 0.1112 1982 5 0.1348 0.1479 0.1758 0.0140 0.1108 1982 6 0.1544 0.1191 0.1903 0.0121 0.0990 1982 7 0.1367 0.1462 0.1743 0.0133 0.0936 1982 8 0.1077 0.1854 0.1577 0.0160 0.1046 1982 9 0.0857 0.2190 0.1374 0.0172 0.1049 1982 10 0.0686 0.2461 0.1198 0.0186 0.1004 1982 11 0.0687 0.2460 0.1198 0.0186 0.1004 1982 12 0.0657 0.2510 0.1178 0.0189 0.1019 
